Full text of "Plotinos : complete works, in chronological order, grouped in four periods : with biography by Porphyry, Eunapius, & Suidas, commentary by Porphyry, illustrations by Jamblichus & Ammonius, studies in sources, development influence, index of subjects, thoughts and words."

See other formats

'■'c \

LIT Y

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2011 with funding from

University of Toronto

http://www.archive.org/details/plotinoscomplete01plot

PLOTINOS
Complete Works

i\i Chronological Order, Grouped In Four Periods,

With

BIOGRAPHY by Porphyry, Eunapius & Suidas

COMMENTARY by Porphyry,

ILLUSTRATIONS by Jamblichus & Ammonius

STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence;

INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts, and Words.

by
Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie,

Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewance;

A.M., Sewanee and Harvardj Ph.D., Tulane and Columbia;

M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia.

Vol. I
Biographies; Amelian Books, i-2i.

PLATONIST PRESS
P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N. J., U.S.A.

All Rights Including that of Translation, Reserved

International Copyright Secured.

THE INSTITUTE CF WEDIAFVAL STUDIES
10 El Z

FOREWORD

It is only with mixed feelings that such a work can be
published. Overshadowing all is the supreme duty to
the English-speaking world, and secondarily to the rest
of humanity to restore to them in an accessible form
their, till now, unexploited spiritual heritage, with its
flood of light on the origins of their favorite philosophy.
And then comes the contrast — the pitiful accomplish-
ment. Nor could it be otherwise; for there are pas-
sages that never can be interpreted perfectly; more-
over, the writer would gladly have devoted to it every
other leisure moment of his life — but that was im-
possible. As a matter of fact, he would have made this
translation at the beginning of his life, instead of at its
end, had it not been for a mistaken sense of modesty;
but as no one offered to do it, he had to do it himself.
If he had done it earlier, his ''Philosophy of Plotinos"
would have been a far better work.

Indeed, if it was not for the difficulty and expense
of putting it out, the writer would now add to the text
an entirely new summary of Plotinos's views. The
fairly complete concordance, however, should be of
service to the student, and help to rectify the latest
German summary of Plotinos, that by Drews, which
in its effort to furnish a foundation for Hartmann's
philosophy of the unconscious, neglected both origins
and spiritual aspects. However, the present genetic

2 FOREWORD

insight of Plotinos's development should make forever
impossible that theory of cast-iron coherence, which is
neither historical nor human.

The writer, having no thesis such as Drews' to
justify, will welcome all corrections and suggestions.
He regrets the inevitable uncertainties of capitalization
(as between the supreme One, Intelligence World-Soul
and Daemon or guardian, and the lower one, intel-
ligence, soul and demon or gyardian) ; and any other
inconsistencies of which he may have been guilty; and
he beseeches the mantle of charity in view of the
stupendousness of the undertaking, in which he prac-
ticaly could get no assistance of any kind, and also in
view of the almost insuperable difficulties of his own
career. He, however, begs to assure the reader that
he 4id exerything ''ad majorem Dei gloriam,"

INDEX.

PLOTINOS' COMPLETE WORKS.

Preface 1

Concordance of Enneads and Chronological

Numbers 2

Concordance of Chronological Numbers and

Enneads 3

Biography of Plotinos, by Porphyry 5

Biographies by Eunapius and Suidas 39

Amelian Books, 1-21 40

Amelio-Porphyrian Books, 22-i3 283

Porphyrian Books, 34-45 641

Eustochian Books, 46-54 1017

PLOTINIC STUDIES

IN SOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE.

1. Development in the Teachings of Plotinos. . 1269

2. Platonism: Significance, Progress, and Re-

sults 1288

3. Plotinos' View of Matter 1 296

4. Plotinos' Creation of the Trinity 1300

5. Resemblances to Christianity 1307

6. Indebtedness to Numenius 1313

7. Value of Plotinos 1327

Concordance to Plotinos

An outline of the doctrines of Plotinos is published
under the title *The Message of Plotinos.''

CONCORDANCE OF ENNEADS AND
CHRONOLOGICAL NUMBERS

iii.l

v.l

i.2

iii.2

V.2

i.3

iii.3

V.3

i.4

iii.4

V.4

i.5

iii.5

V.5

iii.6

V.6

i.7

iii.7

V.7

iii.8

V.8

iii.9

V.9

ii.l

iv.l

vi.l

ii.2

iv.2

vi.2

ii.3

iv.3

vi.3

ii.4

iv.4

vi.4

ii.5

iv.5

vi.5

n.6

iv.6

vi.6

ii.7

iv.7

vi.7

ii.8

iv.8

•

vL8

ii.9

iv.9

vi.9

CONCORDANCE OF CHRONOLOGICAL

NUMBERS AND ENNEADS

i.2

ii.7

iv.7

i.3

vL7

iii.l
iv.l

iv.2

39
40

vi.8

vi.4 ■'^'

ii.l

V.9

vi.5

iv.6

iv.8

V.6

vi.l

V.4

ii.5

vi.2

iv.9

iii.6

vi.3

vi.9

iv.3

iii.7

v.l

iv.4

V.2

iv.5

iii.2

ii.4

iii.8

iii.3

iii.9

V.8

V.3

ii.2

V.5

iii.5

iii.4
L9

ii.9

51
52

vi.6

ii.3

ii.6

ii.8

i.l

V.7

i.5

%ifc of (Motinos

Hnb ©rbet of Ibis Mritinos

By PORPHYRY.
(Written when about 70 years of age, see 23.)

I. PLOTINOS, LIKE PORPHYRY, DESPISED HIS PHY-
SICAL NATURE, BUT A PICTURE OF HIM WAS
SECURED.

Plotinos the philosopher, who lived recently, seemed
ashamed of having a body. Consequently he never
spoke of his family or home (Lycopolis, now Syout, in
the Thebaid, in Egypt). He never would permit any-
body to perpetuate him in a portrait or statue. One
day that Amelius* begged him to allow a painting to
be made of him, he said, *'ls it not enough for me to
have to carry around this imagef, in which nature has
enclosed us? Must I besides transmit to posterity the
image of this image as worthy of attention?" As
Amelius never succeeded in getting Plotinos to recon-
sider his refusal, and to consent to give a sitting,
Amelius begged his friend Carterius, the most famous
painter of those times, to attend Plotinos's lectures,
which were free to all. By dint of gazing at Plotinos,
Carterius so filled his own imagination with Plotinos's
features that he succeeded in painting them from
memory. By his advice, Amelius directed Carterius in
these labors, so that this portrait was a very good like-

*See 7, tSee vi. 7. 8.

6 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

ness. All this occurred without the knowledge of
Plotinos.

II. SICKNESS AND DEATH OF PLOTINOS; HIS BIRTH-
DAY UNKNOWN.

Plotinos was subject to chronic digestive disorders;
nevertheless, he never was willing to take any remedies,
on the plea that it was unworthy of a man of his age to
relieve himself by such means. Neither did he ever
take any of the then popular "wild animal remedy,"
because, said he, he did not even eat the flesh of do-
mestic animals, let alone that of savage ones. He
never bathed, contenting himself with daily massage
at home. But when at the period of the plague, which
was most virulent,* the man who rubbed him died of
it, he gave up the massage. This interruption in his
habits brought on him a chronic quinsy, which never
became very noticeable, so long as I remained with
him; but after I left him, it became aggravated to the
point that his voice, formerly sonorous and powerful,
became permanently hoarse; besides, his vision became
disturbed, and ulcers appeared on his hands and feet.
All this I learned en my return, from my friend Eusto-
chius, who remained with him until his end. These
inconveniences hindered his friends from seeing him
as often as they used to do, though he persisted in his
former custom of speaking to each one individually.
The only solution of this difficulty was for him to leave
Rome. He retired into Campania, on an estate that
had belonged to Zethus, one of his friends who had
died earlier. All he needed was furnished by the estate
itself, or was brought to him from the estate at Min-
turnae, owned by Castricius (author of a Commentarv
on Plato's Parmenides, to whom Porphyry dedicated
his treatise on Vegetarianism). Eustochius himself
told me that he happened to be at Puzzoli at the time

*A. D. 262.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 7

of Plotinos's death, and that he was slow in reaching
the bedside of Plotinos. The latter then said to him,
"I have been waiting for you; I am trying to unite what
is divine in us* to that which is divine in the universe."
Then a serpent, who happened to be under Plotinos's
death-bed slipped into a hole in the wall (as happened
at the death of Scipio Africanus, Pliny, Hist. Nat. xv.
44), and Plotinos breathed his last. At that time
Plotinos was 66 years old (in 270, born in 205), ac-
cording to the account of Eustochius. The emperor
Claudius II was then finishing the second year of his
reign. I was at Lilybaeum; Amelius was at Apamaea in
Syria, Castricius in Rome, and Eustochius alone was
with Plotinos. If we start from the second year of
Claudius II and go back 66 years, we will find that
Plotinos's birth falls in the 18th year of Septimus
Severus (205). He never would tell the month or
day of his birth, because he did not approve of cele-
brating his birth-day either by sacrifices, or banquets.
Still he himself performed a sacrifice, and entertained
his friends on the birth-days of Plato and Socrates;
and on those days those who could do it had to write
essays and read them to the assembled company.

III. PLOTINOS'S EARLY EDUCATION.

This is as much as we learned about him during:
various interviews with him. At eight years of age
he was already under instruction by a grammarian,
though the habit of uncovering his nurse's breast to
suck her milk, with avidity, still clung to him. One
day, however, she so complained of his importunity
that he became ashamed of himself, and ceased doing:
so.^ At 28 years of age he devoted himself entirely to
philosophy. He was introduced to the teachers who
at that time were the most famous in Alexandria. He
would return from their lectures sad and discouraged.

♦See vi. 5. 1.

8 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

He communicated the cause of this grief to one of his
friends, who led him to Ammonius, with whom Plo-
tinos was not acquainted. As soon as he heard this
philosopher, he said to his friend, 'This is the man 1
was looking for!" From that day forwards he remained
close to Ammonius. So great a taste for philosophy
did he develop, that he made up his mind to study
that which was being taught among the Persians, and
among the Hindus. When emperor Gordian prepared
himself for his expedition against the Persians, Plo-
tinus, then 39 years old, followed in the wake of the
army. He had spent between 10 to 11 years near
Ammonius. After Gordian was killed in Mesopotamia,
Plotinos had considerable trouble saving himself at
Antioch. He reached Rome while Philip was emperor,
and when he himself was 5o years of age.

THE SCHOOL OF AMMONIUS.
Herennius, (the pagan) Origen, and Plotinos had
agreed to keep secret the teachings they had received
from Ammonius. Plotinos carried out his agreement.
Herennius was the first one to break it, and Crimen
followed his example. The latter limited himself to
writing a book entitled, "Of Daemons;" and, under
the reign of Gallienus, he wrote another one to prove
that 'The Emperor alone is the Only Poet" (if the
book was a flattery; which is not likely. Therefore
it probably meant: 'The King (of the universe, that
is, the divine Intelligence), is the only 'demiurgic'
Creator.")

PLOTINOS AN UNSYSTEMATIC TEACHER.

For a long period Plotinos did not write anything.
He contented himself with teaching orally what he had
learned from Ammonius. He thus passed ten whole
years teaching a few pupils, without committing any-
thing to writing. However, as he allowed his pupils

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 9

to question him, it often happened that his school was
disorderly, and that there were useless discussions, as I
later heard from Amelius.

AMELIUS, PLOTINOS'S FIRST SECRETARY.
Amelius enrolled himself among the pupils of Plo-
tinos during the third year of Plotinos's stay in Rome,
which also was the third year of the reign of Claudius
II, that is, 24 years. Amelius originally had been a
disciple of the Stoic philosopher Lysimachus.* Ame-
lius surpassed all his fellow-pupils by his systematic
methods of study. He had copied, gathered, and al-
most knew by heart all the works of Numenius. He
composed a hundred copy-books of notes taken at the
courses of Plotinos, and he gave them as a present to
his adopted son, Hostilianus Hesychius, of Apamea.
(Fragments of Amelius's writings are found scattered
in those of Proclus, Stobaeus, Olympiodorus, Damas-
cius, and many of the Church Fathers.)

IV. HOW PORPHYRY CAME TO PLOTINOS. FOR THE
FIRST TIME. IN 253.

In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, I (then
being twenty years of age), left Greece and went to
Rome with Antonius of Rhodes. I found there Amelius,
who had been following the courses of Plotinos for
eighteen years. He had not yet dared to write any-
thing, except a few books of notes, of which there were
not yet as many as a hundred. In this tenth year of
the reign of Gallienus, Plotinos was fifty-nine years
old. When I (for the second, and more important
time) joined him, I was thirty years of age. During
the first year of Gallienus, Plotinos began to write
upon some topics of passing interest, and in the tenth
year of Gallienus, when I visited him for the first time.
he had written twenty-one books, which had been
circulated only among a very small number of friends.

♦See 20.

10 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

They were not given out freely, and it was not easy
to go through them. They were communicated to
to students only under precautionary measures, and
after the judgment of those who received them had
been carefully tested.

PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE FIRST PERIOD
(THE AMELIAN PERIOD).

I shall mention the books that Plotinos had alreadv
written at that time. As he had prefixed no titles to
them, several persons gave them different ones. Here
are those that have asserted themselves:

1. Of the Beautiful. i. 6.

2. Of the Immortality of the Soul. iv. 7.

3. Of Fate. iii. 1.

4. Of the Nature of the Soul. iv. 1.

5. Of Intelligence, of Ideas, and of Existence, v. 9.

6. Of the Descent of the Soul into the Body. iv. 8.

7. How does that which is Posterior to the First

Proceed from Him? Of the One. v. 4.

8. Do all the Souls form but a Single Soul? iv. 9.

9. Of the Good, or of the One. vi. 9.

10. Of the Three Principal Hypostatic Forms of

Existence, v. 1.

11. Of Generation, and of the Order of Things after

the First, v. 2.

12. (Of the Two) Matters, (the Sensible and In-

telligible), ii. 4.

13. Various Considerations, iii. 9.

14. Of the (Circular) Motion of the Heavens, ii. .2.

15. Of the Daemon Allotted to Us, iii. 4.

16. Of (Reasonable) Suicide, i. 9.

1 7. Of Quality, ii. 6.

18. Are there Ideas of Individuals? v. 7.

19. Of Virtues. i. 2.

20. Of Dialectics. i. 3

21. (How does the Soul keep the Mean between In-

divisible Nature and Divisible Nature? ) iv. 2

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 11

These twenty-one books were already written when
I visited Plotinos; he was then in the fifty-ninth year
of his age.

V. HOW PORPHYRY CAME TO PLOTINOS FOR THE
SECOND TIME (A. D. 263-269).

I remained with him this year, and the five follow-
ing ones. I had already visited Rome ten years pre-
viously; but at that time Plotinos spent his summers
in vacation, and contented himself with instructing: his
visitors orally.

During the above-mentioned six years, as several
questions had been cleared up in the lectures of Plo-
tinos, and at the urgent request of Amelius and mv-
self that he write them down, he wrote two books to
prove that

PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE SECOND PERIOD
(THE PORPHRYRIAN PERIOD).

22. The One and Identical Existence is Everywhere

Entire, I, vi. 4.

23. Second Part Thereof. vi. 5.
Then he wrote the book entitled:

24. The Superessential Transcendent Principle Does

Not Think. Which is the First Thinking
Principle? And Which is the Second.? v. 6.
He also wrote the following books:

25. Of Potentiality and Actualization. ii. 5.

26. Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities, iii. 6.

27. Of the Soul, First Part. iv. 3.

28. Of the Soul, Second Part. iv. 4.

29. (Of the Soul, Third; or. How do We See? ) iv. 5.

30. Of Contemplation. iii. 8.

31. Of Intelligible Beauty. v. 8.

32. The Intelligible Entities are not Outside of In-

telligence. Of Intelligence and of Soul. v. 5.

33. Against the Gnostics. ii. 9.

{To he continued.)

12 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

34. Of Numbers. vi. 6.

35. Why do Distant Objects Seem Small ? ii. 8.

36. Does Happiness (Consist in Duration?) i. 5.

37. Of the Mixture with Total Penetration. ii. 7.

38. Of the Multitude of Ideas; Of the Good. vi. 7.

39. Of the Will. vi. 8.

40. (Of the World). ii. 1.

41. Of Sensation, and of Memory. iv. 6.

42. Of the Kinds of Existence, First. vi. 1.

43. Of the Kinds of Existence, Second. vi. 2.

44. Of the Kinds of Existence, Third. vi. 3.

45. Of Eternity and Time. iii. 7.

Plotinos wrote these twenty-four books during the
six years I spent with him; as subjects he would take
the problems that happened to come up, and which we
have indicated by the titles of these books. These
twenty-four books, joined to the twenty-on^ Plotinos
had written before I came to him, make forty-five.

VI. PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE THIRD PERIOD
(THE EUSTOCHIAN PERIOD).

While I was in Sicily, where I went in the fifteenth
year of the reign of Gallienus, he wrote five new books
that he sent me:

46. Of Happiness. i. 4.

47. Of Providence, First. iii. 2.

48. Of Providence, Second. iii. 3.

49. Of the Hypostases that Act as Means of Knowl-

edge, and of the Transcendent. v. 3.

50. Of Love. iii. 5.

These books he sent me in the last year of the reign
of Claudius II, and at the beginning of the second.

Shortly before dying, he sent me the following four
books:

(To be continued.)

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 13

51. Of the Nature of Evils. i. 8.

52. Of the Influence of the Stars. ii. 3.

53. What is the Animal ? What is Man ? 1. 1 .

54. Of the First Good (or, of Happiness). i. 7.

These nine books, with the forty-five previously
written, make in all fifty-four.

Some were composed during the youth of the author,
others when in his bloom, and finally the last, when
his body was already seriously weakened; and they
betray his condition while writing them. The twenty-
one first books seem to indicate a spirit which does
not yet possess all its vigor and firmness. Those that
he wrote during the middle of his life, show that his
genius was then in its full form. These twenty-four
books may be considered to be perfect, with the excep-
tion of a few passages. The last nine are less power-
ful than the others; and of these nine, the last four are
the weakest.

VII. VARIOUS DISCIPLES OF PLOTINOS.

Plotinos had a great number of auditors and dis-
ciples, who were attracted to his courses by love of
philosophy.

Among this number was Amelius of Etruria, whose
true name was Gentilianus. He did indeed insist that
in his name the letter *1" should be replaced by "r,"
so that his name should read "Amerius,*' from "ameria''
(meaning indivisibility, though Suidas states that it was
derived from the town of Ameria, in the province of
Umbria), and not Amelius, from "amellia" (negli-
gence) .

A very zealous disciple of Plotinos was a physician
from Scythopolis (or, Bethshean, in Palestine), named
Paulinus, whose mind was full of ill-digested informa-
tion, and whom Amelius used to call Mikkalos (the
tiny).

14 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

Eustochius of Alexandria, also a physician, knew
Plotinos at the end of his life, and remained with him
until his death, to care for him. Exclusively occupied
with the teachings of Plotinos, he himself became a
genuine philosopher.

Zoticus, also, attached himself to Plotinos. He was
both critic and poet; he corrected the works of Anti-
machus, and beautifully versified the fable of the
Atlantidae. His sight gave out, however, and he died
shortly before Plotinos. Paulinus also, died before
Plotinos.

Zethus was one of the disciples of Plotinos. He
was a native of Arabia, and had married the daughter
of Theodosius, friend of Ammonius. He was a phy-
sician, and much beloved by Plotinos, who sought to
lead him to withdraw from public aflfairs, for which he
had considerable aptitude; and with which he occupied
himself with zeal. Plotinos lived in very close rela-
tions with him; he even retired to the country estate
of Zethus, distant six miles from Minturnae.

Castricius, surnamed Firmus, had once owned this
estate. Nobody, in our times, loved virtue more than
Firmus. He held Plotinos in the deepest veneration.
He rendered Amelius the same services that might have
been rendered by a good servant, he displayed for me
the attentions natural towards a brother. Neverthe-
less this man, who was so attached to Plotinos, re-
mained engaged in public aflfairs.

Several senators, also, came to listen to Plotinos.
Marcellus, Orontius, Sabinillus and Rogatianus applied
themselves, under Plotinos, to the study of philosophy.

The latter, who also was a member of the senate,
had so detached himself from the aflfairs of life, that
he had abandoned all his possessions, dismissed all his
attendants, and renounced all his dignities. On being
appointed praetor, at the moment of being inaugurated,
while the lictors were already waiting for him, he re-
fused to sally forth, and carry out any of the functions

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 15

of this dignity. He even failed to dwell in his own
house (to avoid needless pomp) ; he visited his friends,
boarding and sleeping there; he took food only every
other day; and by this dieting, after having been af-
flicted with gout to the point of having to be carried
around in a litter, he recovered his strength, and
stretched out his hands as easily as any artisan, though
formerly his hands had been incapacitated. Plotinos
was very partial to him; he used to praise him publicly,
and pointed him out as a model to all who desired to
become philosophers.

Another disciple of Plotinos was Serapion of Alex-
andria. At first he had been a rhetorician, and only
later applied himself to philosophy. Nevertheless he
never was able to cure himself of fondness for riches,
or usury.

Me also, Porphyry, a native of Tyre, Plotinos ad-
mitted to the circle of his intimate friendf, and he
charged me to give the final revision to his works.

VIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS.

Once Plotinos had written something, he could
neither retouch, nor even re-read what he had done,
because his weak eyesight made any reading very
painful. His penmanship was poor. He did not sepa'-
rate words, and his spelling was defective; he was
chiefly occupied with ideas. Until his death he con-
tinuously persisted in this habit, which was for us all
a subject of surprise. When he had finished composing
something in his head, and when he then wrote what
he had meditated on, it seemed as if he copied a book.
Neither in conversation nor in discussion did he allow
himself to be distracted from the purpose of his
thoughts, so that he was able at the same time to attend
to the needs of conversation, while pursuing the medi-
tation of the subject which busied him. When the

16 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

person who had been talking with him went away, he
did not re-read what he had written before the inter-
ruption, which, as has been mentioned above, was to
save his eyesight; he could, later on, take up the thread
of his composition as if the conversation had been no
obstacle to his attention. He therefore was able simul-
taneously to live with others and with himself. He
never seemed to need recuperation from this interior
attention, which hardly ceased during his slumbers,
which, however, were troubled both by the insufficiency
of food, for sometimes he did not even eat bread, and
by this continuous concentration of his mind.

IX. PLOTINOS AS GUARDIAN AND ARBITRATOR.

There were women who were very much attached to
him. There was his boarding house keeper Gemina,
and her daughter, also called Gemina; there was also
Amphiclea, wife of Aristo, son of Jamblichus, all three
of whom were very fond of philosophy. Several men
and women of substance, being on the point of death,
entrusted him with their boys and girls, and all their
possessions, as being an irreproachable trustee; and the
result was that his house was filled with young boys and
girls. Among these was Polemo, whom Plotinos edu-
cated carefully; and Plotinos enjoyed hearing Polemo
recite original verses {}). He used to go through the
accounts of the managers with care, and saw to their
economy; he used to say that until these young people
devoted themselves entirely to philosophy, their pos-
sessions should be preserved intact, and see that they
enjoyed their full incomes. The obligation of attending
to the needs of so many wards did not, however, hinder
him from devoting to intellectual concerns a continuous
attention during the nights. His disposition was gentle,
and he was very approachable by all who dwelt with
him. Consequently, although he dwelt full twenty-six
years in Rome, and though he was often chosen as

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 17

arbitrator in disputes, never did he offend any public
personage.

X. HOW PLOTINOS TREATED HIS ADVERSARY,

OLYMPIUS.

Among those who pretended to be philosophers,
there was a certain man named Olympius. He lived in
Alexandria, and for some time had been a disciple of
Ammonius. As he desired to succeed better than
Plotinos, he treated Plotinos with scorn, and developed
sufficient personal animosity against Plotinos to try to
bewitch him by magical operations. However, Olym-
pius noticed that this enterprise was really turning
against himself, and he acknowledged to his friends
that the soul of Plotinos must be very powerful, since
it was able to throw back upon his enemies the evil
practices directed against him. The first time that
Olympius attempted to harm him, Plotinos having
noticed it, said, "At this very moment the body of
Olympius is undergoing convulsions, and is contracting
like a purse." As Olympius several times felt himself
undergoing the very ills he was trying to get Plotinos
to undergo, he finally ceased his practices.

HOMAGE TO PLOTINOS FROM A VISITING EGYPTIAN

PRIEST.

Plotinos showed a natural superiority to other men.
An Egyptian priest, visiting Rome, was introduced to
him by a mutual friend. Having decided to show some
samples of his mystic attainments, he begged Plotinos
to come and witness the apparition of a familiar spirit
who obeyed him on being evoked. The evocation was
to occur in a chapel of Isis, as the Egyptian claimed that
he had not been able to discover any other place pure
enough in Rome. He therefore evoked Plotinos's
guardian spirit. But instead of the spirit appeared a
divinity of an order superior to that of guardians, which
event led the Egyptian to say to Plotinos, 'Tou are

18 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

indeed fortunate, O Plotinos, that your guardian spirit
is a divinity, instead of a being of a lower order." The
divinity that appeared could not be questioned or seen
for as long a period as they would have liked, as a
friend who was watching over the sacrificed birds
choked them, either out of jealousy, or fear.

PLOTINOS'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PUBLIC

MYSTERIES.

As Plotinos's guardian spirit was a divinity, Plotinos
kept the eyes of his own spirit directed on that divine
guardian. That was the motive of his writing his
book* that bears the title ''Of the Guardian Allotted
to Us." In it he tries to explain the differences between
the various spirits that watch over mankind. Anielius,
who was very scrupulous in his sacrifices, and who care-
fully celebrated the Festivals of the New Moon (as
Numenius used to do?) (on the Calends of each
month), one day besought Plotinos to come and take
part in a function of that kind. Plotinos, however,
answered him, "It is the business of those divinities
to come and visit me, and not mine to attend on
them." We could not understand why he should make
an utterance that revealed so much pride, but we dared
not question the matter.

XL PLOTINOS AS DETECTIVE AND AS PROPHET;
PORPHYRY SAVED FROM SUICIDE.

So perfectly did he understand the character of men,
and their methods of thought, that he could discover
stolen objects, and foresaw what those who resided
with him should some day become. A magnificent
necklace had been stolen from Chione, an estimable
nidow, who resided with him and the children (as
matron?). All the slaves were summoned, and
Plotinos examined them all. Then, pointing out one
of them, he said, "This is the culprit." He was put to

*iii. 4.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 19

the torture. For a long while, he denied the deed; but
later acknowledged it, and returned the necklace.
Plotinos used to predict what each of the young people
who were in touch with him was to become. He in-
sisted that Polemo would be disposed to amorous re-
lations, and would not live long; which also occurred.
As to me, he noticed that I was meditating suicide. He
came and sought me, in his house, where I was staying.
He told me that this project indicated an unsound mind,
and that it was the result of a melancholy disposition.
He advised me to travel. I obeyed him. I went to
Sicily,* to study under Probus, a celebrated philosopher,
who dwelt in Lilybaeum. I was thus cured of the
desire to die; but I was deprived of the happiness of
residing with Plotinos until his death.

XII. THE PROJECT OF A PLATONOPOLIS COMES

TO NAUGHT.

The emperor Gallienus and the empress Salonina,
his wife, held Plotinos in high regard. Counting on
their good will, he besought them to have a ruined town
in Campania rebuilt, to give it with all its territory to
him, that its inhabitants might be ruled by the laws of
Plato. Plotinos intended to have it named Platono-
polis, and to go and reside there with his disciples.
This request would easily have been granted but that
some of the emperor's courtiers opposed this project,
either from spite, jealousy, or other unworthy motive.

XIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS'S

DELIVERY.

In his lectures his delivery was very good; he knew
how to make immediate apposite replies. Nevertheless,
his language was not correct. For instance, he used
to say "anamnemisketai" for ''anamimnesketai"; and
he made similar blunders in writing. But when he would
speak, his intelligence seemed to shine in his face, and

*See above. 6

20 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

to illuminate it with its rays. He grew especially hand-
some in discussions; a light dew of perspiration ap-
peared on his forehead, gentleness radiated in his
countenance, he answered kindly, but satisfactorily.
For three days I had to question him, to learn from him
his opinions about the union of the body with the
soul; he spent all that time in explaining to me what
I wanted to know.* A cerain Thaumasius, who had
entered into the school, said that he wanted to take
down the arguments of the discussion in writing, and
hear Plotinos himself speak; but that he would not
stand Porphyry's answering and questioning. *'Never-
theless," answered Plotinos, "if Porphyry does not, by
his questions, bring up the difficulties that we should
solve (notice, in the course of the Enneads, the con-
tinual objections), we would have nothing to write."

XIV. PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF PLOTINOS.

The style of Plotinos is vigorous and substantial,
containing more thoughts than words, and is often full
of enthusiasm and emotion. He follows his own in-
spirations rather than ideas transmitted by tradition.
The teachings of the Stoics and Peripatetics are secretly
mingled among his works; the whole of Aristotle's
Metaphysics is therein condensed. Plotinos was fully
up to the times in geometry, arithmetic, mechanics,
optics and music, although he did not take an over-
weening interest in these sciences. At his lectures were
read the Commentaries of Severus, of Cronius;t of
Numenius,$ of Gains and Atticus (Platonic Philoso-
phers, the latter, setting forth the differences between
Plato and Aristotle) ;|| there were also readings of
the works of the Peripatetics, of Aspasius, of Alexander
(of Aphrodisia, whose theory of Mixture in the Universe

*See iv. 2.

fOften quoted by Porphyry in his Cave of the Nymphs.

$See 3. IIEuseb. Prep. Ev. xi. 2; xv. 4-9, 12-13.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 21

Plotinos studies several times), of Adrastus, and other
philosophers of the day. None of them, however, was
exclusively admired by Plotinos. In his speculations he
revealed an original and independent disposition. In
all his researches he displayed the spirit of Ammonius.
He could readily assimilate (what he read) ; then, in
a few words, he summarized the ideas aroused in him
by profound meditation thereon. One day Longinus's
book "On the Principles," and his "On Antiquarians'*
were read. Plotinos said, "Longinus is a literary man,
but not a philosopher." Origen (the Pagan*) once
came among his audience; Plotinos blushed, and started
to rise. Origen, however, besought him to continue.
Plotinos, however, answered that it was only natural
for lecturers to cease talking when they were aware
of the presence, in the audience, of people who already
knew what was to be said. Then, after having spoken
a little longer, he rose.

XV. PORPHYRY EARNED RECOGNITION AT THE
SCHOOL OF PLOTINOS.

At a celebration of Plato's birthday I was reading
a poem about the "Mystic Marriage" (of the Soul)
when somebody doubted my sanity, because it con-
tained both enthusiasm and mysticism. Plotinos spoke
up, and said to me, loud enough to be heard by every-
body, "You have just proved to us that you are at the
same time poet, philosopher, and hierophant." On
this occasion the rhetorician Diophanes read an
apology on the utterances of Alcibiades in Plato's
"Banquet," and he sought to prove that a disciple who
seeks to exercise himself in virtue should show un-
limited "complaisance" for his teacher, even in case
the latter were in love with him. Plotinos rose several
times, as if he wanted to leave the assembly; never-
theless, he restrained himself, and after the audience
♦See 3.

22 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

had dispersed, he asked me to refute the paper. As
Diophanes would not communicate it to me, I recalled
his arguments, and refuted them; and then I read my
paper before the same auditors as those who had heard
what had been said by Diophanes. I pleased Plotinos
so much, that several times he interrupted me by the
words, "Strike that way, and you will become the light
of men!" When Eubulus, who was teaching Platonism
at Athens, sent to Plotinos some papers on Platonic
subjects, Plotinos had them given to me to examine
them and report to him about them. He also studied
the laws of astronomy, but not as a mathematician
would have done; he carefully studied astrology; but
realizing that no confidence could be placed in its
predictions, he took the trouble to refute them several
times, in his work.*

XVI. PLOTINOS'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE
GNOSTICS.

At that time there were many Christians, among
whom were prominent sectarians who had given up
the ancient philosophy (of Plato and Pythagoras),
such as Adelphius and Aquilinus. They esteemed and
possessed the greater part of the works of Alexander
of Lybia, of Philocomus, of Demostrates and of Lydus.
They advertised the Revelations of Zoroaster, of
Zostrian, of Nicotheus, of Allogenes, of Mesus, and of
several others. These sectarians deceived a great
number of people, and even deceived themselves, in-
sisting that Plato had not exhausted the depths of in-
telligible ''being," or essence. That is why Plotinos
refuted them at length in his lectures, and wrote the
book that we have named "Against the Gnostics." The
rest (of their books) he left me to investigate. Amelius
wrote as much ^s forty books to refute the work of
Zostrian ; and as to me, 1 demonstrated by numerous
*See ii. 3; iii. 1, 2, 4.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 23

proofs that this alleged Zoroastrian book was apo-
cryphal, and had only recently been written by those
of that ilk who wished to make people believe that
their doctrines had been taught by Zoroaster.

XVII. START OF THE AMELIO-PORPHYRIAN CON-
TROVERSY, OVER NUMENIUS.

The Greeks insisted that Plotinos had appropriated
the teachings of Numenius. Trypho, who was both a
Stoic and a Platonist, insisted on this to Amelius, who
wrote a book that we have entitled, "On the Differ-
ence Betv/een the Teachings of Plotinos and Numen-
ius." He dedicated it to me under the title, "To Basil"
(the King, recently used as a name, "Royal"). That
was my name before I was called "Porphyry," the
"Purple One." In my own home language (Phoenic-
ian) I used to be called "Malchus"; that was my father's
name, and in Greek "Malchus" is translated by "Basil-
eus" (Basil, or King). Indeed, Longinus, who dedi-
cated his book "On Instinct" to Cleodamus, and
me jointly, there calls me "Malchus"; and Amelius has
translated this name in Greek, just as Numenius trans-
lated "Maximus" (from Latin into Greek by) "Mega-
os" (the great one). (I will quote the letter in full).

"Greetings from Amelius to Basil (Royal, or Purple
One) :

"You may be sure that I did not have the least
inclination even to mention some otherwise respectable
people who, to the point of deafening you, insist that
the doctrines of our friend (Plotinos) are none other
than those of Numenius of Apamea. It is evident
enough that these reproaches are entirely due to their
desire to advertise their oratorical abilities. Possessed
with the desire to rend Plotinos to pieces, they dare to
o"o as far as to assert that he is no more than a babbler,
a forger, and that his opinions are impossible. But
since you think that it would be well for us to seize

'24 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

the occasion to recall to the public the teachings of
which we approve (in Plotinos's system of philosophy),
and in order to honor so great a man as our friend
Plotinos by spreading his teachings — although this
really is needless, inasmuch as they have long since
become celebrated — 1 comply with your request, and,
in accordance with my promise, 1 am hereby inscribing
to you this work which, as you well know, I threw
together in three days. You will not find in it that
system and judiciousness natural to a book composed
with care; they are only reflections suggested by the
lectures (received from Plotinos), and arranged as they
happened to come to mind. I, therefore, throw myself
on your indulgence, especially as the thought of
(Plotinos, that) philosopher whom some people are
slandering to us, is not easy to grasp, because he ex-
presses the same ideas in different manners in accord-
ance with the exigencies of the occasion. I am sure
you will have the goodness to correct me, if 1 happen
to stray from the opinions of Plotinos. As the tragic
poet says somewhere, being overwhelmed with the
pressure of duties, I find myself compelled to submit to
criticism and correction if I am discovered in altering
the doctrines of our leader. You see how anxious I am
to please you. Farewell!"

XVIII. POLEMIC BETWEEN AMELIUS AND POR-
PHYRY; AMELIUS TEACHES PORPHYRY.

I have quoted this letter in full to show that, even
in the times of Plotinos himself, it was claimed that
Plotinos had borrowed and advertised as his own teach-
ings of Numenius; also that he was called a trifler, and
in short that he was scorned — which happened chiefly
because he was not understood. Plotinos was far from
the display and vanity of the Sophists. When lectur-
ing, he seemed to be holding a conversation with his
pupils. He did not try to convince you by a formal

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 25

argument. This I realized from the first, when attend-
ing his courses. I wished to make him explain himself
more clearly by writing against him a work to prove
that the intelligible entities subsist outside of intellig-
ence.* Plotinos had Amelius read it to him; and after
the reading he laughingly said to him, ''It would be
well for you to solve these difficulties that Porphyry has
advanced against me, because he does not clearly
understand my teachings." Amelius indeed wrote a
rather voluminous work to answer my objections.t
In turn, I responded. Amelius wrote again. This third
work at last made me understand, but not without
difficulty, the thought of Plotinos; and I changed 'my
views, reading my retraction at a meeting. Since that
time, I have 'had complete confidence in the teachings
of Plotinos. 1 begged him to polish his writings, and
to explain his system to me more at length. 1 also
prevailed upon Amelius to write some works.

XIX. HOW THE WORKS OF PLOTINOS WERE PUT

INTO SHAPE.

You may judge of the high opinion of Plotinos held
by Longinus, from a part of a letter he addressed to me.
I was in Sicily; he wished me to visit him in Phoenicia,
and desired me to bring him a copy of the works of
that philosopher. This is what he wrote to me about
the matter:

"Please send me the works; or rather, bring them
with you; for 1 shall never cease begging you to travel
in this one of all other countries, were it only because
of our ancient friendship, and of the sweetness of the
air, which would so well suit your ruined health; J for
you must not expect to find any new knowledge here
when you visit us. Whatever your expectations may be,

*See V. 5.

fThis suggests that Suidas was right in claiming that Amdius
was the teacher of Porphyry. tSee 11.

26 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

do not expect to find anything new here, nor even the
ancient works (of myself, Longlnus? ) that you say are
lost. There is such a scarcity of copyists here, that since
I have been here I have hardly been able to get what
I lacked of Plotinos here, by inducing my copyist to
abandon his usual occupations to devote himself ex-
clusively to this work. Now that I have those works
of Plotinos you sent me, 1 think I have them all; but
these that I have are imperfect, being full of errors.
1 had supposed that our friend Amelius had corrected
the errors of the copyist; but his occupations have been
too pressing to allow of his attending to this. How-
ever passionately 1 desire to examine what Plotinos has
written about the soul, and about existence, I do not
know what use to make of his writings; these are pre-
cisely those of his works that have been most mis-
written by the copyists. That is why I wish you would
send them to me transcribed exactly; I would compare
the copies and return them promptly. I repeat that I
beg you not to send them, but to bring them yourself
with the other works of Plotinos, which might have
escaped Amelius. All those he brought here I have
had transcribed exactly; for why should I not most
zealously seek works so precious? I have often told
you, both when we were together, and apart, and
when you were at Tyre, that Plotinos's works con-
tained reasonings of which I did not approve, but that
I liked and admired his method of writing; his concise
and forceful style, and the genuinely philosophical ar-
rangement of his discussions. I am persuaded that
those who seek the truth must place the works of
FMotinos among the most learned."

XX. OPINION OF LONGINUS, THE GREAT CRITIC,

ABOUT PLOTINOS.

I have made this rather long quotation only to show
what was thought of Plotinos by the greatest critic of

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 27

our days, the man who had examined all the works of
his time. At first Longinus had scorned Plotinos, be-
cause he had relied on the reports of people ignorant
(of philosophy). Moreover, Longinus supposed that
the copy of the works of Plotinos he had received from
Amelius was defective, because he was not yet accus-
tomed to the style of Plotinos. Nevertheless, if any
one had the Vorks of Plotinos in their purity, it was
certainly Amelius, who possessed a copy made upon
the originals themselves. I will further add what was
written by Longinus about Plotinos, Amelius, and the
other philosophers of his time, so that the reader may
better appreciate this great critic's high opinion of
them. This book, directed against Plotinos and Gen-
tilianus Amelius, is entitled *'Of the Limit (of Good and
Evil? ) " and begins as follows:

'There were, O Marcellus Orontius* many philoso-
phers in our time, and especially in the first years of
, our childhood — for it is useless to complain of their
^rarity at the present; but when I was still a youth,
there were still a rather goodly number of men cele-
brated as philosophers. I was fortunate enough to
get acquainted with all of them, because I traveled
early with our parents in many countries. Visiting
many nations and towns, I entered into personal rela-
tions with such of these men as were still alive. Among
these philosophers, some committed their teachings to
writings, with the purpose of being useful to posterity,
while others thought that it was sufficient for them to
explain their opinions to their disciples. Among the
former are the Platonists Euclides, Democritus (who
wrote Commentaries on the Alcibiades, on the Phaedo,
and on the Metaphysics of Aristotle), Proclinus, who
dwelt in the Troad, Plotinos and his disciple Gentil-
ianus Amelius, who are at present teaching at Rome;
the Stoics Themistocles, Phebion, and both Annius and
♦See 7.

28 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

Medius, who were much talked of only recently, and
the Peripatetician Heliodorus of Alexandria. Among
those who did not write their teachings are the Platon-
ists Ammonius (Saccas) and (the pagan) Origen,*
who lived with him for a long while, and who excelled
among the philosophers of that period; also Theodotus
and Eubulus, who taught at Athens. Of course, they
did write a little; Origen, for instance; wrote about
"The Guardian Spirits"; and Eubulus wrote Com-
mentaries on the Philebus, and on the Gorgias, and
"Observations on Arsitotle's Objections against Plato's
Republic.'* However, these works are not con-
siderable enough to rank their authors among those
who have seriously treated of philosophy; for these
little works were by them written only incidentally, and
they did not make writing their principal occupation.
The Stoics Herminus, Lysimachus,t Athenaeus and
Musonius (author of "Memorable Events," translated
in Greek by Claudius Pollio), who lived at Athens.
The Peripateticians Ammonius and Ptolemy, who were
the most learned of their contemporaries, especially
Ammonius, whose erudition was unequalled, none of
these philosophers wrote any important work; they
limited themselves to writing poems, or festal orations,
which have been preserved in spite of them. I doubt
very much that they wished to be known by posterity
merely by books so small (and unrepresentative),
since they had neglected to acquaint us with their teach-
ings in more significant works. Among those who have
left written works, some have done no more than gather
or transcribe what has been left to us from the ancient
(philosophers) ; among these are Euclides, Democritus
and Proclinus. Others limited themselves to recalling
some details extracted from ancient histories, and
they tried to compose books with the same materials
as their predecessors, as did Annius, Medius, and Phebio;

♦See 3, fSee 3.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 29

the latter one trying to make himself famous by style,
rather than by thought. To these we might add Helio-
dorus, who has put in his writings nothing that had not
been said by the ancients, without adding any philo-
sophical explanation. But Plotinos and Gentilianus
Amelius, have shown that they really made a pro-
fession of being writers, both by the great number of
questions they treated, and by the originality of their
doctrines. Plotinos explained the principles of Py-
thagoras and Plato more clearly than his predecessors;
for neither Numenius, nor Cronius, nor Moderatus,*
nor Thrasyllus,t come anywhere near the precision of
Plotinos when they touch on the same topics. Amelius
tried to follow in his footsteps, and adopted the greater
part of his ideas; but differs from him in the verbosity
of his demonstrations, and the diffusion of his style.
The writings of these two men alone deserve special
consideration; for what is the use of criticizing the
works of imitators; had we not better study the authors
whose works they copied, without any additions, either
in essential points, or in argumentation, doing no more
than choosing out the best? This has been our method
of procedure in our controversy with Gentilianus
Amelius's strictures on justice, in Plato's works; and
in my examination of Plotinos's books on the Ideas.§
So when our mutual friends Basil of Tyre, (Porphyry||),
who has written much on the lines of Plotinos, having
even preferred the teachings of Plotinos to my own
(as he had been my pupil), undertook to demonstrate
that Plotinos's views about the Ideas were better than
my own, I have fully refuted his contentions, proving
that he was wrong in changing his views on the sub-
jectJ Besides, I have criticized several opinions of

♦Mentioned in Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras, 48, living under
Nero.
JLiving underATiberius, see Suetonius, Life of Tiberius, 14.
§Seevi. 5. ||See 17. IJSee 18.

30 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

Gentilianus Amelius and Plotinos, as for instance in
the ''Letter to Amelius" which is long enough to form
a whole book. I wrote it to answer a 'letter sent me
from Rome by Amelius, which was entitled 'The
Characteristics of the Philosophy of Plotinos."* I,
however, limited myself to entitling my little work,
"A Letter to Amelius."

XXI. RESULTS OF LONGINUS'S CRITICISM AND
VINDICATION OF PLOTINOS'S ORIGINALITY.

From the above it will be seen that Plotinos and
Amelius are superior to all their contemporaries by the
great number of questions they consider, and by the
originality of their system; that Plotinos had not ap-
propriated the opinions of Numenius, and that he did
not even follow them; that he had really profited by
the opinions of the Pythagoreans (and of Plato) ;
further, that he was more precise than Numenius,
Cronius, and Thrasyllus. After having said that
Amelius followed in the footsteps of Plotinos, but that
he was prolix and diffuse in his expositions, which
characteristic forms the difference between their styles,
he speaks of me, who at that time had known Plotinos
for only a short time, and says, "Our mutual friends,
Basil (King) of Tyre (Porphyry), who has written
much, taking Plotinos as his model." By that he
means that I have avoided the rather unphilosophical
diffuseness of Amelius, and have imitated the (concise)
style of Plotinos. The quotation of the judgment of
this famous man, the first critic of his day, should de-
cide of the reverence due to our philosopher, Plotinos.
If I had been able to visit Longinus when he begged
me to do so, he would not have undertaken the refuta-
tion he wrote, before having clearly understood
Plotinos's system.
♦See 17.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 31

XXII. THE APOLLONIAN ORACLE ABOUT PLOTINOS.

(But when I have a long oracle of Apollo to quote,
why should I delay over a letter of Longinus's, or, in
the words of the proverb, quoted in Iliad xxii. 126 and
Hesiod Theogony 35), ''Why should I dally near the
oak-trees, or the rock.? " If the testimony of the wise
is to be adduced, who is wiser than Apollo, a deity who
said of himself, ''I know the number of the grains of
sand, and the extent of the ocean; I understand the
dust, and I hear him who does not speak!" This was
the divinity who had said that Socrates was the wisest
of men; and on being consulted by Amelius to discover
what had become of the soul of Plotinos, said:

*'Let me sing an immortal hymn to my dear friend!
Drawing my golden bow, I will elicit melodious sounds

from my lyre.
I also invoke the symphonic voice of the choir of

Muses,
Whose harmonious power raises exultant paeans,
As they once sang in chorus in praise of Achilles,
A Homeric song in divine inspiration.
Sacred choir of Muses, let us together celebrate this

man.
For long-haired Apollo is among you!

''O Deity, who formerly wert a man, but now ap-

proachest
The divine host of guardian spirits, delivered from the

narrowing bonds of necessity
That enchains man (while in the body), and from the

tumult caused by the
Confusing whirlwind of the passions of the body.
Sustained by the vigor of thy mind, thou hastenest to

swim
(And like the sage Ulysses in Phaeacia), to land on a

shore not submerged by the waves,
With vigorous stroke, far from the impious crowds.

32 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

Persistently following the straightening path of the
purified soul,

Where the splendor of the divinity surrounds you, the
home of justice,

Far from contamination, in the holy sanctuary of
initiation,

When in the past you struggled to escape the bitter
waves,*

When blood-stained life eddied around you with re-
pulsive currents,

In the midst of the waters dazed by frightening tumult.

Even then the divinities often showed you your end;t

And often, when your spirit was about to stray from the
right path,

The immortals beckoned you back to the real end; the
eternal path,

Enlightening your eyes with radiant beams in the midst
of gloomy darkness.

No deep slumber closed your eyelids, and when shaken
by the eddies (of matter).

You sought to withdraw your eyes from the night that
pressed down upon them;

You beheld beauties hidden from any who devote them-
selves to the study of wisdom.
"Now that you have discarded your cloak of mor-
tality, and ascended

Climbing out from the tombs of your angelic soul.

You have entered the choir of divinities, where breathes
a gentle zephyr.

There dwell friendship, and delightful desire, ever ac-
companied by pure joy;

There may one quench one's thirst with divine am-
brosia;

There bound by the ties of love, one breathes a gentle
air, under a tranquil sky.

♦See ii. 3. 17.
tSce 23.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 33

There dwell the sons of Jupiter, who lived in the golden

age;
The brothers Minos and Rhadamanthus, the just

Aeacus,
The divine Plato, the virtuous Pythagoras,
And all those who formed the band of immortal love,
And who by birth belong to the most blessed of

divinities.
Their soul tastes continual joy amidst perpetual feasts!
And you, blessed man, after having fought many a

valiant fight.
In the midst of chaste angels, you have achieved eternal

Felicity.
**Here, O Muses, let us close this hymn in honor of

Plotinos;
Cease the mazes of the dancing of the graceful choir;
This is what my golden lyre had to say of this eternally

blessed man!"

XXIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS;
THE ECSTATIC TRANCES.

This oracle (pieced out of numerous quotations)
says (in some now lost lines, perhaps) that Plotinos
was kindly, affable, indulgent, gentle, such as, indeed
we knew him in personal intercourse. It also mentions
that this philosopher slept little, that his soul was pure,
ever aspiring to the divinity that he loved whole-
heartedly, and that he did his utmost to liberate himself
(from terrestrial domination) **to escape the bitter
waves of this cruel life."

That is how this divine man, who by his thoughts
often aspired to the first (principle), to the divinity
superior (to intelligence), climbing the degrees in-
dicated by Plato (in his Banquet), beheld the vision
of the formless divinity, which is not merely an idea,
being founded on intelligence and the whole intelligible
world. I, myself, had the blessed privilege of ap-

34 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

preaching this divinity, uniting myself to him, when I
was about sixty-eight years of age.

That is how "the goal (that Plotinos sought to
achieve) seemed to him located near him." Indeed,
his goal, his purpose, his end was to approach the
supreme divinity, and to unite himself with the divinity.
While I dwelt with him, he had four times the bliss of
reaching that goal, not merely potentially, but by a
real and unspeakable experience. The oracle adds that
the divinities frequently restored Plotinos to the right
path when he strayed from it, ''enlightening his eyes
by radiant splendor." That is why it may truthfully
be said that Plotinos composed his works while in
contemplation of the divinities, and enjoying that
vision. "Thanks to this sight that your 'vigilant' eyes
had of both interior and exterior things, you have,"
in the words of the oracle, "gazed at many beauties
that would hardly be granted to many of those who
study philosophy." Indeed, the contemplation of men
may be superior to human contemplation; but, com-
pared to divine knowledge, if it be of any value what-
ever, it, nevertheless, could not penetrate the depths
reached by the glances of the divinities.

Till here the oarcle had limited itself to indicatmg
what Plotinos had accomplished while enclosed in the
vesture of the body. It then proceeds to say that he
arrived at the assembly of the divinities where dwell
friendship, delightful desire, joy, and love communing
with the divinity, where the sons of God, Minos, Rhada-
manthus, and Aeacus are established as the judges of
souls. Plotinos joined them, not to be judged, but to
enjoy their intimacy, as did the higher divinities. There
indeed dwell Plato, Pythagoras, and the other sages
who formed the choir of immortal love. Reunited with
their families, the blessed angels spend their life "in
continued festivals and joys," enjoying the perpetual
beatitude granted them by divine goodness.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 35

XXIV. CONTENTS OF THE VARIOUS ENNEADS.

This is what I have to relate of the life of Plotinos,
He had, however, asked me to arrange and revise his
works. I promised both him and his friends to work
on them. I did not judge it wise to arrange them in
confusion chronologically. So I imitated Apollodorus
of Athens, and Andronicus the Peripatetician, the
former collecting in ten volumes the comedies of
Epicharmus, and the latter dividing into treatises the
works of Aristotle and Theophrastus, gathering to-
gether the writings that referred to the same subject.
Likewise, I grouped the fifty-four books of Plotinos into
six groups of nine (Enneads), in honor of the perfect
numbers six and nine. Into each Ennead I have
gathered the books that treat of the same matter, in
each case prefixing the most important ones.

The First Ennead contains the writings that treat of
Morals. They are:

1. What is an Animal ? What is a Man? 53.

2. Of the Virtues, 19.

3. Of Dialectics, 20.*

4. Of Happiness, 46.

5. Does Happiness (consist in Duration) ? 36.

6. Of Beauty, 1.

7. Of the First Good, and of the Other Goods, 54.

8. Of the Origin of Evils, 51.

9. Of (Reasonable) Suicide, 16.
Such are the topics considered in the First Ennead;

which thus contains what relates to morals.

In the Second. Ennead are grouped the writings that
treat of Physics, of the World, and of all that it con-
tains. They are:

1. (Of the World). 40.

2. Of the (Circular) Motion (of the Heavens), 14.

3. Of the Influence of the Stars, 52.

36 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

4. (Of both Matters) (Sensible and Intelligi-

ble), 12.

5. Of Potentiality and Actuality, 25.

6. Of Quality (and of Form), 17.

7. Of Mixture, Where there is Total Penetra-

tration, 37.

8. Of Vision. Why do Distant Objects Seem

Smaller? 35.

9. (Against Those Who say that the Demiurgic

Creator is Evil, as well as The World It-
self), Against the Gnostics, 33.

The Third Ennead, which also relates to the world,
contains the different speculations referring thereto.
Here are its component writings:

1. Of Destiny, 3.

2. Of Providence, the First, 47.

3. Of Providence, the Second, 48.

4. Of the Guardian Spirit who was Allotted to

Us, 15.

5. Of Love, 50.

6. Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Things, 26.

7. Of Eternity of Time, 45.

8. Of Nature, of Contemplation, and of the One, 30.

9. Different Speculations, 13.

We have gathered these three Enneads into one
single body. We have assigned the book on the
Guardian Spirit Who has been Allotted to Us, in the
Third Ennead, because this is treated in a general man-
ner, and because it refers to the examination of con-
ditions characteristic of the production of man. For
the same reason the book on Love was assigned to the
First Ennead. The same place has been assigned to
the book on Eternity and Time, because of the observa-
tions which, in this Ennead, refer to their nature.
Because of its title, we have put in the same group the
booj; on Nature, Contemplation, and the One.

LIFE OF FLOTINOS 37

After the books that treat of the world, the Fourth
Ennead contains those that refer to the soul. They are:

1. Of the Nature of the Soul, the First, 4.

2. Of the Nature of the Soul, the Second, 21.

3. Problems about the Soul, the First, 27.

4. Problems about the Soul, the Second, 28.

5. (Problems about the Soul, the Third, or) Of

Vision, 29.

6. Of Sensation, of Memory, 41.

7. Of the Immortality of the Soul, 2.

8. Of the Descent of the Soul into the Body, 6.

9. Do not all Souls form a Single Soul? 8.

The Fourth Ennead, therefore, contains all that re-
lates to Psychology.

The Fifth Ennead treats of Intelligence. Each boolc
in it also contains something about the principle su-
perior to intelligence, and also about the intelligence
characteristic of the soul, and about Ideas.

1. About the three Principal Hypostatic Forms of

Existence, 10.

2. Of Generation, and of the Order of Things

Posterior to the First, 11.

3. Of the Hypostatic Forms of Existence that Trans-

mit Knowledge, and of the Superior Prin-
ciple, 49.

4. How that which is Posterior to the First Pro-

ceeds from it? Of the One, 7.

5. The Intelligibles are not Outside of Intelligence.

Of the Good, 32.

6. The Super-essential Principle Does Not Think.

Which is the First Thinking Principle?
Which is the Second? 24.

7. Are there Ideas of Individuals? 18.-

8. Of Intelligible Beauty, 31.

9. Of Intelligence, of Ideas, and of Existence, 5.

38 LIFE OF PLOTINOS

We have gathered the Fourth and Fifth Ennead into
a single volume. Of the Sixth Ennead, we have
formed a separate volume, so that all the writings of
Plotinos might be divided into three parts, of which
the first contains three Enneads, the second two; and
the third, a single Ennead.

Here are the books that belong to the Sixth Ennead,
and to the Third Volume.

1. Of the Kinds of Existence, the First, 42.

2. Of the Kinds of Existence, the Second, 43.

3. Of the Kinds of Existence, the Third, 44.

4. The One Single Existence is everywhere Present

in its Entirety, First, 2 2,

5. The One Single Existence is everywhere Present

in its Entirety, Second, 23.

6. Of Numbers, 34

7. Of the Multitude of Ideas. Of the Good, 38.

8. Of the Will, and of the Liberty of the One, 39.

9. Of the Good, or of the One, 9.

This is how we have distributed into six Enneads the
fifty-four books of Plotinos. We have added to several
of them, Commentaries, without following any regular
order, to satisfy our friends who desired to have ex-
planations of several points. We have also made
headings of each book, following the chronological
order, with the exception of the book on The Beautiful,
whose date of composition we do not know. Besides,
we have not only written up separate summaries for
each book, but also Arguments, which are contained
among the summaries.*

Now we shall try to punctuate each book, and to
correct the mistakes. Whatever else we may have to
do besides, will easily be recognized by a reading of
these books.

*The fragments of all this are probably the Principles of the
Theory of the Intelligibles, by Porphyry.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS 39

LIFE OF PLOTINOS, BY EUNAPIUS.

The philosopher Plotinos came from Egypt; to be
accurate, I will add that his home was Lycopolis. This
fact was not set down by the divine Porphyry, though
he himself, as he reports, was a student of Plotinos,
and had spent a great part of his life near him.

The altars dedicated to Plotinos are not yet cold;
and not only are his books read by the learned more
than are even those of Plato, but even the multitude,
though incapable of clearly understanding his doctrine,
nevertheless conforms its conduct of life to his sug-
gestions.

Porphyry has set down all the details of the life of
this philosopher, so that little can be added thereto;
besides Porphyry seems to have clearly expounded
many of Plotinos's writings.

LIFE OF PLOTINOS, BY SUIDAS.

Plotinos of Lycopolis, philosopher, disciple of that
Ammonius who had once been a porter, was the
teacher of Amelius, who himself had Porphyry as pupil;
the latter formed Jamblichus, and Jamblichus Sopater.
Plotinos prolonged his life till the seventh year of the
reign of Gallienus. He composed fifty-four books,
which are grouped in six enneads. His constitution
was weakened by the effects of the sacred disease
(epilepsy) , He wrote besides other works,

40 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH.

Of Beauty.

REVIEW OF BEAUTY OF DAILY LIFE.

1. Beauty, chiefly affects the sense of sight. Still,
the ear perceives it also, both in the harmony of
words, and in the different kinds of music; for songs
and verses are equally beautiful. On rising from the
domain of the senses to a superior region, we also
discover beauty in occupations, actions, habits, sciences
and virtues. Whether there exists a type of beauty
still higher, will have to be ascertained by discussion.

PROBLEMS CONCERNING HIGHER BEAUTY

What is the cause that certain bodies seem beautiful,
that our ears listen with pleasure to rhythms judged
beautiful, and that we love the purely moral beauties?
Does the beauty of all these objects derive from some
unique, immutable principle, or will we recognize some
one principle of beauty for the body, and some other
for something else? What then are these principles, if
there are several? Or which is this principle, if there
is but one?

WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY PARTICIPATION IN
WHICH THE BODY IS BEAUTIFUL?

First, there are certain objects, such as bodies, whose
beauty exists only by participation, instead of being
inherent in the very essence of the subject. Such are
beautiful in themselves, as is, for example, virtue. In-
deed, the same bodies seem beautiful at one time,
while at another they lack beauty; consequently, there

16] OF BEAUTY 41

is a great difference between being a body and being
beautiful. What then is the principle whose presence
in a body produces beauty therein? What is that
element in the bodies which moves the spectator, and
which attracts, fixes and charms his glances? This
is the first problem to solve; for, on finding this prin-
ciple, we shall use it as a means to resolve other
questions.

POLEMIC AGAINST SYMMETRY, THE STOIC
DEFINITION OF BEAUTY.

(The Stoics), like almost everybody, insist that
visual beauty consists in the proportion of the parts
relatively to each other and to the whole, joined to
the grace of colors. If then, as in this case, the beauty
of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just
proportion of their parts, beauty could not consist of
anything simple, and necessarily could not appear in
anything but what was compound. Only the totality
will be beautiful; the parts by themselves will possess
no beauty; they will be beautiful only by their relation
with the totality. Nevertheless, if the totality is beauti-
ful, it would seem also necessary that the parts be
beautiful; for indeed beauty could never result from
the assemblage of ugly things. Beauty must therefore
be spread among all the parts. According to the same
docti*ine, the colors which, like sunlight, are beautiful,
are beautiful but simple, and those whose beauty is not
derived from proportion, will also be excluded from the
domain of beauty. According to this hypothesis, how
will gold be beautiful? The brilliant lightning in the
night, even the stars, would not be beautiful to con-
template. In the sphere of sounds, also, it would be
necessary to insist that what is simple possesses no
beauty. Still, in a beautiful harmony, every sound, ^
even when isolated, is beautiful. While preserving the "<>
same proportions, the same countenance seems at one

42 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

time beautiful, and at another ugly. Evidently, there
is but one conclusion: namely, that proportion is not
beauty itself, but that it derives its beauty from some
superior principle. (This will appear more clearly
from further examples). Let us examine occupations
and utterances. If also their beauty depended on pro-
portion, what would be the function of proportion when
considering occupations, laws, studies and sciences?
Relations of proportion could not obtain in scientific
speculations; no, nor even in the mutual agreement of
these speculations. On the other hand, even bad
things may show a certain mutual agreement and har-
mony; as, for instance, were we to assert that wisdom
is softening of the brain, and that justice is a generous
folly. Here we have two revoltingly absurd state-
ments, which agree perfectly, and harmonize mutually.
Further, every virtue is a soul-beauty far truer than any
that we have till now examined; yet it could not admit
of proportion, as it involves neither size nor number.
Again, granting that the soul is divided into several
faculties, who will undertake to decide which combina-
tion of these faculties, or of the speculations to which
the soul devotes itself, will produce beauty? More-
over (if beauty is but proportion), what beauty could
be predicated of pure intelligence?

BEAUTY CONSISTS IN KINSHIP TO THE SOUL.

2. Returning to our first consideration, we shall
examine the nature of the element of beauty in bodies.
It is something perceivable at the very first glance,
something which the soul recognizes as kindred, and
sympathetic to her own nature, which she welcomes
and assimilates. But as soon as she meets an ugly
object, she recoils, repudiates it, and rejects it as some-
thing foreign, towards which her real nature feels
antipathy. That is the reason why the soul, being such
as it is, namely, of an essence superior to all other

16] OF BEAUTY 43

beings, when she perceives an object kindred to her
own nature, or which reveals only some traces of it,
rejoices, is transported, compares this object with her
own nature, thinks of herself, and of her intimate being
as it would be impossible to fail to perceive this re-
semblance.

BEAUTY CONSISTS IN PARTICIPATION IN A FORM.
How can both sensible and intelligible objects be
beautiful? Because, as we said, sensible objects par-
ticipate in a form. While a shapeless object, by nature
capable of receiving shape (physical) and form (in-
telligible), remains without reason or form, it is ugly.
That which remains completely foreign to all divine
reason (a reason proceeding from the universal Soul),
is absolute ugliness. Any object should be considered
ugly which is not entirely molded by informing reason,
the matter, not being able to receive perfectly the
form (which the Soul gives it). On joining matter,
form co-ordinates the different parts which are to com-
pose unity, combines them, and by their harmony pro-
duces something which is a unit. Since (form) is one,
that which it fashions will also have to be one, as far
as a composite object can be one. When such an
object has arrived at unity, beauty resides in it, and it
communicates itself to the parts as well as to the whole.
When it meets a whole, the parts of which are per-
fectly similar, it interpenetrates it evenly. Thus it
would show itself now in an entire building, then in a
single stone, later in art-products as well as in the
works of nature. Thus bodies become beautiful by
communion with (or, participation in) a reason de-
scending upon it from the divine (universal Soul).

THE SOUL APPRECIATES THE BEAUTIFUL BY AN
AESTHETIC SENSE.

3. The soul appreciates beauty by an especially
ordered faculty, whose sole function it is to appreciate

44 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

all that concerns beauty, even when the other faculties
take part in this judgment. Often the soul makes her
(aesthetic) decisions by comparison with the form
of the beautiful which is within her, using this form as
a standard by which to judge. But what agreement
can anything corporeal have with what is incorporeal?
For example, how can an architect judge a l3uilding
placed before him as beautiful, by comparing it with
the Idea which he has within himself? The only ex-
planation can be that, on abstracting the stones, the
exterior object is nothing but the interior form, no
doubt divided within the extent of the matter, but still
one, though manifested in the manifold? When the
senses perceive in an object the form which combines,
unites and dominates a substance which lacks shape,
and therefore is of a contrary nature; and if they
also perceive a shape which distinguishes itself from
the other shapes by its elegance, then the soul, uniting
these multiple elements, fuses them, comparing them
to the indivisible form which she bears within herself,
then she pronounces their agreement, kinship and har-
mony with that interior type.

INSTANCES OF CORRESPONDENCE OF OUTER
SENSE BEAUTY WITH ITS IDEA.

Thus a worthy man, perceiving in a youth the
character -of virtue, is agreeably impressed, because he
observes that the youth harmonizes with the true type
of virtue which he bears within himself. Thus also the
beauty of color, though simple in form, reduces under
its sway that obscurity of matter, by the presence of
the light, which is something incorporeal, a reason, and
a form. Likewise, fire surpasses all other bodies in
beauty, because it stands to all other elements in the
relation of a form; it occupies the highest regions;* it
is the subtlest of bodies because it most approaches the
*See ii. 1.

16] OF BEAUTY 45

incorporeal beings; without permitting itself to be pene-
trated by other bodies, it penetrates them all; without
itself cooling, it communicates to them its heat; by its
own essence it possesses color, and communicates it to
others; it shines and coruscates, because it is a form.
The body in which it does not dominate, shows but a
discolored hue, and ceases being beautiful, merely be-
cause it does not participate in the whole form of color.
Once more, thus do the hidden harmonies of sound
produce audible harmonies, and also yield to the soul
the idea of beauty, though showing it in another order
of things. Audible harmonies can be expressed in
numbers; not indeed in any kind of numbers, but only
in such as can serve to produce form, and to make it
dominate.

TRANSITION FROM SENSE BEAUTY TO INTELLEC-
TUAL BEAUTY.
So much then for sense-beauties which, descending
on matter like images and shadows, beautify it and
thereby compel our admiration. 4. Now we shall
leave the senses in their lower sphere, and we shall rise
to the contemplation of the beauties of a superior order,
of which the senses have no intuition, but which the
soul perceives and expresses.

INTERIOR BEAUTIES COULD NOT BE APPRECIATED

WITHOUT AN INTERIOR MODEL.

Just as we could not have spoken of sense-beauties

if we had never seen them, nor recognized them as

such, if, in respect to them, we had been similar to

persons born blind, likewise we would not know enough

to say anything about the beauty either of the arts or

sciences, or of anything of the kind, if we were not

already in possession of this kind of beauty; nor of the

splendor of virtue, if we had not contemplated the

("golden) face of Justice," and of temperance, before

whose splendor the morning and evening stars grow pale.

46 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

MORAL BEAUTIES MORE DELIGHTFUL THAN SENSE-
BEAUTIES.

To see these beauties, they must be contem-
plated by the faculty our soul has received; then, while
contemplating them, we shall experience far more
pleasure, astonishment and admiration, than in con-
templation of the sense-beauties, because we will have
the intuition of veritable beauties. The sentiments in-
spired by beauty are admiration, a gentle charm, desire,
love, and a pleasurable impulse.

THEY WHO FEEL THESE SENTIMENTS MOST
KEENLY ARE CALLED LOVERS.

Such are the sentiments for invisible beauties which
should be felt, and indeed are experienced by all souls,
but especially by the most loving. In the presence of
beautiful bodies, all indeed see them; but not all are
equally moved. Those who are most moved are
designated "lovers."*

THE CAUSE OF THESE EMOTIONS IS THE INVISIBLE

SOUL.

5. Let us now propound a question about experi-
ences to these men who feel love for incorporeal
beauties. What do you feel in presence of the noble
occupations, the good morals, the habits of temper-
ance, and in general of virtuous acts and sentiments,
and of all that constitutes the beauty of souls.? What
do you feel when you contemplate your inner beauty?
What is the source of your ecstasies, or your enthusi-
asms? Whence come your desires to unite yourselves
to your real selves, and to refresh yourselves by retire-
ment from your bodies? Such indeed are the experi-
ences of those who love genuinely. What then is the
object which causes these, your emotions ? It is neither
a figure, nor a color, nor any size; it is that (colorless)

*See i. 3.

i.6] OF BEAUTY 47

invisible soul, which possesses a wisdom equally in-
visible; this soul in which may be seen shining the
splendor of all the virtues, when one discovers in one-
self, or contemplates in others, the greatness of char-
acter, the justice of the heart, the pure temperance, the
imposing countenance of valor, dignity and modesty,
proceeding alone firmly, calmly, and imperturbably;
and above all, intelligence, resembling the divinity, by
its brilliant light. What is the reason that we declare
these objects to be beautiful, when we are transported
with admiration and love for them? They exist, they
manifest themselves, and whoever beholds them will
never be able to restrain himself from confessing them
to be veritable beings. Now what are these genuine
beings? They are beautiful.

LOVE OF BEAUTY EXPLAINED BY AVERSION FOR

OPPOSITE.

But reason is not yet satisfied; reason wonders why
these veritable beings give the soul which experiences
them the property of exciting love, from which pro-
:eeds this halo of light which, so to speak, crowns all
virtues. Consider the things contrary to these beautiful
Dbjects, and with them compare what may be ugly in
the soul. If we can discover of what ugliness consists,
md what is its cause, we shall have achieved an im-
portant element of the solution we are seeking. Let
LIS picture to ourselves an ugly soul; she will be given
Lip to intemperance; and be unjust, abandoned to a host
of passions, troubled, full of fears caused by her
:owardliness, and of envy by her degradation; she will
dt longing only for vile and perishable things; she will
oe entirely depraved, will love nothing but impure
ivishes, will have no life but the sensual, and will take
pleasure in her turpitude. Would we not explain such
I state by saying that under the very mask of beauty
turpitude had invaded this soul, brutalized her, soiled

;48 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

her with all kinds of vices, rendering her incapable of
a pure life, and pure sentiments, and had reduced her
to an existence obscure, infected with evil, poisoned
by lethal germs; that it had hindered her from contem-
plating anything she should, forcing her to remain
solitary, because it misled her out from herself towards
inferior and gloomy regions? The soul fallen into this
state of impurity, seized with an irresistible inclination
towards the things of sense, absorbed by her intercourse
with the body, sunk into matter, and having even re-
ceived it within herself, has changed form by her ad-
mixture with an inferior nature. Not otherwise would
be a man fallen into slimy mud, who no longer would
present to view his primitive beauty, and would exhibit
only the appearance of the mud that had defiled him;
his ugliness would be derived from something foreign;
and to recover his pristine beauty he would have to
wash off his defilement, and by purification be restored
to what he once was.

UGLINESS IS ONLY A FOREIGN ACCRETION.

We have the right to say that the soul becomes ugly
by mingling with the body, confusing herself with it,
by inclining herself towards it. For a soul, ugliness
consists in being impure, no longer unmingled, like gold
tarnished by particles of earth. As soon as this dross
is removed, and nothing but gold remains, then again
it is beautiful, because separated from every foreign
body, and is restored to its unique nature. Likewise
the soul, released from the passions begotten by her
intercourse with the body when she yields herself too
much to it, delivered from exterior impressions, puri-
fied from the blemishes contracted from her alliance
with the body — that is, reduced to herself, she lays
aside that ugliness which is derived from a nature
foreign to her.

i.6] OF BEAUTY 49

VIRTUES ARE ONLY PURIFICATIONS.

6. Thus, according to the ancient (Platonic or Em-
pedoclean) maxim, ''courage, temperance, all the
virtues, nay, even prudence, are but purifications."
The mysteries were therefore wise in teaching that the
man who has not been purified will, in hell, dwell at
the bottom of a swamp; for everything that is not pure,
because of its very perversity, delights in mud, just as
we see the impure swine wallow in the mud with delight.
And indeed, what would real temperance consist of, if
it be not to avoid attaching oneself to the pleasures of
the body, and to flee from them as impure, and as only
proper for an impure being? What else is courage,
unless no longer to fear death, which is mere separation
of the soul from the body? Whoever therefore is will-
ing to withdraw from the body could surely not fear
death. Magnanimity is nothing but scorn of things
here below. Last, prudence is the thought which, de-
tached from the earth, raises the soul to the intelligible
world. The purified soul, therefore, becomes a form,
a reason, an incorporeal and intellectual essence; she
belongs entirely to the divinity, in whom, resides the
source of the beautiful, and of all the qualities which
have affinity with it.

THE SOUL'S WELFARE IS TO RESEMBLE THE

DIVINITY.
Restored to intelligence, the soul sees her own beauty
increase; indeed, her own beauty consists of the intel-
ligence with its ideas; only when united to intelligence
is the soul really isolated from all the remainder. That
is the reason that it is right to say that "the soul's
welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the
divinity," because it is the principle of beauty and of
the essences; or rather, being is beauty, while the other
nature (non-being, matter), is ugliness. This is the
First Evil, evil in itself, just as that one (the First

So WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

Principle) is the good and the beautiful; lor good and
beauty are identical. Consequently, beauty or good,
and evil or ugliness, are to be studied by the same
methods. The first rank is to be assigned to beauty,
which is identical with the good, and from which is de-
rived the intelligence which is beautiful by itself. The
soul is beautiful by intelligence, then, the other thing's,
like actions, and studies, are beautiful by the soul which
gives them a form. It is still the soul which beautifies
the bodies to which is ascribed this perfection; being a
divine essence, and participating in beauty, when she
seizes an object, or subjects it to her dominion, she
gives to it the beauty that the nature of this object
enables it to receive.

APPROACH TO THE GOOD CONSISTS IN SIMPLIFI-
CATION.

We must still ascend to the Good to which every
soul aspires. Whoever has seen it knows what 1 still
have to say, and knows the beauty of the Good. In-
deed, the Good is desirable for its own sake; it is the
goal of our desires. To attain it, we have to ascend
to the higher regions, turn towards them, and lay aside
the garment which we put on when descending here
below; just as, in the (Eleusynian, or Isiac) mysteries,
those who are admitted to penetrate into the recesses
of the sanctuary, after having purified themselves, lay
aside every garment, and advance stark naked.

THE SUPREME PURPOSE OF LIFE IS THE

ECSTATICAL VISION OF GOD. «.^

7. Thus, in her ascension towards divinity, the soul
advances until, having risen above everything that is
foreign to her, she alone with Him who is alone, be-
holds, in all His simplicity and purity, Him from whom
all depends, to whom all aspires, from whom every-

i.6] OF BEAUTY 51

thing draws its existence, life and thought. He who
beholds him is overwhelmed with love; with ardor
desiring to unite himself with Him, entranced with
ecstasy. Men who have not yet seen Him desire Him
as the Good; those who have, admire Him as sovereign
beauty, struck simultaneously with stupor and pleasure,
thrilling in a painless orgiasm, loving with a genuine
emotion, with an ardor without equal, scorning all
other affections, and disdaining those things which
formerly they characterized as beautiful. This is the
experience of those to whom divinities and guardians
have appeared; they reck no longer of the beauty of
other bodies. Imagine, if you can, the experiences of
those who behold Beauty itself, the pure Beauty, which,
because of its very purity, is fleshless and bodiless,
outside of earth and heaven. All these things, indeed
are contingent and composite, they are not principles,
they are derived from Him. What beauty could one
still wish to see after having arrived at vision of Him
who gives perfection to all beings, though himself re-
mains unmoved, without receiving anything; after find-
ing rest in this contemplation, and enjoying it by be-
coming assimilated to Him? Being supreme beauty,
and the first beauty. He beautifies those who love
Him, and thereby they become worthy of love. This
is the great, the supreme goal of souls; this is the goal
which arouses all their efforts, if they do not wish to
be disinherited of that sublime contemplation the en-
joyment of which confers blessedness, and privation of
which is the greatest of earthly misfortunes. Real mis-
fortune is not to lack beautiful colors, nor beautiful
bodies, nor power, nor domination, nor royalty. It
is quite sufficient to see oneself excluded from no
more than possession of beauty. This possession is
precious enough lo render worthless domination of a
kingdom, if not of the whole earth, of the sea, or even
of the heavens — if indeed it were possible, while

52 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

abandoning and scorning all that (natural beauty), to
succeed in contemplating beauty face to face.

THE METHOD TO ACHIEVE ECSTASY IS TO CLOSE
THE EYES OF THE BODY.

8. How shall we start, and later arrive at the
contemplation of this ineffable beauty which, like
the divinity in the mysteries, remains hidden in the
recesses of a sanctuary, and does not show itself out-
side, where it might be perceived by the profane? We
must advance into this sanctuary, penetrating into it,
if we have the strength to do so, closing our eyes to the
spectacle of terrestrial things, without throwing a back-
ward glance on the bodies whose graces formerly
charmed us. If we do still see corporeal beauties, we
must no longer rush at them, but, knowing that they
are only images, traces and adumbrations of a superior
principle, we will flee from them, to approach Him of
whom they are merely the reflections. Whoever would
let himeslf be misled by the pursuit of those vain
shadows, mistaking them for realities, would grasp only
an image as fugitive as the fluctuating form reflected
by the waters, and would resemble that senseless
(Narcissus) who, wishing to grasp that image himself,
according to the fable, disappeared, carried away by
the current. Likewise he would wish to embrace cor-
poreal beauties, and not release them, would plunge,
not his body, but his soul into the gloomy abysses, so
repugnant to intelligence; he would be condemned to
total blindness; and on this earth, as well as in hell,
he would see naught but mendacious shades.

HOW TO FLY TO OUR FATHERLAND.

This indeed is the occasion to quote (from Homer)
with peculiar force, **Let us fly unto our dear father-
land!" But how shall we fly? How escape from
here? is the question Ulysses asks himself in that

16] OF BEAUTY 53

allegory which represents him trying to escape from
the magic sway of Circe or Calypso, where neither the
pleasure of the eyes, nor the view of fleshly beauty
were able to hold him in those enchanted places. Our
fatherland is the region whence we descend here below.
It is there that dwells our Father. But how shall we
return thither? What means shall be employed to
return us thither? Not our feet, indeed; all they could
do would be to move us from one place of the earth
to another. Neither is it a chariot, nor ship which need
be prepared. All these vain helps must be left aside,
and not even considered. We must close the eyes of
the body, to open another vision, which indeed all pos-
sess, but very few employ.

HOW TO TRAIN THIS INTERIOR VISION.

9. But how shall we train this interior vision? At
the moment of its (first) awakening, it cannot contem-
plate beauties too dazzling. Your soul must then first
be accustomed to contemplate the noblest occupations
of man, and then the beautiful deeds, not indeed those
performed by artists, but those (good deeds) done by
virtuous men. Later contemplate the souls of those
who perform these beautiful actions. Nevertheless,
how will you discover the beauty which their excellent
soul possesses? Withdraw within yourself, and ex-
amine yourself. If you do not yet therein discover
beauty, do as the artist, who cuts off, polishes, purifies
until he has adorned his statue with all the marks of
beauty. Remove from your soul, therefore, all that is
superfluous, straighten out all that is crooked, purify
and illuminate what is obscure, and do not cease per-
fecting your statue until the divine resplendence of
virtue shines forth upon your sight, until you see
temperance in its holy purity seated in your breast.
When you shall have acquired this perfection; when
you will see it in yourself; when you will purely dwell

54 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

within yourself; when you will cease to meet within
yourself any obstacle to unity; when nothing foreign
will any more, by its admixture, alter the simplicity of
your interior essence; when within your whole being
you will be a veritable light, immeasurable in size,
uncircumscribed by any figure within narrow bound-
aries, unincreasable because reaching out to infinity,
and entirely incommensurable because it transcends all
measure and quantity; when you shall have become
such, then, having become sight itself, you may have
confidence in yourself, for you will no longer need
any guide. Then must you observe carefully, for it is
only by the eye that then will open itself within you
that you will be able to perceive supreme Beauty. But
if you try to fix on it an eye soiled by vice, an eye that
is impure, or weak, so as not to be able to support
the splendor of so brilliant an object, that eye will see
nothing, not even if it were shown a sight easy to grasp.
The organ of vision will first have to be rendered
analogous and similar to the object it is to contemplate.
Never would the eye have seen the sun unless first it
had assumed its form; likewise, the soul could never
see beauty, unless she herself first became beautiful.
To obtain the view of the beautiful, and of the divinity,
every man must begin by rendering himself beautiful
and divine. ^

THE LANDMARKS OF THE PATH TO ECSTASY.

Thus he will first rise to intelligence, and he will
there contemplate beauty, and declare that all this
beauty resides in the Ideas. Indeed, in them everything
is beautiful, because they are the daughters and the |
very essence of Intelligence. *

Above intelligence, he will meet Him whom we call
the nature of the Good, and who causes beauty to
radiate around Him; so that, to repeat, the first thing
that is met is beauty. If a distinction is to be established

16] OF BEAUTY 55

among the intelligibles, we might say that intelligible
beauty is the locus of ideas, and that the Good, which
is located above the Beautiful, is its source and prin-
ciple. If, however, we desire to locate the Good and
the Beautiful within one single principle, we might
regard this one principle first as Good, and only after-
wards, as Beauty.

REFERENCES.

Page 40, line 4, Equally Beautiful, Phaedrus p. 250, Cary 63-65;

Hippias Major, 295, Cary 44; Philebus p. 17, Cary 20, 21.
Page 41, line 11, Stoic definition, Cicero, Tusculans, iv. 13.
Page 44, line 30, Obscurity of Matter, Timaeus, p. 31, Cary 11;

Philebus, p. 29, Cary 52.
Page 45, line 22, Superior Order, Banquet 210, Cary 34;

Timaeus, p. 31, Cary 11.
Page 45, line 35, Golden Face of Justice, Athenaeus, Deipnoso-

phistae, xii. 546.
Page 46, line 10, Pleasurable Impulse, Banquet, p. 191, Cary 17,

18; Cratylos, p. 420, Cary 78-80.
Page 47, line 5, Justice of the Heart, Banquet, p. 209, Cary 33 ;

Republic, iii. 402, Cary 12.
Page 48, line 23, Ugliness, Banquet, p. 215-217, Cary 39, 40;

Philebus, p. 66, Cary 158 159.
Page 49, line 4, Purifications, Phaedo, p. 69, Cary 37.
Page 49, line 32, Assimilating to Divinity, Republic x. p. 613,

Cary 12.
Page 50, line 1, Good and Beautiful, Timaeus, p. 35, Cary 12.
Page 50, line 5, Identical with Good, Philebus. p. 64, Cary

153-155; First Alcibiades, p. 115, Cary 23, 24.
Page 51, line 1, 2, He who Beholds, Phaedrus, p. 278, Cary 145.
Page 51, line 8, Ardor without Equal; line 15, Very Purity;

Banquet, p. 210, 211; Cary 34, 35.
Page 51, line 29, Confers Blessedness, Phaedrus, p. 250. Cary 64.
Page 53, line 16, Interior Vision, Republic, x., p. 533. Cary 13.
Page 53, line 34, Temporance Seated, Phaedrus, p. 279, Cary 147.
Page 54, line 19, Organ of Vision, Timaeus, p. 45, Cary 19.
Page 54, line 23, Assumed its form, Republic, vi., p. 508, Cary 19.
Page 54, line 29, Rise to Intelligence Philebus, p, 64, Gary 153-155.

56 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN.

Of the Immortality of the Soul: Polemic Against

Materialism.

IS THE SOUL IMMORTAL?

1. Are we immortal, or does all of us die? (An-
other possibility would be that) of the two parts of
which we are composed, the one might be fated to be
dissolved and perish, while the other, that constitutes
our very personality, might subsist perpetually. These
problems must be solved by a study of our nature.

THE BODY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL.

Man is not a simple being; he contains a soul and a
body, which is united to this soul, either as tool, or in
some other manner.* This is how we must distinguish
the soul from the body, and determine the nature and
manner of existence ("being") of each of them.

THE BODY IS COMPOSITE, AND THEREFORE
PERISHABLE.

As the nature of the body is composite, reason con-
vinces us that it cannot last perpetually, and our senses
show it to us dissolved, destroyed, and decayed, be-
cause the elements that compose it return to join the
elements of the same nature, altering, destroying them
and each other, especially when this chaos is abandoned
to the soul, which alone keeps her parts combined.
Even if a body were taken alone, it would not be a
unity; it may be analyzed into form and matter, prin-

♦As pilot, perhaps, iv. 3. 21.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 57

ciples that are necessary to the constitution of all
bodies, even of those that are simple.* Besides, as they
contain extension, the bodies can be cut, divided into
infinitely small parts, and thus perish. f Therefore if
our body is a part of ourselves,^ not all of us is im-
mortal; if the body is only the instrument of the soul,
as the body is given to the soul only for a definite
period, it still is by nature perishable.

THE SOUL IS THE INDIVIDUALITY, AS ITS FORM,
AND AS A SKILLED WORKMAN.

The soul, which is the principal part of man, and
which constitutes man himself,§ should bear to the body
the relation of form to matter, or of a workman to his
tool;|| in both cases the soul is the man himself.

IF THE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL, WE MUST STUDY
INCORPOREALITY.

2. What then is the nature of the soul ? If she is a
body, she can be decomposed, as every body is a com-
posite. If, on the contrary, she is not a body, if hers
is a different nature, the latter must be examined;
either in the same way that we have examined the
body, or in some other way.

A.— THE SOUL IS NOT CORPOREAL (AS THE STOICS

THOUGHT).

(a.) (Neither a material molecule, nor a material
aggregation of material atoms could possess life and in-
telligence.) First, let us consider the nature of this
alleged soul-body. As every soul necessarily possesses
life, and as the body, considered as being the soul, must
obtain at least two molecules, if not more (there are
three possibilities) : either only one of them possesses
life, or all of them possess it, or none of them. If one

♦See ii., 4. 6. fSee ii. 7. 1. jSee i. 1. 10.

§Seei. 9. 8. 10. ||See iv. 3. 20, 2L

58 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

molecule alone possesses life, it alone will be the soul.
Of what nature will be that molecule supposed to pos-
sess life by itself? Will it be water (Hippo), air
(Anaximenes, Archelaus, and Diogenes), earth, or fire
(Heraclitus, Stobaeus?*) But those are elements that'
are inanimate by themselves, and which, even when
they are animated, possess but a borrowed life. Still
there is no other kind of body. Even those (philoso-
phers, like the Pythagoreans) who posited elements
other (than water, air, earth and fire) still considered
them to be bodies, and not souls, not even attributing
souls to them. The theory that life results from the
union of molecules of which, nevertheless, none by
itself possesses life, is an absurd hypothesis. If further
any molecule possesses life, then a single one would be
sufficient.

NI^HER MIXTURE NOR ITS PRINCIPLE WILL
EXPLAIN LIFE AS A BODY.

The most irrational theory of all is that an aggre-
gation of molecules should produce life, that elements
without intelligence should beget intelligence. Others
(like Alexander of Aphrodisia) insist that to produce
life these elements must be mingled in a certain manner.
That would, however, imply (as thought Galien and
Hippocrates,t) the existence of a principle which pro-
duces order, and which should be the cause of mixture
or, temperament,^ and that should alone deserve being
considered as soul. No simple bodies could exist, much
less composite bodies, unless there was a soul in the
j, universe; for it is (seminal) reason which, in adding
\ j itself to matter, produces body.§ But surely a (seminal)
' * reason could proceed from nowhere except a soul.

*Ecl. Phys., p. 797, Heeren and Aristotle, de Anima, i. 2.
tSee Nemesius, de Nat. Horn. 2.
jSee ii. 7, \.
§See ii. 7, 3.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 59

NO ATOMIC AGGREGATION COULD PRODUCE A

SELF-HARMONIZING UNITY.
3. (b.) (No aggregation of atoms could form a
whole that would be one and sympathetic with itself.)
Others, on the contrary, insist that the soul is con-
stituted by the union of atoms or indivisibles (as thought
Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus.*) To refute this
error, we have to examine the nature of sympathy (or
community of affection, a Stoic characteristic of a
living being,t) and juxtaposition. $ On the one hand
an aggregation of corporeal molecules which are in-
capable of being united, and which do not feel cannot
form a single sympathetic whole such as is the soul,
which is sympathetic with herself. On the other hand,
how could a body or extension be constituted by (a
juxtaposition of) atoms?

SOUL IS A SIMPLE SUBSTANCE, WHILE EVERY -BODY
IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM.
(c.) (Every body is a composite of matter and form,
while the soul is a simple substance.) Inasmuch as mat-
ter possesses no qu?.lity,§ the matter of no simple body
will be said to possess life in itself. That which imparts
life to it must then be its form. If form is a ''being,"
the soul cannot simultaneously be matter and form; it
will be only matter or form. Consequently, the soul will
not be the body, since the body is not constituted by
matter exclusively, as could be proved analytically, if
necessary.

IF SOUL IS ONLY AN AFFECTION OF MATTER,

WHENCE THAT AFFECTION?
(d.) (The soul is not a simple manner of being of
matter, because matter could not give itself a form.)
Some Stoics might deny that form was a "being," as-
serting the soul to be a mere ailection (or, manner of
*Stob. Eel Phys. 797. fSec ii. 3, 5.

tSec ii. 7, \. §ii. 4, 7.

60 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2,

being) of matter.* From whence then did matter
acquire this affection and animating life? Surely matter
itself could not endow itself with a form and a soul.
That which endows matter or any body with life must
then be some principle alien and superior to corporeal
nature.

NO BODY COULD SUBSIST WITHOUT THE POWER
OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. ^

(e.) (No body could subsist without the power of thej
universal soul.) Besides no body could subsist without
the power of the universal Soul (from Numeniusf),
Every body, indeed, is in a perpetual flow and move-
ment (as thought Heraclitus, in Plato, Cratylus§), and
the world would soon perish if it contained nothing but
bodies, even if some one of them were to be called
soul; for such a soul, being composed of the same
matter as the other bodies, would undergo the same
fate that they do; or rather, there would not even be
any body, everything would remain in the condition of
shapeless matter, since there would exist no principle to
fashion it. Why, there would not even be any matter,
and the universe would be annihilated to nothingness, if
the care of keeping its parts united were entrusted to
some body which would have nothing but the name
of soul, as for instance, to air, or a breath without
cohesion,^ which could not be one, by itself. As
all bodies are divisible, if the universe depended on
a body, it would be deprived of intelligence and
given up to chance. How, indeed, could there
be any order in a spirit which itself would need
to receive order from a soul? How could this spirit
contain reason and intelligence? On the hypothesis of
the existence of the soul, all these elements serve to
constitute the body of the world, and of every animal,

♦See iv. 7, 8. fEuseb., Prep. Ev. xv. 17. .^ '

JCicero, Tusculans, i. 9. §p. 54, Cousin. , ''"-•'

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 61

because all different bodies together work for the end
of all; but without the soul, there is no order, and even
nothing exists any more.

IF THE SOUL IS NOT SIMPLE MATTER, SHE MUST BE
A SUBSTANTIAL FORM.

4. (f) (If the soul is anything but simple matter, she
must be constituted by a substantial form.) Those who
claim that the soul is a body are, by the very force of
the truth, forced to recognize the existence, before
and above them, of a form proper to the soul; for they
acknowledge the existence of an intelligent spirit, and
an intellectual fire (as do the Stoics, following in the
footsteps of Heraclitus, Stobaeus*). According to them,
it seems that, without spirit or fire, there canot be any
superior nature in the order of beings, and that the soul
needs a location where she may be built up. On the
contrary, it is bodies alone that need to be built up on
something, and indeed, they are founded on the powers
of the soul. If really we do believe that the soul and
life are no more than a spirit, why add the qualifica-
tion "of a certain characteristic, "f ^ meaningless term
employed when forced to admit an active nature su-
perior to that of bodies. As there are thousands of in-
animate spirits, not every spirit is a soul. If only that
spirit is a soul which possesses that "special character-
istic," this "special characteristic" and this "manner of
being" will either be something real, or will be nothing.
If they are nothing, there will be nothing real but spirit,
and this alleged "manner of being" is nothing more
than a word. In that system, therefore, nothing but
matter really exists. God, the soul, and all other things
are no more than a word; the body alone really sub-
sists. If, on the contrary, that "manner of being" is
something real, if it is anything else than substrate or

♦Eel. Phys. 797, Cicero, de Nat. Deor. iii. 14.

fSee ii. 4, 1. *p6s echon.' of Dikearchus and Aristoxenus.

62 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

matter, if it resides in matter without being material or
composed of matter, it must then be a nature different
from the body, namely, a reason (by a pun).*

THE BODY EXERTS A UNIFORM ACTION, WHILE THE
SOUL EXERTS A VARIED ONE.

(g.) (The body exerts an uniform action, while the
soul exerts a very diverse action.) The following con-
siderations further demonstrate the impossibility of the
soul being a body. A body must be hot or cold, hard
or soft, liquid or solid, black or white, or qualities dif-
fering according to its nature. If it is only hot or cold,
light or heavy, black or white, it communicates its
only quality to what comes close to it; for fire' could
not cool, nor ice heat. Nevertheless, the soul produces
not only different effects in different animals, but con-
trary effects even in the same being; she makes certain
things solid, dense, black, light, and certain others
liquid, sparse, white, or heavy. According to the differ-
ent quality of the body, and according to its color, she
should produce but a single effect; nevertheless, she
exerts a very diverse action. "^

THREE MORE PROOFS OF THE INCORPOREl'TY~OF

THE SOUL. __ J

5. (h.) (The body has but a single kind of m7)tion,'
while the soul has different ones.) If the soul is a
body, how does it happen that she has different kinds
of motion instead of a single one, as is the case with
the body? Will these movements be explained by
voluntary determinations, and by (seminal) reasons?
In this case neither the voluntary determinations, nor
these reasons, which differ from each other, can belong
to a single and simple body; such a body does not
participate in any particular reason except by the
principle that made it hot or cold.
♦See ii. 6, on 'logos.*

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 63

BODIES CAN LOSE PARTS, NOT SO THE SOUL.

(i.) (Souls cannot, as do bodies, lose or gain parts,
ever remaining identical.) The body has the faculty
of making its organs grow within a definite time and in
fixed proportions. From where could the soul derive
them.? Its function is to grow, not to cause growth,
unless the principle of growth be comprehended within
its material mass. If the soul thai; makes the body
grow was herself a body, she should, on uniting with
molecules of a nature similar to hers, develop a growth
proportional to that of the organs. In this case, the
molecules that will come to add themselves to the soul
will be either animate or inanimate; if they are animate,
how could they have become such, and from whom
will they have received that characteristic? If they
are not animate, how will they become such, and how
will agreement between them and the first soul arise?
How will they form but a single unity with her, and how
will they agree with her? Will they not constitute a
soul that will remain foreign to the former, who will
not possess her requirements of knowledge? This
aggregation of molecules that would thus be called soul
will resemble the aggregation of molecules that form
our body. She would lose parts, she would acquire new
ones; she will not be identical. But if we had a soul that
was not identical, memory and self-consciousness of
our own faculties would be impossible.

THE SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE; THAT IS NOT
THE CASE WITH THE BODY.

(j.) (The soul, being one and simple, is everywhere
entire, and has parts that are identical to the whole;
this is not the case with the body.) If the soul is a
body, she will have parts that are not identical with
the whole, as every body is by nature divisible. If then
the soul has a definite magnitude of which she cannot
lose anything without ceasing to be a soul, she will by

64 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

losing her parts, change her nature, as happens to every
quantity. If, on losing some part of its magnitude, a
body, notwithstanding, remains identical in respect to
quality, it does not nevertheless become different from
what it was, in respect to quantity, and it remains iden-
tical only in respect to quality, which differs from quan-
tity. What shall we answer to those who insist that
the soul is a body? Will they say that, in the same
body, each part possesses the same quality as the
total soul, and that the case is similar with the part of
a part? Then quantity is no longer essential to the
nature of the soul; which contradicts the hypothesis that
the soul needed to possess a definitd magnitude. Be-
sides the soul is everywhere entire; now it is impossible
tor a body to be entire in several places simultaneously,
or have parts identical to the whole. If we refuse the
name of soul to each part, the soul is then composed
of inanimate parts. Besides, if the soul is a definite
magnitude, she cannot increase or diminish without
ceasijng to be a soul; but it often happens that from a
single conception or from a single germ are born two
or more beings, as is seen in certain animals in whom
the germs divide;* in this case, each part is equal to
the whole. However superficially considered, this fact
demonstrates that the principle in which the part is
equal to the whole is essentially superior to quantity,
and must necessarily lack any kind of quantity. On
this condition alone can the soul remain identical when
the body loses its quantity, because she has need of no
mass, no quantity, and because her essence is of an en-
tirely different nature. The soul and the (seminal)
reasons therefore possess no extension.

THE BODY COULD NOT POSSESS SENSATION.

6. (k.) (The body could not possess either sensa-
tion, thought, or virtue.) If the soul were a body, she
*See V. 7, 3.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 65

would not possess either sensation, thought, science,
virtue, nor any of the perfections that render her more
beautiful. Here follows the proof.

IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE BODY TO HAVE
SENSATION.
The subject that perceives a sense-object must itself
be single, and grasp this object in its totality, by one
and the same power. This happens when by several
organs we perceive several qualities of a single object,
or when, by a single organ, we embrace a single com-
plex object in its totality, as, for instance, a face. It is
not one principle that sees the face, and another one
that sees the eyes; it is the ''same principle" which em-
braces everything at once. Doubtless we do receive a
sense-impression by the eyes, and another by the ears;
but both of them must, end in some single principle.
How, indeed, could any decision be reached about the
difference of sense-impressions unless they all con-
verged toward the same principle? The latter is like
a centre, and the individual sensations are like radii
which from the circumference radiate towards the cen-
tre of a circle. This central principle is essentially single.
If it was divisible, and if sense-impressions were directed
towards two points at a distance from each other, such
as the extremities of the same line, they would either
still converge towards one and the same point, as, for
instance, the middle (of the line), or one part would
feel one thing, and another something else. It would
be absolutely as if I felt one thing, and you felt another,
when placed in the presence of one and the same thing
(as thought Aristotle, de Anima*). Facts, therefore,
demonstrate that sensations centre in one and the same
principle; as visible images are centred in the pupil of
the eye; otherwise how could we, through the pupil,
see the greatest objects? So much the more, there-
•iii. 2.

66 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

fore, must the sensations that centre in the (Stoic)
/'directing principle"* resemble indivisible intuitions
and be perceived by an indivisible principle. If the latter
possessed extension, it could, like the sense-object, be
divided; each of its parts would thus perceive one of
the parts of the sense-object, and nothing within us
would grasp the object in its totality. The subject that
perceives must then be entirely one; otherwise, how
could it be divided? In that case it could not be made
to coincide with the sense-object, as two equal figures
superimposed on each other, because the directing prin-
ciple does not have an extension equal to that of the
sense-object. How then will we carry out the division ?
Must the subject that feels contain as many! parts as
there are in the sense-object? Will each part of the
soul, in its turn, feel by its own parts, or will (we decide
that) the parts of parts will not feel? Neither is that
likely. If, on the other hand, each part feels the entire
object, and if each magnitude is divisible to infinity, the
result is that, for a single object, there will be an in-
finity of sensations in each part of the soul; and, so
much the more, an infinity of images in the principle
that directs us. (This, however, is the opposite of the
actual state of affairs.)

AGAINST THE STOICS, SENSATIONS ARE NOT
IMPRESSIONS OF A SEAL ON WAX.

Besides, if the principle that feels were corporeal, it
could feel only so long as exterior objects produced in
the blood or in the air some impression similar to that
of a seal on wax.f If they impressed their images on
wet substances, as is no doubt supposed, these impres-
sions would become confused as images in water, and
memory would not occur. If, however, these impres-
sions persisted, they would either form an obstacle to
subsequent ones, and no further sensation would occur;

*See iv. 2, 2. fiv. 2, 1.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 67

or they would be effaced by the new ones, which would
destroy memory. If then the soul is capable of recall-
ing earlier sensations, and having new ones, to which
the former would form no obstacle, it is because she is
not corporeal.

SENSATION CANNOT BE RELAYED FROM SENSE-
ORGAN TO DIRECTING PRINCIPLE.

7. The same reflections may be made about pain,
and one's feeling of it. When a man's finger is said
to give him pain, this, no doubt, is a recognition that
the seat of the pain is in the finger, and that the feeling
of pain is experienced by the directing principle. Con-
sequently, when a part of the spirit suffers, this suffer-
ing is felt by the directing principle, and shared by the
whole soul.* How can this sympathy be explained?
By relay transmission, (the Stoic) will answer; the
sense-impression is felt first by the animal spirit that
is in the finger, and then transmitted to the neighboring
part, and so on till it reaches the directing part. Neces-
sarily, if the pain is felt by the first part that experi-
ences it, it will also be felt by the second part to which
it is transmitted; then by the third, and so on, until the
one pain would have caused an infinite number of
sensations. Last the directing principle will perceive
all these sensations, adding thereto its own sensation.
Speaking strictly, however, each of these sensations
will not transmit the suffering of the finger, but
the suffering of one of the intermediate parts. For
instance, the second sensation will relay the suffer-
ing of the hand. The third, that of the arm, and so on,
until there will be an infinity of sensations. The direct-
ing principle, for its part, will not feel the pain of the
finger, but its own; it will know none but that, it will

*Plutarch, de Placitis Philosoph, iii. 8. The Stoic definition of
sensation being that senses are spirits stretched (by relays with
"tension") from the directing principle to the organs.

6S WORKS OF PLOTINOS [

pay no attention to the rest, because it will ignore th
pain suffered by the finger. Therefore, relayed sensa
tion is an impossibility, nor could one part of the bod.
perceive the suffering felt by another part; for the bod.
has extension, and, in every extension, parts are foreigi
to each other (the opposite of the opinion of Clean
thes, Nemesius).* Consequently, the principle that feel
must everywhere be identical with itself; and among al
beings, the body is that which is least suitable to thh
identity.

THE BODY CANNOT THINK.

8. If, in any sense whatever, the soul were a body,
we could not think. Here is the proof. If feelingf is
explained as the soul's laying hold of perceptible things
by making use of the body, thinking cannot also
of making use of the body. Otherwise, thinking
and feeling would be identical. Thus, thinking
must consist in perceiving without the help of the
body (as thought AristotleJ). So much the more,
the thinking principle cannot be corporeal. Since it is
sensation that grasps sense-objects, it must likewise
be thought, or intellection, that grasps intelligible ob-
jects. Though this should be denied, it will be admitted
that we think certain intelligibles entities, and that
we perceive entities that have no extension. How
could an entity that had extension think one that had
no extension.? Or a divisible entity, think an indivis-
ible one.? Could this take place by an indivisible part?
In this case, the thinking subject will not be corporeal;
for there is no need that the whole subject be in con-
tact with the object; it would suffice if one of its parts
reached the object (as Aristotle said against Plato). §

♦de Nat. Horn. 2.

tSee iv. 4, 23. In the words of Zeno, as, for the Stoics, the
principal act of the intelligence was comprehensive vision, "phalli
tasia kataleptike."

$de Anima, iii. 4, 5. §de Anima, i. 3.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 69

If then this truth be granted, that the highest thouglils
must have incorporeal objects, the latter can be cog-
nized only by a thinking principle that either is, or
becomes independent of body. Even the objection that
the object of thought is constituted by the forms inher-
ent in matter, implies that these forces cannot be
thought unless, by intelligence, they are separated from
matter. It is not by means of the carnal mass of the
body, nor generally by matter, that we can effect the
abstraction of triangle, circle, line or point. To suc-
ceed in this abstraction, the soul must separate from the
body, and consequently, the soul cannot be corporeal

THE BODY CANNOT POSSESS VIRTUE.

Neither do beauty or justice possess extension, I
suppose; and their conception must be similar. These
things can be cognized or retained only by the indivis-
ible part of the soul. If the latter were corporeal,
where indeed could virtues, prudence, justice and cour-
age exist? In this case, virtues (as Critias thought),*
would be no more than a certain disposition of the
spirit, or blood (as Empedocles also thought). f For
instance, courage and temperance would respectively
be no more than a certain irritability, and a fortunate
temperament of the spirit; beauty would consist in the
agreeable shape of outlines, which cause persons, in
whom they occur, to be called elegant and handsome.
Under this hypothesis, indeed, the types of spirit might
possess vigor and beauty. But what need would it
have of temperance? On the contrary, the spirit would
seek to be agreeably affected by the things it touches
and embraces, to enjoy a moderate heat, a gentle cool-
ness, and to be in contact only with sweet, tender, and
smooth entities. What incentive would the spirit have
to apportion rewards to those who had deserved them?

*de Anim. Arist. i. 2. fCicero, Tusculans, i. 9.

70 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

IF VIRTUE WERE CORPOREAL IT WOULD BE
PERISHABLE.

Are the notions of virtue, and othei" intelligible en-
tities by the soul thought eternal, or does virtue arise
and perish? If so, by what being, and how will it be
formed? It is the same problem that remains to be
solved. Intelligible entities must therefore be eternal
and immutable, like geometrical notions, and conse-
quently cannot be corporeal. Further, the subject in
whom they exist must be of a nature similar to theirs,
and therefore not be corporeal; for the nature of body
is not to remain immutable, but ta be in a perpetual
flow. j

BODIES ARE ACTIVE ONLY BY MEANS OF INCOR-
POREAL POWERS.

(9.) There are men who locate the soul in the body,

so as to give her a foundation in some sphere of activ-

; ity, to account for the various phenomena in the body,

such as getting hot or cold, pushing on or stopping,

I (and the like). They evidently do not realize that

\ bodies produce these effects only through incorporeal

I powers, and that those are not the powers that we

\ attribute to the soul, which are thought, sensation,

' reasoning, desire, judiciousness, propriety and wisdom,

all of them entities that cannot possible be attributes

of a corporeal entity. Consequently, those (material-

I ists) attribute to the body all the faculties of incor-

I poreal essences, and leave nothing for the latter.

WHY BODIES ARE ACTIVATED BY INCORPOREAL

POWERS.

The proof that bodies are activated only by incor-
poreal faculties may be proved as follows: Quantity
and quality are two different things. Every body has
a quantity, but not always a quality, as in the case of

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 71

matter, (according to the Stoic definition, that it was a
body without quahty, but possessing magnitude*).
Granting this, (you Stoic) will also be forced to admit
that as quality is something different from quantity, it
must consequently be different from the body. Since
then every body has a quantity, how could quality,
which is no quantity, be a body? Besides, as we said
above,t every body and mass is altered by division;
nevertheless, when a body is cut into pieces, every part
preserves the entire quality without undergoing altera-
tion. For instance, every molecule of honey, possesses
the quality of sweetness as much as all the molecules
taken together; consequently that sweetness cannot
be corporeal; and other qualities must be in a similar
case. Moreover, if the active powers were corporeal,
they would have to have a material mass proportional
to their strength or weakness. Now there are great
masses that have little force, and small ones that have
great force; demonstrating that power does not depend
on extension, and should be attributed to some (sub-
stance) without extension. Finally, you may say that
matter is identical with body, and produces different
beings only by receiving different qualities (the Stoics
considering that even the divinity was no more than
modified matter, their two principles being matter and
quality ;$ the latter, however, was also considered as
body) . How do you (Stoics) not see that qualities thus
added to matter are reasons, that are primary and im-
material? Do not object that when the spirit (breath)
and blood abandon animals, they cease to live; for if
these things are necessary to life, there are for our
life many other necessities, even during the presence
of the soul (as thought Nemesius).§ Besides, neither
spirit nor blood are distributed to every part of the
body.

*See ii. 4, L JSee ii 4, 1.

tSee iv. 7. 5. §de Nat. Horn. 2.

72 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

THE SOUL CAN PENETRATE THE BODY; BUT TWO
BODIES CANNOT PENETRATE EACH OTHER.

(10). The soul penetrates the whole body, while an
entire body cannot penetrate another entire body. Fur-
ther, if the soul is corporeal, and pervades the whole
body, she will, with the body, form (as Alexander of
Aphrodisia pointed out) a mixture,* similar to the other
bodies (that are consititued by a mixture of matter and
quality, as the Stoics taught). Now as none of the
bodies ^hat enter into a mixture is in actualizationf the
soul, instead of being in actualization in the bodies,
would be in them only potentially; consequently, she
would cease to be a soul, as the sweet ceases to be sweet
when mingled with the bitter; we would, therefore,
have no soul left. If, when one body forms a mixture
with another body, total penetration occurs, so that
each molecule contains equal parts of two bodies and
that each body be distributed equally in the whole space
occupied by the mass of the other, without any increase
of volume, nothing that is not divided will remain. In-
deed, mixture operates not only between the larger
parts (which would be no more than a simple juxta-
position) ; but the two bodies must penetrate each other
mutually, even if smaller — it would indeed be impos-
sible for the smaller to equal the greater; still, when the
smaller penetrates the larger it must divide it entirely.
If the mixture operates in this manner in every part,
and if no undivided part of the mass remain, the body
must be divided into points, which is impossible. In-
deed, were this division pushed to infinity, since every
body is fully divisible, bodies will have to be infinite not
only potentially, but also in actuality. It is therefore
impossible for one entire body to penetrate another in
its entirety. Now as the soul penetrates the entire body,
the soul must be incorporeal (as thought Nemesius)4

♦See ii. 7. fSee ii. 7. 1. $Nat. Horn. 2.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 73

THE STOIC DEVELOPMENT FROM HABIT TO SOUL
AND INTELLIGENCE WOULD MAKE THE PERFECT
ARISE FROM THE IMPERFECT, AN IMPOSSIBILITY.

(11). (If, as stoics claim, man first was a certain
nature called habit,* then a soul, and last an intel-
ligence, the perfect would have arisen from the im-
perfect, which is impossible). To say that the first
nature of the soul is to be a spirit, and that this spirit
became soul only after having been exposed to cold,
and as it were became soaked by its contact, be-
cause the cold subtilized it; J this is an absurd
hypothesis. Many animals are born in warm places,
and do not have their soul exposed to action of
cold. Under this hypothesis, the primary nature
of the soul would have been made dependent on
the concourse of exterior circumstances. The Stoics,
therefore, posit as principle that which is less per-
fect (the soul), and trace it to a still less perfect
earlier thing called habit (or form of inorganic
things) .f Intelligence, therefore, is posited in the last
rank since it is alleged to be born of the soul, while, on
the contrary, the first rank should be assigned to in-
telligence, the second to the soul, the third to nature,
and, following natural order, consider that which is less
perfect as the posterior element. In this system the
divinity, by the mere fact of his possessing intelligence,
is posterior and begotten, possessing only an incidental
intelligence. The result would, therefore, be that
there was neither soul, nor intelligence, nor divinity;
for never can that which is potential pass to the con-
dition of actualization, without the prior existence of
some actualized principle. If what is potential were to
transform itself into actualization — which is absurd —
its passage into actualization will have to involve at the

♦See ii. 4, 16. fSee ii. 4, 16.

$As thought Chrysippus, in Plutarch, de Stoic. Repugnant.

74 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

very least a contemplation of something which is not
merely potential, but actualized. Nevertheless, on the
hypothesis that what is potential can permanently re-
main identical, it will of itself pass into actualization,
and will be superior to the being which is potential only
because it will be the object of the aspiration of such
a being. We must, therefore, assign the first rank to
the being that has a perfect and incorporeal nature,
which is always in actualization. Thus intelligence
and soul are prior to nature; the soul, therefore, is not
a spirit, and consequently no body. Other reasons for
the incorporeality of the soul have been advanced; but
the above suffices (as thought Aristotle).*

II. THE SOUL IS NEITHER THE HARMONY NOR EN-
TELECHY OF THE BODY— THE SOUL IS THE HAR-
MONY OF THE BODY; AGAINST THE PYTHA-
GOREANS.

(12). a. Since the soul is not corporeal, its real
nature must be ascertained. Shall we assert that she is
something distinct from the body, but dependent there-
on, as, for instance, a harmony.^ Pythagoras, indeed,
used this word in a technical sense; and after him the
harmony of the body has been thought to be something
similar to the harmony of a lyre. As tension produces
in the lyre-strings an affection (or, manner of being, or
state) that is called harmony, likewise, as contrary ele-
ments are mingled in our body, an individual mixture
produces life and soul, which, therefore, is only an
individual affection of this mixture.

WHY THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY.

As has already been said abovef this hypothesis is
inadmissible for several reasons. To begin with, the
soul is prior (to the body), and the harmony is pos-
.*MejL xii. 6; see ii. 5, 3.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 75

terior thereto. Then the soul dominates the body, gov- ] \
erns it, and often even resists it, which would be im-
possible if the soul were only a harmony. The soul,
indeed, is a ''being," which harmony is not. When
the corporeal principles of which we are composed are
mingled in just proportions, their temperament consti-
tutes health (but not a ''being," such as the soul).
Besides, every part of the body being mingled in a
different manner should form (a different harmony,
and consequently) a different soul, so that there would
be several of them. The decisive argument, however,
is that this soul (that constitutes a harmony) pre-
supposes another soul which would produce this har-
mony, as a lyre needs a musician who would produce
harmonic vibrations in the strings, because he pos-
sesses within himself the reason according to which 'he
produces the harmony. The strings of the lyre do not
vibrate of themselves, and the elements of our body
cannot harmonize themselves. Nevertheless, under
this hypothesis, animated and orderly "being" would
have been made up out of inanimate and disordered
entities; and these orderly "beings" would owe their
order and existence to chance. That 'is as impossible
for parts as for the whole. The soul, therefore, is no
harmony.

THE SOUL IS NOT THE ENTELECHY OF THE BODY
(POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE). ARISTOTLE'S
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.*

(13). b. Now let us examine the opinion of those who i
call the soul an entelechy. They say that, in the com- '
posite, the soul plays the part of form in respect to
matter, in the body the soul animates. The soul, how- \
ever, is not said to be the form of any body, nor of the
body as such; but of the natural body, that is organized,
and which possesses life potentially.f

♦From end of iv. 2. 3. fAristotle, dc Anima, ii. L

76 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

IF THE SOUL IS AN ENTELECHY, SHE IS A DIFFER-
ENT ONE THAN ARISTOTLE'S.

If the soul's relation to the body is the same as that
of the statue to the metal, the soul will be divided
with the body, and on cutting a member a portion of
the soul would be cut along with it. According to this
teaching, the soul separates from the body only during
sleep, since she must inhere in the body of which she is
the entelechy, in which case sleep would become en-
tirely inexplicable. If the soul be an entelechy, the
struggle of reason against the passions would became
entirely impossible. The entire human being will ex-
perience but one single sentiment, and never be in dis-
^ agreement with itself. If the soul be an entelechy,
^ there will perhaps still be sensations, but mere sensa-
tions; pure thoughts will have become impossible. Con-
sequently the Peripateticians themselves are obliged to
introduce (into human nature) another soul, namely,
the pure intelligence, which they consider immortal.*
The rational soul, therefore, would have to be an
entelechy in a manner different from their definition
thereof, if indeed this name is at all to be used.

IF AN ENTELECHY BE GRANTED, IT IS INSEPARABLE
FROM THE BODY.

The sense-soul, which preserves the forms of sense-
objects previously perceived, must preserve them with-
out the body. Otherwise, these forms would inhere in
the body like figures and corporeal shapes. Now, if
the forms inhered in the sense-soul in this manner, they
could not be received therein otherwise (than as cor-
poreal impressions). That is why, if we do grant the
existence of an entelechy, it must be inseparable from
the body. Even the faculty of appetite, not indeed that
which makes us feel the need of eating and drinking,

♦Arist. de Anima, ii. 2; iii. 5.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 17

but that which desires things that are independent of
the body, could not either be an entelechy.*

NEITHER COULD THE SOUL OF GROWTH BE AN

ENTELECHY.

The soul's faculty of growth remains to be con-
sidered. This at least might be thought an inseparable
entelechy. But neither does that suit her nature. For
if the principle of every plant is in its root, and if growth
takes place around and beneath it,t as occurs in many
plants, it is evident that the soul's faculty of growth,
abandoning all the other parts, has concentrated in the
root alone; it, therefore, was not distributed all around
the soul, like an inseparable entelechy. Add that this
soul, before the plant grows, is already contained in the :
small body (of the seed). If then, after having vivified ;
a great plant, the soul's faculty of growth can condense 1
into a small space, and if later it can, from this small j
space, again spread over a whole plant, it is evidently 1
entirely separable from the (plant's) matter.

THE ENTELECHY IS NOT A FORM OF THE BODY.
AS THE SOUL TRANSMIGRATES.

Besides, as the soul is indivisible, the entelechy of
the divisible body could not become divisible as is the
body. Besides, the same soul passes from the body of
one animal into the body of some other. How
could the soul of the first become that of the second,
if she were only the entelechy of a single one? The f
example of animals that metamorphose demonstrates
the impossibility of this theory. The soul, therefore,
is not the simple form of a body; she is a genuine \
"being," which does not owe its existence merely to
fier being founded on the body, but which, on the con- |
trary, exists before having become the soul of some

♦See Aristotle, de Anima, i. 5.
tSee Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2.

)

78 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

individual animal. It is, therefore, not the body that
begets the soul.

THE SOUL IS AN INCORPOREAL AND IMMORTAL
ESSENCE. THE SOUL BEING NONE OF COR-
POREAL POSSIBILITIES, MUST BE INCORPOREAL.

c. What then can be the nature of the soul, if she
is neither a body, nor a corporeal affection, while,
nevertheless, all the active force, the productive power
and the other faculties reside in her, or come from her?
What sort of a ''being," indeed, is this (soul) that has
an existence independent of the body? She must evi-
dently be a veritable "being." Indeed, everything cor-
poreal must be classified as generated, and ex-
cluded from genuine "being," because it is born, and
perishes, never really exists, and owes its salvation ex-
clusively to participation in the genuine existence, and
that only in the measure of its participation therein.

THE PERSISTENCE OF THE CHANGEABLE IMPLIES
THE ETERNAL IN THE BACKGROUND.*

9v (14). It is absolutely necessary to postulate the
existence of a nature different from bodies, by itself
fully possessing genuine existence, which can neither be
born nor perish. Otherwise, all other things would hope-
lessly disappear, as a result of the destruction of the
existence which preserves both the individuals and the
universe, as their beauty and salvation. The soul, in-
deed, is the principle of movement (as Plato thought,
in the Phraedrus) ; it is the soul that imparts movement
to everything else; the soul moves herself. She, im-
parts life to the body she animates; but alone she pos-
sesses life, without ever being subject to losing it,
because she possesses it by herself. All beings, indeed,

*Here we resume Ennead IV. Book 7. The bracketed num-
bers are those of the Teubner text; the unbracketed those of the
Didot edition.

iy.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 79

live only by a borrowed life; otherwise, we would have
to proceed from cause to cause unto infinity. There
must, therefore, exist a nature that is primarily alive,
necessarily incorruptible and immortal because it is
the principle of life for everything else. It is thereon
that must be founded all that is divine and blessed, that
lives and exists by itself, that lives and exists supremely,
which is immutable in its essence, and which can
neither be born nor perish. How indeed could exist-
ence be born or perish? If the name of ''existence"
really suited it, it must exist forever, just as whiteness
is not alternately black and white. If whiteness were
existence itself, it would, with its ''being" (or nature)
(which is, to be whiteness), possess an eternal exist-
ence; but, in reality, it is no more than whiteness.
Therefore, the principle that possesses existence in it-
self and in a supreme degree will always exist. Now
this primary and eternal existence can not be anything
dead like a stone, or a piece of wood. It must live, and
live with a pure life, as long as it exists within itself. If
something of it mingles with what is inferior, this part
meets obstacles in its aspiration to the good; but it
does not lose its nature, and resumes its former condi-
tion on returning to a suitable condition (as thought
Plato, in his Phaedo*).

THE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL BECAUSE OF HER
KINSHIP WITH THE DIVINE.

10. (15). The soul has affinities with the divine and
eternal nature. This is evident, because, as we have
demonstrated it, she is not a body, has neither figure
nor color, and is impalpable. Consider the following
demonstration. It is generally granted that everything
that is divine and that possesses genuine existence en-
joys a happy and wise life. Now let us consider the
nature of our soul, in connection with that of the divine.
Let us take a soul, not one inside of a body, which is

*Page 299, Cousin.

80 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

undergoing the irrational motions of appetite and
anger, and the other affections born of the body, but a
soul that has eliminated all that, and which, so far as
possible, had no intercourse with the body. Such a
soul would show us that vices are something foreign to
the nature of the soul, and come to her from else-
where, and that, inasmuch as she is purified, she in her
own right possesses the most eminent qualities, wisdom,
and the other virtues (as thought Plato*). If the soul,
when re-entering into herself, is such, how could she
not participate in this nature that we have acknowl-
edged to be suitable to every thing that is eternal and
divine? As wisdom and real virtue are divine things,
they could not dwell in a vile and mortal entity; the
existence that receives them is necessarily divine, since
it participates in divine things by their mutual affinity
and community. Anyone who thus possesses wisdom
and virtue in his soul differs little from the superior
beings; he is inferior to them only by the fact of his
having a body. If all men, or at least, if many of them
held their soul in this disposition, no one would be
sceptic enough to refuse to believe that the soul is im-
mortal. But as we consider the soul in her present con-
dition of being soiled by vices, no one imagines that her
nature is divine and immortal.

THE SOUL, LIKE OTHER THINGS, SHOULD BE
JUDGED IN HER PUREST CONDITION.

Now when we consider the nature of some being, it
should be studied in its rarest condition, since extrane-
ous additions hinder it from being rightly judged.
The soul must be therefore considered only after
abstraction of foreign things, or rather, he who makes
this abstraction should observe himself in that condi-
tion. He then will not doubt that he is immortal, when
he sees himself in the pure world of intelligence. He
♦Quoted in i. 1. 12, in Republic x.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 81

will see his intelligence occupied, not in the observa-
tion of some sense-object that is mortal, but in thinking
the eternal by an equally eternal faculty.* He will see
all the entities in the intelligible world, and he will see
himself become intelligible, radiant, and illuminated by
the truth emanating from the Good, which sheds the
light of truth on all intelligible entities.! Then (like
Empedocles, in Diog. LaertesJ), he will have the risfht
to say:

''Farewell, I am riow an immortal divinity.*'
For he has ascended to the divinity, and has become
assimilated thereto. As purification permits one to
know the better things, so the notions we have within
us, and which constitute real science, are made clear.
Indeed, it is not by an excursion among external ob-
jects that the soul attains the intuition of wisdom and
virtue, but by re-entering into herself, in thinking her-
self in her primitive condition. Then she clears up and
recognizes in herself the divine statues, soiled by the
rust of time. Likewise, if a piece of gold were animated
and released itself from the earth by which it was cov-
ered, after first having been ignorant of its real nature
because it did not see its own splendor, it would admire
itself when considering itself in its purity; it would find
that it had no need of a borrowed beauty, and would
consider itself happy to remain isolated from every-
thing else.§

EVEN ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS THE SOUL MUST

BE IMMORTAL.

11. (16). What sensible man, after having thus
considered the nature of the soul, could still doubt of
the immortality of a principle which derives life from
naught but itself, and which cannot lose it? How
could the soul lose life, since she did not borrow it
from elsewhere, and since she does not possess it as
fire possesses heat? For, without being an accident of
♦See i. 1, 11. tSee i. 6, 9. $See viii. 62. §See i. 6, 5.

82 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

fire, the heat, nevertheless, is an accident of its matter;
for fire can perish. But, in the soul, life is not an ac-
cident that comes to add itself to a material subject to
constitute a soul. In fact, there is here an alternative:
either life is a genuine ''being," which is alive by itself;
in which case this "being" is the soul that we are seek-
ing to discover, and immortality cannot be refused her;
or the soul is a composite, and she must be decomposed
until we arrive at something immortal which moves by
itself; and such a principle could not be subject to death.
Further, when (Stoics) say that life is only an acci-
dental modification of matter, they are thereby forced
to acknowledge that the principle that imparted this
modification to matter is immortal, and incapable of
admitting anything contrary to what it communicates
(that is, life, as said Plato, in his Phaedo"^), but there
is only a single nature that possesses life in actualiza-
tion.

THERE IS NO CONCEIVABLE WAY IN WHICH SOUL

COULD PERISH.

12. (17). (The Stoics), indeed, claim that every
soul is perishable. In this case, everything should long
since have been destroyed. Others might say that our
soul were mortal, while the universal Soul were im-
mortal. On them, however, is the burden of proof of a
difference between the individual and universal souls.
Both of them, indeed, are a principle of movement;
both live by themselves; both grasp the same object by
the same faculty, either by thinking the things contained
in heaven, or by considering the nature (''being") of
each being, ascending unto the first principle. Since our
soul thinks absolute essences either by the notions she
finds within herself, or by reminiscence, she evidently
is prior to the body. Possessing knowledge of eternal
entities, she herself must be eternal. All that dissolves,
existing only by its compositeness, can naturally dis-

*Page 297, Cousin.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 83

solve in the same manner that it became composite.
But the soul is a single, simple actualization, whose
essence is life; not in this manner therefore can the soul
perish. Neither could the soul perish by division into a
number of parts; for, as we have shown, the soul is
neither a mass nor a quantity. As little could the soul
perish by alteration; for when alteration destroys any-
thing, it may remove its form, but leaves its matter;
alteration, therefore, is a characteristic of something
composite. Consequently as the soul cannot perish
in any of these ways, she is imperishable.

DESCENT INTO THE BODY NEED NOT CONFLICT
WITH THE ETERNITY OF SOUL.

13. (18). If intelligible entities are separated from
sense objects, how does it happen that the soul descends
into a body? * So long as the soul is a pure and impassi-
ble intelligence, so long as she enjoys a purely intellect-
ual life like the other intelligible beings, she dwells
among them; for she has neither appetite nor desire. But
that part which is inferior to intelligence and which is
capable of desires, follows their impulsion, "proceeds"
and withdraws from the intelligible world. Wishing to
ornament matter on the model of the Ideas she contem-
plated in Intelligence, in haste to exhibit her fruitful-
ness, and to manifest the germs she bears within her
(as said Plato, in the Banquetf) , the soul applies herself
to produce and create, and, as result of this application,
she is, as it were, orientated (or, in "tension") towards
sense-objects. With the universal Soul, the human
soul shares the administration of the whole world,
without, however, entering it; then, desiring to ad-
minister some portion of the world on her own re-
sponsibility, she separates from the universal Soul, and
passes into a body. But even when she is present with
the body, the soul does not devote herself entirely to

♦See iv. 8, 5. fPages 206, 312, 313, Cousin.

84 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [2

it, as some part of her always remains outside of it;
that is how her intelligence remains impassible.*

THE SOUL AS THE ARTIST OF THE UNIVERSE.

The soul is present in the body at some times, and at
other times, is outside of it. When, indeed, following
her own inclination, she descends from first-rank
entities (that is, intelligible entities) to third-rank en-
tities (that is, earthly entities), she ''proceeds" by
virtue of the actualization of intelligence, which, re-
maining within herself, embellishes everything by the
ministration of the soul, and which, itself being im-
mortal, ordains everything with immortal power; for
intelligence exists continuously by a continuous actuali-
zation.f

ALL SOULS HAVE IMMORTALITY, EVEN IF SUNK
INTO ANIMALS OR PLANTS.

14. (19). What about the souls of animals inferior to
man? The (rational) souls that have strayed so far as
to descend into the bodies of animals are nevertheless
still immortal. J Souls of a kind other (than rational
souls), cannot proceed from anything else than the
living nature (of the universal Soul) ; and they neces-
sarily are the principles of life for all animals. The
case is the same with the souls that inhere in plants.
Indeed, all souls have issued from the same principle
(the universal Soul), all have an individual life, and are
indivisible and incorporeal essences ("beings").

EVEN IF THE SOUL HAS DIFFERENT PARTS, THE
ORIGINAL PARTS SURVIVE.

To the objection that the human soul must decom-
pose because she contains three parts, it may be
answered that, when souls issue from here below, those
that are purified leave what had been added to them in

♦See iv. 8, 8. fSee iv. 8, 6, 7. JSee i. 1, 11.

iv.7] OF IMMORTALITY OF SOUL 85

generation (the irrational soul,*) while the other non-
purified souls do free themselves therefrom with time.
Besides, this lower part of the soul does not itself perish, ,
for it exists as long as the principle from which it pro- t
ceeds. Indeed, nothing that exists is annihilated.

THE HISTORIC EVIDENCE FOR IMMORTALITY OF

THE SOUL.

15. (20) . This, then, is our answer to those who seek
a philosophical demonstration. Those who are satisfied
with the testimony of faith and sense, may be referred
to those extracts from history which furnish numerous
proofs thereof.f We may also refer to the oracles
given by the divinities who order an appeasement of
the souls who were victims of some injustice, and to
honor the dead,** and to the rites observed by all
towards those who live no more;t which presupposes
that their souls are still conscious beyond. Even after
leaving their bodies, many souls who lived on the earth
have continued to grant benefits to men.§ By revela-
tion of the future ;|1 and rendering other services, they
themselves prove that the other souls cannot have
perished.

*See iv. 5, 7.

fCicero, Tusculans, i. 12-16.

jPlato, in Diog, Laert, iii. 83.

§Cicero, Tusculans, i. 18, 37.

llCicero, Tusculans, i. 12, 18; de Divinat, i. 58.

**Such as Porphyry's "Philosophy derived from Oracles."

As the first book was evidently Platonic, the second seems
Numenian, reminding us of the latter's book on the Immortality
of the Soul, one of the arguments from which we find in 3 E.

86 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [3

THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FIRST.

Concerning Fate.

POSSIBLE THEORIES ABOUT FATE,

1. The first possibility is that there is a cause both
for the things that become, and those that are; the cause
of the former being their becoming, and that of the
latter, their existence. Again, neither of them may have
a cause. Or, in both cases, some may have a cause, and
some not. Further, those that become might have a
cause, while, of these that exist, some might partly
have a cause. Contrariwise, all things that exist may
have a cause, while of those that become, parts may
have a cause, and part not. Last, none of the things
that become might have any cause.

EXCEPT THE FIRST, ALL THINGS ARE CAUSED.

Speaking of eternal things, the first cannot be de-
rived from other causes, just because they are first.
Things dependent from the first, however, may indeed
thence derive their being. To each thing we should also
attribute the resultant action; for a thing's being is
constituted by its displayed energy.

STOIC AND EPICUREAN CAUSELESS ORIGIN REALLY
THE UTMOST DETERMINISM.

Now among the things that become, or among those
that although perpetually existent do not always result
in the same actions, it may be boldly asserted that

iii.l] OF FATE %7

everything has a cause. V/e should not admit (the
Stoic contention*) that something happens without a\
cause, nor accept the (Epicureanf) arbitrary converg- '
ence of the atoms, nor believe that any body initiates
a movement suddenly and without determining reason, \
nor suppose (with Epicurus again:):) that the soul under-
takes some action by a blind impulse, without any
motive. Thus to suppose that a thing does not belong
to itself, that it could be carried away by involuntary
movements, and act without motive, would be to sub-
ject it to the most crushing determinism. The will must
be excited, or the desire awakened by some interior or
exterior stimulus. No determination (is possible) with-?
out motive.

EVERY GOOD THING HAS SOME CAUSE; NATURE
BEING THE ULTIMATE CAUSE.

If everything that happens has a cause, it is possible
to discover such fact's proximate causes, and to them
refer this fact. People go downtown, for example, to
see a person, or collect a bill. In all cases it is a matter
of choice, followed by decision, and the determina- ,
tion to carry it out. There are, indeed, certain facts
usually derived from the arts; as for instance the re-
establishment of health may be referred to medicine
and the physician. Again, when a man has become
rich, this is due to his finding some treasure, or receiving
some donation, to working, or exercising some lucrative
profession. The birth of a child depends on its father,
and the concourse of exterior circumstances, which, by
the concatenation of causes and effects, favored his
procreation; for example, right food, or even a still
more distant cause, the fertility of the mother, or, still
more generally, of nature (or, in general, it is usual
to assign natural causes) .

*Chrysippus, in Cicero, de Fato, 10.

tCicero, de Fiiiibus, i. 6. JCicero, de Natura Deorum. i. 25.

88 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [3

PROXIMATE CAUSES ARE UNSATISFACTORY; WE
MUST SEEK THE ULTIMATE ONES.

2. To stop, on arriving at these causes, and to re-
fuse further analysis, is to exhibit superficiality. This
is against the advice of the sages, who advise ascend-
ing to the primary causes, to the supreme principles.
For example, why, during the full moon, should the
one man steal, and the other one not steal ? Or, why,
under the same influence of the heavens, has the one,
and not the other, been sick.? Why, by use of the
same means, has the one become rich, and the other
poor? The difference of dispositions, characters, and
fortunes force us to seek ulterior causes, as indeed the
sages have always done.

MATERIALISTS SUPPORT DETERMINISM.

Those sages who (like Leucippus, Democritus and
Epicurus) assumed material principles such as the
atoms, and who explain everything by their motion,
their shock and combinations, pretend that everything
existent and occurring is caused by the agency of these
atoms, their ''actions and reactions." This includes,
according to them, our appetites and dispositions. The
necessity residing in the nature of these principles, and
in their effects, is therefore, by these sages, extended
to everything that exists. As to the (Ionic Hylicists),
who assume other physical (ultimate) principles, re-
ferring everything to them, they thus also subject all
beings to necessity.

HERACLITUS, THOUGH MORE SPIRITUAL, IS ALSO

DETERMINIST.

There are others (such as Heraclitus*), who, seeking
the (supreme) principle of the universe, refer every-
thing to it; saying that this principle penetrates, moves,

♦Stabeus, Eel. Phys. i. 6, p. 178.

iii.1] OF FATE 89

and produces everything. This they call Fate, and the
Supreme Cause. From it they derive everything; its
motions are said to give rise not only to the things that
are occurring, but even our thought. That is how
the members of an animal do not move themselves, but
receive the stimulus from the ''governing principle"
within them.

THE ASTROLOGERS MAKE COSMIC DEDUCTIONS
FROM PROGNOSTICATION.

Some (of the astrologers) explain everything by the
circular motion of the heavens, by the relative positions
of the planets and stars, and by their mutual aspects
(or, relations). They base this (principle) on the
prevalent habit of deducing therefrom conjectures
about futurity.

THE STOIC DETERMINISM IS BASED ON VARIOUS

THEORIES.

Others (like the Stoic Chrysippus*) define Fate
otherwise: it is "the concatenation of causes" in ''their
connection towards the infinite," by which every pos-
terior fact is the consequence of an anterior one. Thus
the things that follow relate to the things that precede,
and, as their effects, necessarily depend thereupon,
^imidst these (Stoic) philosophers there are two con-
ceptions of Fate: some consider that everything de-
pends from a single principle, while others do not.
These views we shall study later.

We shall first examine the system with which we
began; later we shall review the others.

THE PHYSICAL THEORIES ARE ABSURD.

3. To refer everything to physical causes, whether
you call them atoms or elements, and from their dis-

*Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, vi. 2.

90 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [3

ordered motion to deduce order, reason and the soul
that directs (the body), is absurd and impossible;
nevertheless, to deduce everything from atoms, is, if
possible, still more impossible; and consequently many
valid objections have been raised against this theory.

THE STOIC POLEMIC AGAINST THE EPICUREANS.

To begin with, even if we do admit such atomic
principles, their existence does not in any way inevit-
ably lead to either the necessity of all things, or fatality.
Let us, indeed, grant the existence of atoms; now some
will move downwards — that is, if there -is-aa-oip aoi,
down in the universe — others obliquely, by chance, in
various directions. As there will be no order, there will
be nothing determinate. Only what will be born of
the atoms will be determinate. It will therefore be
impossible to guess or predict events, whether by art —
and indeed, how could there be any art in the midst
of orderless things? — or by enthusiasm, or divine in-
spiration; for prediction implies that the future is de^.
termined. True, bodies will obey the impulses neces-
sarily communicated to them by the atoms; but how
could you explain the operations and affections of the
soul by movements of atoms? How could atomic
shock, whether vertical or oblique, produce in the soul
these our reasonings, or appetites, whether necessarily,
or in any other way? What explanation could they
give of the soul's resistance to the impulsions of the
body? By what concourse of atoms will one man
become a geometrician, another become a mathe-
matician and astronomer, and the other a philosopher?
i For, according to that doctrine we no longer produce
I any act for which we are responsible, we are even no
longer living beings, since we undergo the impulsion of
bodies that affect us just as they do inanimate things.

iii.l] OF FATE 91

APPLICATION OF THIS POLEMIC TO THE
PHYSICISTS.

The same objections apply to the doctrine of the
philosophers who explain everything by other physical
causes (such as ''elements"). Principles of inferior
nature might well warm us, cool us, or even make us
perish; but they could not beget any of the operations
which the soul produces; these have an entirely dif-
ferent cause.

RESTATEMENT OF HERACLITUS'S POSITION.
4. But might (Heraclitus) suppose that a single Soul
interpenetrating the universe produces everything, and
by supplying the universe with motion supplies it
simultaneously to all its constituent beings, so that
from this primary cause, would necessarily flow all
secondary causes, whose sequence and connection
would constitute Fate? Similarly, in a plant, for in-
stance, the plant's fate might be constituted by the
(''governing") principle which, from the root, admin-
isters its other parts, and which organizes into a single
system their "actions" and "reactions."*

THIS WOULD INTERFERE WITH SELF-CONSCIOUS-
NESS AND RESPONSIBILITY.

To begin with, this Necessity and Fate would by their
excess destroy themselves, and render impossible the
sequence and concatenation of the causes. It is, in-
deed, absurd to insist that our members are moved by
Fate when they are set in motion, or innervated, by
the "governing principle." It is a mistake to suppose
that there is a part which imparts motion, and on the
other hand, a part which receives it from the former;
it is the governing principle that moves the leg, as it
would any other part. Likewise, if in the universe
exists but a single principle which "acts and reacts," if
things derive from each other by a series of causes each

*As thought the Stoics, Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. IL

92 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [3

of which refers to the preceding one, it will no longer
be possible to say truly that all things arise through
causes, for their totality will constitute but a single
being. In that case, we are no longer ourselves; actions
are no longer ours; it is no longer we who reason; it
is a foreign principle which reasons, wills, and acts in
us,- just as it is not our feet that walk, but we who
walk by the agency of our feet. On the contrary, com-
mon sense admits that every person lives, thinks, and
acts by his own individual, proper life, thought and
action; to each must be left the responsibility of his
actions, good or evil, and not attribute shameful deeds
to the universal cause.

RESTATEMENT OF THE ASTROLOGICAL THEORY

OF FATE.

5. Others, again, insist that this is not the state of
affairs. Their disposition depends on the circular
movement of the heaven which governs everything, on
the course of the stars, of their mutual relative position
at the time of their rising, of their setting, of their
zenith, or of their conjunction. Indeed, such ar^ the
signs on which are founded prognostications and pre-
dictions of what is to happen, not only to the universe,
but also to each individual, both as to his fortunes and
his thought. It is noticed that the other animals and
vegetables increase or decrease according to the kind
of sympathy existing between them and the stars, that
all other things experience their influence, that various
regions of the earth differ according to their adjust-
ment with the stars, and especially the sun; that from
the nature of these regions depend not only the char-
acter of the plants and animals, but also human forms,
size, color, affections, passions, tastes, and customs. In
this system, therefore, the course of the stars is the
absolute cause of everything.

iii.l] OF FATE 93

REFUTATION OF THE ASTROLOGICAL SYSTEM.

To this we answer that our astrologer attributes in-
directly to the stars all our characteristics: will, pas-
sions, vices and appetites; he allows us no role other
than to turn like mills, instead of responsibility, as
befits men, producing actions that suit our nature. On
the contrary, we should be left in possession of what
belongs to us by the observation that the universe i
limits itself to exercising some influence on what we \
possess already thanks to ourselves, and which is really \
characteristic of us. Moreover, one should distinguish ^
the deeds in which we are "active," from those in which
we are necessarily ''passive," and not deduce every- i
thing from the stars. Nobody, indeed, doubts that the \
differences of place and climate exert an influence over ^
us, imparting to us, for instance, a cool or warm-
hearted disposition. Heredity also should be con- >
sidered; for children usually resemble their parents by ^
their features, form, and some affections of the ir-
rational soul. Nevertheless, even though they resemble '
them by their facial features, because they are born in
the same place, they may differ in habits and thoughts,
because these things depend on an entirely different
principle. In addition, we can adduce to the support ;
of this truth the resistance which the soul offers to the
temperament and to the appetites. As to the claim
that the stars are the causes of everything, because one
can predict what is to happen to each man from a con-
sideration of their positions, it would be just as reason-
able to assert that the birds and the other beings which
the augurs consult as omens produce the events of
which they are the signs.

HOROSCOPES QUESTIONED; THEY DO NOT ACCOUNT
FOR SIMULTANEOUS DIFFERENCES.

This leads us to consider, more in detail, what sort
of facts may be predicted according to the inspection of

94 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [3

the positions occupied by the stars presiding over the
birth of a man. They who, from the assertion that the
stars indicate a man's future, draw the consequence that
the stars produce them, are in error. In some person's
horoscope which indicates birth from noble parents,
on either maternal or paternal side, this nobility of
birth cannot be attributed to the stars, as this nobility
subsisted already in the parents before the stars had
taken the position according to which the horoscope
is cast. Besides, astrologers pretend they can discover
the parent's fortune from the birth of their children,
and from the condition of the parents the disposition
and fate of the unborn offspring. From a child's horo-
scope, they announce his brother's death; and from a
woman's horoscope, the fortunes of her husband, and
conversely. It is unreasonable to refer to the stars
things which evidently are necessary consequences of
parental conditions. We then reach a dilemma: the
cause lies either in these antecedent conditions, or in
the stars. The beauty and ugliness of children, when
they resemble their parents, must evidently be derived
from them, and not from the course of the stars. More-
over, it is probable that at any one moment are born
a crowd of human and animal young; now, inasmuch
as they are born under the same star, they all ought
to have the same nature. How does it then happen
that, in the same positions, stars produce men and
other beings simultaneously (as Cicero asks*) ?

HEREDITY MORE IMPORTANT THAN STAR-
INFLUENCE; CONTINUATION.

6. Each being derives his character from his nature.

One being is a horse because he is born from a mare,

while another is human, because born from a human

mother; and more: he is that particular horse, and that

particular man because he is born from such and such

a horse, or woman. Doubtless, the course of the stars

*Cicero, de Divinatione, ii. 44. }

iii.l] OF FATE 95

may modify the result, but the greatest part of the in-
fluence must be allowed to heredity.

STARS AFFECT THE PHYSICAL, NOT THE MENTAL

BEING.

The stars act on the body only in a physical way, and
thus impart to them heat, cold, and the variety of tem-
perament which results therefrom. But how could they
endow the man with habits, tastes, and inclinations
which do not seem to depend on the temperament, such
as the avocation of a surveyor, a grammarian, a gam-
bler, or an inventor?

IRRATIONAL CLAIMS OF ASTROLOGERS.
Besides, nobody would admit that perversity could
come from beings who are divinities. How could one
believe that they are the authors of the evils attributed
to them, and that they themselves become evil because
they set or pass under the earth, as if they could pos-
sibly be affected by the fact that, in regard to us, they
seem to set; as if they did not continue to wander
around the heavenly sphere, and remained in the same
relation to the earth? Besides it is incredible that be-
cause a star is in such or such a position in respect of
another star, it becomes better or worse, and that it
affects us with goodness when it is well disposed, and
evil in the contrary case.

STARS SERVE AS LETTERS IN WHICH TO READ

NATURE.

We grant that by their movement the stars co-operate
in the conservation of the universe, and that they
simultaneously play in it another part. They serve as
letters for those skilled in deciphering this kind of
writing; and who, by the observation of the figures
formed by the stars, read into them future events ac-
cording to the laws of analogy, as for instance, if one
presaged high deeds from seeing a bird fly high.

96 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [3

RESTATEMENT OF THE STOIC DOCTRINE, AND THEi

HERACLITIAN. |

7. There remains to be considered the (Stoic) doc-'
trine which, concatenating and interrelating all things
among each other, establishes "a single cause which
produces everything through seminal reasons." This
doctrine reattaches itself to (Heraclitus's)' which de-
duces from the action of the universal Soul the con-
stitution and the movements of the individuals as well
as those of the universe.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIA'S POLEMIC AGAINST

THE STOICS.

In this case, even if we possessed the power of doing
something by ourselves, we would not be any the less
than the remainder of the universe subjected to neces-
sity, because Fate, containing the whole series of causes,
necessarily determines each event. Now since Fate in-
cludes all causes, there is nothing which could hinder
the occurrence of that event, or alter it. If then
everything obeys the impulsion of a single principle,
nothing is left to us but to follow it. Indeed, in this
case, the fancies of our imagination would result from
anterior facts, and would in turn determine our ap-
petites; our liberty would then have become a mere
word; nor would we gain any advantage from obeying
our appetites, since our appetites themselves will be
determined by anterior facts. We would have no more
liberty than the other animals, than children, or the
insane, who run hither and yon, driven by blind ap-
petites; for they also obey their appetites, as fire would
do, and as all the things which fatally follow the dis-
positions of their nature. These objections will be
decisive for those capable of apprehending them; and
in the search for other causes of our appetites they
will not content themselves with the principles which
we have examined.

iii.1] OF FATE 97

THE HUMAN SOUL^AS AN INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLE.

8. What other cause, besides the preceding, will y
we have to invoke so as to let nothing occur without . \
a cause, to maintain order and interdependence of ^ ^6
things in the world, and in order to preserve the pos-
sibility of predictions and omens without destroying our
personality?

We shall have to introduce among the number of
beings another principle, namely: the soul; and not only
the World-soul, but even the individual soul of every
person. In the universal concatenation of causes and
eflfects, this soul is a principle of no little importance,
because, instead of, like all other things, being born of
a ''seminal reason," it constitutes a "primary cause."
Outside of a body, she remains absolute mistress of
herself, free and independent of the cause which ad-
ministers the world. As soon as she has descended into
a body, she is no longer so independent, for she then
forms part of the order to which all things are sub-
jected. Now, inasmuch as the accidents of fortune,
that is to say, the surrounding circumstances, determine
many events, the soul alternately yields to the influence
of external circumstances, and then again she dominates
them, and does what she pleases. This she does more
or less, according as she is good or evil. When she
yields to the corporeal temperament, she is necessarily
subjected to desire or anger, discouraged in poverty, or
proud in prosperity, as well as tyrannical in the exercise
of power. But she can resist all these evil tendencies
if her disposition is good; she modifies her surroundings
more than she is affected by them; some things she
changes, others she tolerates without herself incurring
guilt.

THE SOUL IS FREE WHEN FOLLOWING REASON.

9. All things therefore, which result either from a
choice by the soul, or from exterior circumstances, are

98 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [3

"necessary," or determined by a cause. Could any-
thing, indeed, be found outside of these causes? If we
gather into one glance all the causes we admit, we find
the principles that produce everything, provided we
count, amidst external causes, the influence exercised by
the course of the stars. When a soul makes a decision,
and carries it out because she is impelled thereto by
external things, and yields to a blind impulse, we should
not consider her determination and action to be free.
The soul is not free when, perverting herself, she does
not make decisions which direct her in the straight path.
On the contrary, when she follows her own guide, pure
and impassible reason, her determination is really
voluntary, free and independent, and the deed she
performs is really her own work, and not the conse-
, quence of an exterior impulse; she derives it from her
"4 \ inner power, her pure being, from the primary and
■ I sovereign principle which directs her, being deceived
• by no ignorance, nor vanquished by the power of ap-
petites; for when the appetites invade the soul, and
subdue her, they drag her with them by their violence,
and she is rather ''passive" than "active" in what she
does.

THE SOUL OBEYS FATE ONLY WHEN EVIL.

10. The conclusion of our discussion is that while
everything is indicated and produced by causes, these
are of two kinds: first the human soul, and then only ex-
terior circumstances. When the soul acts "conform-
ably to right reason" she acts freely. Otherwise, she
is tangled up in her deeds, and she is rather "passive"
than "active." Therefore, whenever she lacks pru-
dence, the exterior circumstances are the causes of her
actions; one then has good reason to say that she obeys
Fate, especially if Fate is here considered as an exterior
cause. On the contrary, virtuous actions are derived
from ourselves; for, when we are independent, it is

iii.1] OF FATE 99

natural for us to produce them. Virtuous men act, and
do good freely. Others do good only in breathing-
spells left them in between by their passions. If, during
these intervals, they practice the precepts of wisdom, it
is not because they receive them from some other
being, it is merely because their passions do not hinder
them from listening to the voice of reason.

As the first book seemed Platonic, and the second Numenian,
so this third om seems called fonth by the practical opposition of
astrologers or Gnostics. Later in life, his thirty-third book,
id. 9, was to take up again this polemic in more extended form.
This chronologic arrangement of Plotinos's first three books
reveals his three chief sources of interest — devotion to Plato,
reliance on Numenius, and opposition to the Gnostics and astrol-
ogers.

100 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [4

FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIRST.

Of the Being of the Soul.

It is in the intelligible world that dwells veritable
being. Intelligence is the best that there is on high;
but there are also souls; for it is thence that they de-
scended thither. Only, souls have no bodies, while
here below they inhabit bodies and are divided there.
On high, all the intelligences exist together, without
separation or division; all the souls exist equally to-
gether in that world which is one, and there is no local
distance between them. Intelligence therefore ever
remains inseparable and indivisible; but the soul, in-
separable so long as she resides on high, nevertheless
possesses a divisible nature. For her ''dividing herself"
consists in departing from the intelligible world, and
uniting herself to bodies; it might therefore be reason-
ably said that she becomes divisible in passing into
bodies, since she thus separates from the intelligible
world, and divides herself somewhat. In what way
is she also indivisible? In that she does not separate
herself entirely from the intelligible world, ever re-
siding there by her highest part, whose nature it is to
be indivisible. To say then that the soul is composed
of indivisible (essence) and of (essence) divisible in
bodies means then no more than that the soul has an
(essence) which dwells partly in the intelligible world,
and partly descends into the sense-world, which is sus-
pended from the first and extends downwards to the
second, as the ray goes from the centre to the circum-

iv.l] WORKS OF PLOTINOS 101

ference. When the soul descended here below, it is
by her superior part that she contemplates the intel-
ligible world, as it is thereby that she preserves the
nature of the all (of the universal Soul). For here
below she is not only divisible, but also indivisible;
her divisible part is divided in a somewhat indivisible
manner; she is indeed entirely present in the whole
body in an indivisible manner, and nevertheless she is
said to divide herself because she spreads out entirely in
the whole body.

102 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [5

FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.

Of Intelligence, Ideas and Essence.

THE SENSUAL MAN, THE MORAL. AND THE
SPIRITUAL.

1. From their birth, men exercise their senses,
earlier than their intelligence,^ and they are by neces-
sity forced to direct their attention to sense-objects.
Some stop there, and spend their life without progress-
ing further. They consider suffering as evil, and
pleasure as the good, judging it to be their business to
avoid the one and encompass the other. That is the
content of wisdom for those of them that pride them-
selves on being reasonable; like those heavy birds
who, having weighted themselves down by picking up
too much from the earth, cannot take flight, though
by nature provided with wings. There are others who
have raised themselves a little above earthly objects
because their soul, endowed with a better nature, with-
draws from pleasures to seek something higher ;2 but
as they are not capable of arriving at contemplation
of the intelligible, and as, after having left our lower
region here, they do not know where to lodge, they
return to a conception of morality v/hich considers
virtue to consist in these common-place actions and
occupations whose narrow sphere they had at first
attempted to leave behind. Finally a third kind is that
of those divine men who are endowed with a piercing
vision, and whose penetrating glance contemplates the
splendor of the intelligible world, and rise unto it,

V.9] OF INTELLIGENCE, IDEAS, ESSENCE 103

taking their flight above the clouds and darkness of this
world. Then, full of scorn for terrestrial things, they
remain up there, and reside in their true fatherland
with the unspeakable bliss of the man who, after long
journeys, is at last repatriated.

THE HIGHER REGION REACHED ONLY BY THOSE
WHO ARE BORN PHILOSOPHERS.

'2. Which is this higher region? What must be
done to reach it? One must be naturally disposed to
love, and be really a born philosopher.^ In the
presence of beauty, the lover feels something similar
to the pains of childbirth; but far from halting at bodily
beauty, he rises to that aroused in the soul by virtue,
duties, science and laws. Then he follows them up to
the cause of their beauty, and in this ascending progress
stops only when he has reached the Principle that oc-
cupies the first rank, that which is beautiful in itself.^
Then only does he cease being driven by this torment
that we compare to the pains of childbirth.

LOVE IS TRANSFORMED INTO PROGRESSIVELY
HIGHER STAGES.

But how does he rise up thither? How does he
have the power to do so ? How does he learn to love ?
Here it is. The beauty seen in bodies is incidental; it
consists in the shapes of which the bodies are the
matter.^ Consequently the substance changes, and it
is seen changing from beauty to ugliness. The body
has only a borrowed beauty. Who imparted that
beauty to the body? On the one hand, the presence
of beauty; on the other, the actualization of the soul
which fashioned the body, and which gave it the shape
it possesses. But is the soul, by herself, absolute
beauty? No, since some souls are wise and beautiful,
while some others are foolish and ugly. It is therefore
only by wisdom that the soul is beautiful. But from

104 WORKS OR PLOTINOS [5.

what is her wisdom derivied? Necessarily from intel-
ligence; not from the intelligence that is intelligent at
some time, though not at others, but from the genuine
Intelligence, which is beautiful on that very account.^
Shall we stop at Intelligence, as a first principle? Or
shall we on the contrary still rise above it? Surely so,
; for Intelligence presents itself to us before the first
> Principle only because it is, so to speak, located in the
f antechamber of the Good.*^ It bears all things within
\ itself, and manifests them, so that it displays the image
I of the Good in manifoldness, while the Good itself
j remains in an absolute simple unity.

PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF
INTELUGENCE.

3. Let us now consider the Intelligence which
reason tells us is absolute essence and genuine "being,"
and whose existence we have already established in a
different manner. It would seem ridiculous to inquire
whether Intelligence form part of the scale of beings;
i but there are men who doubt it, or who at least are
* disposed to ask for a demonstration that Intelligence
' possesses the nature we predicate of it, that it is separ-
ated (from matter), that it is identical with the es-
sences, and that it contains the ideas. This is our
task.

I-N THE HUMAN WORLD EVERYTHING IS A COM-
POSITE OF FORM AND MATTER.

All things that we consider to be essences are com-
posites; nothing is simple or single, either in works of
art, or in the products of nature.^ Works of art, in-
deed, contain metal, wood, stone, and are derived from
these substances only by the labor of the artist, who,
by giving matter its form makes of it a statue, or bed,
or house. Among the products of nature, those that

V.9] OF INTELLIGENCE, IDEAS, ESSENCE 105

are compounds or mixtures may be analyzed into tlie
form impressed on the elements of the compound; so,
for instance, we may in a man, distinguish a soul and
body, and in the body four elements. Since the very
matter of the elements, taken in itself, has no form,
every object seems composed of matter and of some
principle that supplies it with form.^ So we are led 1 \
to ask whence matter derives its form, and to seek
whether the soul is simple, or whether it contains two
parts, one of which plays the parts of matter, and the \
other of form,^^ so that the first part would be j I
similar to the form received by the metal of a statue,
and the latter to the principle which produces the form
itself.

[THE WORLD-SOLTL ALSO IS A COMPOUND OF FORM

AND MATTER.

Applying this conception to the universe, we rise to
Intelligence, recognizing therein the demiurgic creator
of the world. It was in receiving from it its shapes by
the intermediation of another principle, the universal
Soul, that the (material) substances became water, air,
earth and fire. On the one hand, the Soul shapes the
four elements of the world ;^^ on the other, she receives
from Intelligence the (seminal) reasons,^^ ^s the souls
of the artists themselves receive from the arts the
reasons which they work out.^^ In Intelligence, there-
fore, there is a part which is the form of the soul ; it is
intelligence considered as shape. There is another
which imparts shape, like the sculptor who gives the
metal the shape of the statue, and which in itself pos- l| |
sesses all it gives.^^ Now the (shapes) which the ■ ^
Intelligence imparts to the soul connect with the truth
as closely as possible, while those which the soul im-
parts to the body are only images and appearances.^^

106 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [5

WHY OUR ASCENT CANNOT STOP WITH THE SOUL.

4. Why should we not, on arriving at the Soul, stop
there, and consider her the first principle? Because
Intelligence is a power different from the Soul, and
better than the Soul; and what is better must, by its
very nature, precede (the worst). The Stoics^ ^ are
wrong in thinking that it is the Soul which, on reaching
her perfection, begets Intelligence. How could that
which is potential pass into actualization unless there
were some principle that effected that transition? If
this transition were due to chance, it could not have
occurred at all. The first rank must therefore be as-
signed to that which is in actualization, which needs
nothing, which is perfect, while imperfect things must
be assigned to the second rank. These may be per-
fected by the principles that begat them, which, in
respect to them, play a paternal part, perfecting what
they had originally produced that was imperfect.
What is thus produced is matter, as regards the
creating principle, and then becomes perfect, on re-
ceiving its form from it. Besides, the Soul is (often)
affected; and we need to discover some thing that is
impassible, without which everything is dissolved by
time; therefore there is need of some principle prior
to the soul. Further, the Soul is in the world; now
there must be something that resides outside of the
world, and which consequently would be superior to
the Soul; for since that which inheres in the world
resides within the body, or matter, if nothing existed
outside of the world, nothing would remain permanent.
In this case, the (seminal) reason of man, and all the
other reasons could be neither permanent nor eternal.
The result of all these considerations, as well as of
many others that we could add thereto, is the necessary
assertion of the existence of Intelligence beyond the
Soul.

V.9] OF INTELLIGENCE, IDEAS, ESSENCE 107

INTELLIGENCE IS IN ACTUALIZATION BECAUSE ITS
THOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH ITS ESSENCE

OR EXISTENCE.
5. Taking it in its genuine sense, Intelligence is
not only potential, arriving at being intelligent after
having been unintelligent — for otherwise, we would be
forced to seek out some still higher principle — but is
in actualization, and is eternal. As it is intelligent by
itself, it is by itself that it thinks what it thinks, and
that it possesses what is possesses. Now since it thinks
^f itself and by itself, it itself is what it thinks. If we
could distinguish between its exitsence and its thought,
its ^'being" would be unintelligent; it would be poten-
tial, not in actualization. Thought, therefore, must
not be separated from its object, although, from sense-
objects, we have become accustomed to conceive of
intelligible entities as distinct from each other.

REASONS. AS ARCHETYPES, MUST HAVE EXISTED
BEFORE STOIC "HABIT," NATURE OR SOUL.

Which then is the principle that acts, that thinks,
and what is the actualization and thought of Intel-
ligence, necessary to justify the assertion that it is
what it thinks? Evidently Intelligence, by its mere
real existence, thinks beings, and makes them exist;
Jt therefore is the. beings. Indeed, the beings will
either exist outside of it, or within it; and in the latter
case they would have to be identical with it. That they
should exist outside of Intelligence, is unthinkable; for
where would they be located? They must therefore
exist within it, and be identical with it. They could
not be in sense-objects, as common people think, be-
cause sense-objects could not be the first in any genus.
The form which inheres in their matter is only the
representation of existence; now a form which exists
in anything other than itself is put in it by a superior
principle, and is its image. Further, if Intelligence

108 \VORKS PR PLOTINOS [5

must be the creative power of the universe, it could
not, while creating the universe, think beings as exist-
ent in what does not yet exist. Intelligible entities,
therefore, must exist before the world, and cannot be
images of sense-objects, being on the contrary, their
archetypes, and constituting the *'being" of Intelligence.
It might be objected that the (seminal) reasons might
suffice. These reasons are, no doubt, eternal; and, if
they be eternal and impassible, they must exist within
the Intelligence whose characteristics we have de-
scribed, the Intelligence which precedes the ^'habit,"^"^
nature,^ ^ and the soul,^^ because here these entities are
potential.20

INTELLIGENCE IS POSTULATED BY THE GENERAL
NECESSITIES OF THE WORLD.

Intelligence, therefore, essentially constitutes all
beings; and when Intelligence thinks them, they are
not outside of Intelligence, and neither precede nor
follow it. Intelligence is the first legislator, or rather,
I it is the very law of existence. Parmenides^i therefore
I was right in saying, ^Thought is identical with exist-
[ ence." The knowledge of immaterial things is there-
^ fore identical with those things themselves. That is
why I recognize myself as a being, and why I have
reminiscences of intelligible entities. Indeed, none of
those beings is outside of Intelligence, hor is contained
in any location; all of them subsist in themselves as
immutable and indestructible. That is why they really
are beings. If they were born, or perished, they would
possess existence only in an incidental manner, they
would no longer be beings; it would be the existence
they possessed which would be essence. It is only by
participation that sense-things are what they are said
to be; the nature that constitutes their substance de-
rives its shape from elsewhere, as the metal receives
, its shape from the sculptor, and wood from the car-

y,?] OF, INTELLIGENCE, I_DEAS, ESSENCE ;i09

penter; while the image of art penetrates into the
matter, the art itself remains in its identity, and within
itself possesses the genuine existence of the statue or
of the bed. That is how the bodies* general necessity
of participating in images shows that they are different
from the beings; for they change, while the entities are
immutable, possess within themselves their own
foundation, and have no need of existing in any loca-
tion, since they have no extension, and since they sub-
sist in an intellectual and absolute existence. Again,^^
the existence of the bodies needs to be guarded^s by
some other principle, while intelligence, which furnishes
the existence for objects in themselves perishable, has
need of nothing to make itself subsist.

INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS ALL BEINGS GENERA-

TIVELY.

6. Thus Intelligence actually constitutes all beings;
it contains them all, but not locally; it contains them
as it possesses itself; it is identical with them. All
entities are simultaneously contained within it, and in
it remain distinct, as many kinds of knowledge may
exist within the soul without their number causing any
confusion; each of them appears when needed, without
involving the others. If in the soul each thought be an
actualization independent of other thoughts, so much
the more must Intelligence be all things simultaneously,
with this restriction, however, that each of them is a
special power. Considered in its universality, Intel-
ligence contains all entities as the genus contains all
species, as the whole contains all parts. Even the
seminal powers bear the impress of this universality.
Each one, considered in its totality, is a centre which
contains all the parts of the organism in an undivided
condition; nevertheless in it the reason of the eyes
differs from that of the hands, and this diversity is
jnanifested by that of the organs begotten (there-

110 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [5

from). 24 Each of the powers of the seed, therefore,
is the total unity of the seminal reason when this power
is united to the others which are implied therein. What
in the seed is corporeal contains matter, as, for in-
stance, humidity; but the seminal reason is the entire
form; it is identical with the generative power, a power
which itself is the image of a superior power of the
soul. This generative power contained in seeds is^^
usually called ''nature." Proceeding from the superior
powers as light radiates from the fire, it tames and
fashions matter, imparting thereto the seminal reason^s
without pushing it, or moving it as by levers.

THERE ARE SCIENTIFIC NOTIONS THAT ARE
POSTERIOR, BUT SOME THAT ARE PRIOR.

7. The scientific notions that the soul forms of
sense-objects, by discursive reason, and which should
rather be called opinions,^'^ are posterior to the ob-
jects (they deal with) ; and consequently, are no more
than images of them. But true scientific notions re-
ceived from intelligence by discursive reasons do not
contain any sense-cenceptions. So far as they are
scientific notions, they are the very things o? which
they are the conceptions; they reveal the intimate
union of intelligence and thought. Interior Intelligence,
which consists of the primary (natures) possesses it-
self intimately, resides within itself since all eternity,
and is an actualization. It does not direct its glances
outside of itself, because it possesses everytliing within
itself; it does not acquire, and does not reason to dis-
cover things that may not be present to them. Those
are operations characteristic of the soul. Intelligence,
remaining fixed within itself, is all things simultane-
ously. Nevertheless, it is not thought which makes
each of them subsist; it is only because intelligence
thought the divinity or movement, for instance, that
the divinity or movement exists.^^ When we say that

V.9] OF INTELLIGENCE, IDEAS, ESSENCE HI

thoughts are forms, we are mistaken if thereby we mean
that the intelligible exists only because Intelligence
thinks it. On the contrary, it is only because the in-
telligible exists, that Intelligence can think. Other-
wise, how would Intelligence come to think the intel-
ligible? It cannot meet the intelligible by chance, nor
waste itself in fruitless efforts.

THOUGHT IS THE FORM, SHAPE THE ACTUALIZA-
TION OF THE BEING.

8. Since the thought is something essentially
one ( ? ), the form, which is the object of thought, and
the idea^^ are one and the same thing. Which is this
thing.? Intelligence and the intellectual "being," for
no idea is foreign to intelligence; each form is intel-
ligence, and the whole intelligence is all the forms;
every particular form is a particular intelligence. Like-
wise science, taken in its totality, is all the notions it
embraces; every notion is a part of the total science;
it is not separated from the science locally, and exists ?
potentially in the whole science.^^ Intelligence resides
within itself, and by possessing itself calmly, is the
eternal fulness of all things. If we conceived it as
being prior to essence, we would have to say that it
was the action and thought of Intelligence which pro-
^ duced and begat all beings. But as, on the contrary, it
is certain that essence is prior to Intelligence, we
jshould, within the thinking principle, first conceive the
Ibeings, then actualization and thought, just as (the 1
l.nature) of fire is joined by the actualization of the '
jfire, so that beings have innate intelligence (?^^) as f
itheir actualization. Now essence is an actualization;
{therefore essence and intelligence are but a single
'actualization, or rather both of them fuse.^^ Conse-
quently, they form but a single nature, as beings, the
actualization of essence, and intelligence. In this case

112 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [5

the thought is the form, and the shape is the actualiza-
tion of the being. When, however, in thought we
separate essence from Intelligence, we must conceive
one of these principles as prior to the other. The
Intelligence which operates this separation is indeed
different from the essence from which it separates ;32
but the Intelligence which is inseparable from essence
and which does not separate thought from essence is
itself essence and all things.

INTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE UNIVERSAL ARCHE-
TYPE.

9. What then are the things contained within the
unity of Intelligence which we separate in thinking of
them? They must be expressed without disturbing
their rest, and we must contemplate the contents of
Intelligence by a science that somehow remains within
unity. Since this sense-world is an animal which em-
braces all animals, since it derives both its general and
special existence from a principle different from it-
self, ^^ a principle which, in turn, is derived from in-
telligence, therefore intelligence must itself contain
the universal archetype, and must be that intelligible
world of which Plato^^ (well) says; ^'Intelligence sees
the ideas contained within the existing animal. "^^ Since
an animal, whose (seminal) reason exists with the
matter fit to receive it, must of course be begotten, so
the mere existence of a nature that is intellectual, all-
powerful, and unhindered by any obstacle — since
nothing can interpose between it and the (substance)
capable of receiving the form — must necessarily be
adorned (or, created) by intelligence, but only in a
divided condition does it reveal the form it receives,
so that, for instance, it shows us on one hand a man,
and on the other the sun, while intelligence possesses
everything in unity.

V.9] OF INTELLIGENCE, IDEAS, ESSENCE 113

IN THE SENSE-WORLD ONLY THOSE THINGS THAT
ARE FORMS PROCEED FROM INTELLIGENCE.

10. Therefore, in the sense-world, all the things
that are forms proceed from intelligence; those which
are not forms do not proceed therefrom. That is, in
the intelligible world we do not find any of the things
that are contrary to nature, any more than we find
what is contrary to the arts in the arts themselves.
Thus the seminal reason does not contain the defects,
such as limping would be in a body. Congenital lame-
ness is due to the reason's failure to dominate matter,
while accidental lameness is due to deterioration of
the form (idea? ).

NATURAL CHARACTERISTICS ARE DERIVED FROM
THE CATEGORIES IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.

The qualities that are natural, quantities, numbers,
magnitudes, states, actions and natural experiences,
movements and recuperations, either general or par-
ticular, are among the contents of the intelligible world,
where time is replaced by eternity, ^^ and space is re-
placed by the ^'telescoping" of intelligible entities (that
are within each other). As all entities are together in
the intelligible world, whatever entity you select (by
itself) is intellectual and living ''being," identity and
difference, movement and rest;^^ it is what moves, and
what is at rest; it is "being," and quality; that is, it is
all. There every essence is in actualization, instead
of merely being in potentiality; consequently it is not
separated from quality.

THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD FAILS TO CONTAIN
EARTHLY IMPERFECTIONS.

Does the intelligible world contain only what is
found in the sense-world, or does it contain anything
additional? .... Let us consider the arts, in this

114 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [5

respect. To begin with, the intelligible world does not
contain any imperfection. Evils here below -^^me
from lack, privation, omission; it is a state of matter,
or of anything similar to matter, which failed to be
completely assimilated.^^

SOME ARTS ARE PURELY EARTHLY; OTHERS.
LIKE MUSIC. INTELLIGIBLE.

11. Let US therefore consider the arts and their
products. Unless as represented within human reason,
we cannot refer to the intelligible world arts or
imitation such as painting, sculpture, dancing, or act-
ing, because they are born here below, take sense-
objects as models, representing their forms, motions,
and visible proportions.^'^ If, however, we possess a
faculty which, by studying the beauties offered by the
symmetry of animals, considers the general character-
istics of this symmetry, it must form part of the intel-
lectual power which, on high, contemplates universal
symmetry. Music, however, which studies rhythm and
harmony, is, so far as it studies what is intelligible in
these things, the image of the music that deals with
intelligible rhythm.

THERE ARE MANY AUXILIARY ARTS WHICH HELP
THE PROGRESS OF NATURE.

The«arts which produce sense-objects, such as archi-
tecture and carpentry, have their principles in the in-
telligible world, and participate in wisdom, so far as
they make use of certain proportions. But as they
apply these proportions to sense-objects, they cannot
wholly be referred to the intelligible world, unless in
so far as they are contained within human reason. The
case is similar with agriculture, which assists the growth
of plants; medicine, which increases health, and (gym-
nastics) which supplies the body with strength as well
as vigor,^^ for on high there is another Power, another

V.9] OF INTELLIGENCE, IDEAS, ESSENCE ll5

Health, from which all living organisms derive their
needed vigor.

OTHER ARTS ARE INTELLIGIBLE WHEN APPLIED
TO THE INTELLIGIBLE.

Last, whenever rhetoric, strategy, private and public
finance and politics weave beauty in their deeds, and
they glance above, they (discover) that they have
added to their science a contribution from the intellig-
ible science.

The science of geometry, however, which deals
(wholly) with intelligible entities, must be referred to
the intelligible world. So also with philosophy, which
occupies the first rank among sciences because it
studies essence. This is all we have to say about arts
and their products.

THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAINS ONLY UNI-
VERSAL IDEAS; PARTICULARITIES ARE DERIVED
FROM MATTER.

12. If the intelligible world contains the idea of
Man, it must also contain that of the reasonable man,
and of the artist; and consequently the idea of the arts
that are begotten by Intelligence. We must therefore
insist that the intelligible world contains the ideas of
the universals, the idea of Man as such, and not, for
instance, that of Socrates. Still we shall have to decide
whether the intelligible world does not also contain the
idea of the individual man, that is, of the man considered
with the things that differ in each individual; for one
may have a Roman nose and the other a pug nose.
These differences are indeed implied within the idea
of man, just as there are differences within the idea
of animal. But the differences between a Roman or
a snub nose are derived from matter. Likewise, amidst
the varieties of colors, some are contained within the
seminal reason, while others are derived from matter
and space. ■"'"^

116 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [5

BESIDES IDEAS OF INDIVIDUAL SOULS AND INTEL-
LIGENCE. THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAINS
THE SOUL ITSELF AND INTELLIGENCE ITSELF.

13. It remains for us to study whether the intel-
ligible world contains only what is in the sense-world,
or whether we should distinguish from the individual
soul the Soul itself, from the particular intelligence.
Intelligence itself, as we have above distinguished the
particular man from Man himself. We should not
consider all things here below as images of archetypes,
for instance, the soul of a man as the image of the
Soul herself. Only degrees of dignity differentiate souls;
but these souls are not the Soul itself. As the Soul
itself exists really, it must also contain a certain wis-
dom, justice and science, which are not images of
wisdom, justice, and intelligible science, as sense-objects
are images of intelligible entities, but which are these
very entities located here below in entirely different
conditions of existence; for they are not locally cir-
cumscribed. Therefore when the soul issues from the
body, she preserves these things within herself; for the
sense-world exists only in a determinate place, while
the intelligible world exists everywhere; therefore all
that the soul contains here below is also in the intel-
ligible world. Consequently if, by "sense-objects" we
really mean "visible" things, then indeed the intel-
ligible world contains entities not present in this sense-
world. If, on the contrary, we include within the
"sense-world" the soul and all she implies, then all
things that are above are present here below also.

THE SUPREME BEING ENTIRELY ONE DOES NOT
EXPLAIN THE ORIGIN OF THE MANIFOLD.

14. Can we identify the nature that contains alii
the intelligibles (Intelligence) with the supreme Prin-|
ciple? Impossible, because the supreme Principle must'

V.9] OF INTELLIGENCE, IDEAS, ESSENCE 117

be essentially one, and simple, while essences form a
multitude. But as these essences form a multitude, we
are forced to explain how this multitude, and all these
essences can exist. How can (the single) Intelligence
be all these things? Whence does it proceed.^ This
we shall have to study elsewhere.^^

THE SOUL RECEIVES ACCIDENTS FROM MATTER,
BUT DEFECTS ARE NOT IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.

It may further be asked whether the intelligible
world contains the ideas of objects which are derived
from decay, which are harmful or disagreeable, such
as, for instance, mud or excreta. We answer that all
the things that universal Intelligence receives from the
First are excellent. Among them are not found ideas
of those dirty and vile objects mentioned above; In-
telligence does not contain them. But though receiving
from Intelligence ideas, the soul receives from matter
other things, among which may be found the above-
mentioned accidents. Besides, a more thorough answer
to this question must be sought for in our book where
we explain "How the Multitude of Ideas Proceeds from
the One."42

NOT ALL EARTHLY ENTITIES HAVE CORRESPOND-
• ING IDEAS.

In conclusion, the accidental composites in which
Intelligence does not share and which are formed by a
fortuitous complex of sense-objects, have no ideas cor-
responding to them in the intelligible world. Things
that proceed from decay are produced only because the
Soul is unable to produce anything better in this case;
otherwise she would have rather produced some object
more agreeing with nature; she therefore produces
what she can.

118 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [5

EVEN THE ARTS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE SOUL.

All the arts concerned with things natural to man
are contained within the ideas of Man himself. The
Art that is universal is prior to the other arts; but Art
is posterior to the Soul herself, or rather, to the life
that is in Intelligence before becoming soul, and which,
on becoming soul, deserves to be called the Soul herself.

1 As thought Plato, in the
Pha^do, C81. 2 See i. 6.8. 3 See
i. 3.1. 4 See i. 3. ^ See i.
6.2 6 See i. 6.6 ^ See i. 6.9,
and the Philebus of Plato.
C64. 8 As suggested in the
Phaedo of Plato. ^ See ii. 4.6.
i^The rational soul and intel-

9.5. 11 See ii.
12 See ii. 3.17.
vi. 4.9. 13 A
" or "logos," i.
4.3; ii. 6.2; ii.

ligence, see iii.

9.12; iv. 4.14.

18; ii. 9.2, 3;

oun on "reason,

6.2; ii. 3.16; ii.

l.Z. 14 See iv. 4.1012. 15 Far

from the truth ; see iii. 8.3. 7.

16 Stoics, see iv. 7.8. i'^ Or

Stoic form of insorganik objects.

18 The form of lower living

beings, i^ The form of human

nature. 20 See iv. 7.14. 21 Par-
menides, see v. 1.8. 22^3
Plato hints in his Cratylos, C50,
by a pun between "soma" and
"sozesthai.'' 23 Xhe later theo-
logical "saved." 24 See Aris-
totle, de Gen. i. 18. 25 By
Stoics. 26 See iii. 8.1-3. 27 See
V. 5.1. 28 See v. 1.4. 29 In
Greek a pain on "eidos" and
"idea." so See iv. 9.5. 3i See
iii. 9.1. 32 See iii. 9.1. 33 The
universal Soul. 34 Timaeus,
€39. 35 See iii. 9.1. 36 See iii.
7.10. 37 See ii. 7.2. 38 To
form, see i, 6.2 39 As thought
Plato, in his Republic, x. ^o As
thought Plato in Gorgias,
C464. 41 vi. 7. 42 vi. 7.

DIFFICULT PASSAGES.

20 This sentence might well
be translated as follows :
"When therefore thought
(meets) the essentially one,
the latter is the form, and the
former the idea." While this

version seems more literal, it
makes no connected sense
with what follows. 4 3 Qr, "so
that it may contain the intel-
ligence which is one, as its
own actualization."

iv.8] DESCENT OF SOUL INTO BODY 119

FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHTH.
Of the Descent of the Soul Into the Body.^

THE EXPERIENCE OF ECSTASY LEADS TO
QUESTIONS.

1. On waking from the slumber of the body to re-
turn to myself, and on turning my attention from
exterior things so as to concentrate it on myself, I often
observe an alluring beauty, and I become conscious of
an innate nobility. Then I live out a higher life, and I
experience atonement with the divinity. Fortifying
myself within it, I arrive at that actualization which
raises me above the intelligible. But if, after this
sojourn with the divinity, I descend once more from
Intelligence to the exercise of my reasoning powers, I
am wont to ask myself how I ever could actually again
descend, and how my soul ever could have entered
into a body, since, although she actually abides in the
body, she still possesses within herself all the perfec-
tion I discover in her.

HERACUTUS, THE ORIGINATOR OF THESE QUES-
TIONS, ANSWERS THEM OBSCURELY.

Heraclitus, who recommends this research, asserts
that ''there are necessary changes of contraries into
each other;" he speaks of *'ascenscions" and of a
"descent," says that it is **a rest to change, a fatigue
to continue unremittingly in the same kinds of work,
and to be overwrought. He thus reduces us to conjee-

120' WORKS OF PLOTINOS [6

tures because he does not explain himself definitely;
and he would even force us to ask how he himself came
to discover what he propounds.

EMPEDOCLES, AS A POET, TELLS OF PYTHAGOREAN

MYTHS. I

Empedocles teaches that "it is a law for souls that
have sinned to fall down here below;" and that '*he
himself, having withdrawn from the divinity, came
down to the earth to become the slave of furious dis- j
cord." It would seem that he limited himself to ad- '
vancing the ideas that Pythagoras and his followers .
generally expressed by symbols, both on this and other \
subjects. Besides Empedocles is obscure because he
uses the language of poetry.

PLATO SAYS MANY CONTRADICTORY THINGS THAT
ARE BEAUTIFUL AND TRUE.

Last, we have the divine Plato, who has said so
many beautiful things about the soul. In his dialogues
he often spoke of the descent of the soul into the body,
so that we have the right to expect from him some-
thing clearer. Unfortunately, he is not always suf-
ficiently in agreement with himself to enable one to
follow his thought. In general, he depreciates cor-
poreal things; he deplores the dealings between the
soul and the body; insists^ that the soul is chained
down to it, and that she is buried in it as in a tomb.
He attaches much importance to the maxim taught in
the mysteries that the soul here below is as in a prison. ^
What Plato calls the "cavern"* and Empedocles calls
the "grotto," means no doubt the sense-world.^ To
break her chains, and to issue from the cavern, means
the soul's^ rising to the intelligible world. In the
Phaedrus,*^ Plato asserts that the cause of the fall of
the soul is the loss of her wings; that after having once

V.8] DESCENT OF SOUL INTO BODY 121

nore ascended on high, she is brought back here below
)y the periods;^ that there are souls sent down into
his world by judgments, fates, conditions, and neces-
ity; still, at the same time, he finds fault with the
'descent" of the soul into the body. But, speaking
)f the universe in the Timaeus,^ he praises the world,
ind calls it a blissful divinity. He states that the
lemiurgic creator, being good, gave it a soul to make
t intelligent, because without the soul, the universe
ould not have been as intelligent as it ought to have
leen.^^ Consequently, the purpose of the introduc-
ion of the universal Soul into the world, and similarly
if each of our souls was only to achieve the perfection
if the world; for it was necessary for the sense-world
0 contain animals equal in kind and numbers to those
ontained in the intelligible world.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY PLATO'S THEORIES.

2. Plato's theories about the soul lead us to ask
ow, in general, the soul has, by her nature, been led
3 enter into relations with the body. Other questions
rise: What is the nature of the world where the soul
ves thus, either voluntarily or necessarily, or in any
ther way? Does the Demiurge^^ act without meet-
ig any obstacle, or is it with him as with our souls?

[UMAN BODIES ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE
THAN THE WORLD-BODY.

To begin with, our souls, charged with the adminis-
'ation of bodies less perfect than the world, had to
enetrate within them profoundly in order to manage
^em; for the elements of these bodies tend to scatter,
nd to return to their original location, while, in the
niverse, all things are naturally distributed in their
roper places.^^ Besides, our bodies demand an active
nd vigilant foresight, because, by the surrounding

l\^

122 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [

objects they are exposed to many accidents; for they
always have a crowd of needs, as they demand con-
tinual protection against the dangers that threaten |
them. ^3 But the body of the world is complete andl
perfect. It is self-sufficient; it has nothing to suffer
contrary to its nature; and consequently, it (acts) on
a mere order of the universal Soul. That is why the
universal Soul can remain impassible, feeling no need,
remaining in the disposition desired by her own nature.
That is why Plato says that, when our soul dwells with
this perfect Soul, she herself becomes perfect, soaring in
the ethereal region, and governing the whole world.^^
So long as a human soul does not withdraw from the|
(universal) Soul to enter into a body, and to belong^
to some individual, she easily administers the world, in
the same manner, and together with the universal
Soul. Communicating to the body essence and per-
fection is therefore, for the soul, not an unmixed evil;
because the providential care granted to an inferior
nature does not hinder him who grants it from himself
remaining in a state of perfection. ■

HOW THE TWO-FOLD SOUL EXERTS A TWO-FOLD

PROVIDENCE.

In the universe there are, indeed, two kinds of provi-
dences.^^ The first Providence regulates everything in
a royal manner, without performing any actions, or ob-
serving the details. The second, operating somewhat
like an artisan, adjusts its creative power to the inferior
nature of creatures by getting in contact with them.^^.
Now as the divine Soul (or, the principal power,^^|
always administers the whole world in the first or regal
way, dominating the world by her superiority, and by
injecting into the world her lowest power (nature), we*
could not accuse the divinity of having given a bad
place to the universal Soul. Indeed, this universal Soul

iv.8] DESCENT OF SOUL INTO BODY 123

was never deprived of her natural power, possessing it
always, because this power is not contrary to her being,
possessing it uninterruptedly from all eterriity.

STAR-SOULS, LIKE UNINCARNATE SOULS. GOVERN
THE WORLD UNTROUBLEDLY.

(Plato) further states that the relation of the souls
of the stars to their bodies is the same as that of the
universal Soul to the universe, ^^ where he makes the
stars participate in the movements of the universal
Soul. He thus grants to those souls the blessedness
which is suitable to them. The intercourse of the soul
v/ith the body is usually blamed for two things: be-
cause it hinders the soul from busying herself with the
conceptions of intelligence, and then because it ex-
poses her to agreeable or painful sensations which fill
her with desires. Now neither of these two results
affect the soul that has not entered into a body, and
which does not depend thereon by belonging to some
particular individual. Then, on the contrary, she
possesses the body of the universe, which has no fault,
no need, which can cause her neither fears nor desires,
because she has nothing to fear. Thus no anxiety
ever forces her to descend to terrestrial objects, or to
distract herself from her happy and sublime contem-
plation. Entirely devoted to divine things, she governs
the world by a single power, whose exercise involves
no anxiety.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMAN AND COSMIC
INCARNATION.

3. Consider now the human soul which^^ under-
goes numberless ills while in the body, eking out a
miserable existence, a prey to griefs, desires, fears,
sufferings of all kinds, for whom the body is a tomb,
and the sense-world a "cave" or "grotto." This dif-

124 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [6

ference of opinions about the condition of the universal
Soul and the human soul is not contradictory, because
these two souls do not have the same reasons for
descent into a body. To begin with, the location of
thought, that we call the intelligible world, -^ contains
not only the entire universal Intelligence, but also the
intellectual powers, and the particular intelligences
comprised within the universal Intelligence; since there
is not only a single intelligence, but a simultaneously
single and plural intelligence. Consequently, it must
also have contained a single Soul, and a plurality of
souls; and it was from the single Soul, that the multiple
particular and different souls had to be born, as from
one and the same genus are derived species that are
both superior and inferior, and more or less intellectual.
Indeed, in the intelligible world, there is, on one hand,
the (universal) Intelligence which, like some great
animal, potentially contains the other intelligences.
On the other hand, are the individual intelligences,
each of which possess in actualization what the former
contains potentially. We may illustrate by a living
city that would contain other living cities. The soul
of the universal City would be more perfect and
powerful; but nothing would hinder the souls of the
other cities from being of the same kind. Similarly, in
the universal Fire, there is on one hand a great fire,
and on the other small fires, while the universal Being
is the being of the universal Fire, or rather, is the
source from which the being of the universal Fire
proceeds.

THE RATIONAL SOUL POSSESSES ALSO AN
INDIVIDUALITY.

The function of the rational soul is to think, but
she does not limit herself to thinking. Otherwise there
would be no difference between her and intelligence.
Besides her intellectual characteristics, the soul's" char-

iv.8] DESCENT OF SOUL INTO BODY 125

acteristic nature, by virtue of which she does not re-
main mere intelligence, has a further individual func-
tion, such as is possessed by every other bein^. By
raising her glance to what is superior to her, she thinks;
by bringing them down to herself, she preserves her-
self; by lowering them to what is inferior to her, she
adorns it, administers it, and governs it. All these
things were not to remain immovable in the intelligible
world, to permit of a successive issue of varied beings,
which no doubt are less perfect than that which pre-
ceded them, but which, nevertheless, exist necessarily
during the persistence of the Principle from which they
proceed.

INCARNATE SOULS WEAKEN BECAUSE THEY CON-
TEMPLATE THE INDIVIDUAL.

4. There are individual souls which, in their con-
version^i towards the principle from which they pro-
ceed, aspire to the intelligible world, and which also
exercise their power on inferior things, just as light,
which does not disdain to throw its rays down tu us
though remaining suspended to the sun on high. These
souls must remain sheltered from all suffering so long
as in the intelligible world they remain together with
the universal Soul. They must besides, in heaven,
share with it the administration of the world; like
kings who, being colleagues of the great King of the
universe, share the government with Him, without
themselves descending from their thrones, withr.ut
ceasing to occupy a place as elevated as He. But when
they pass from this state in which they live with the
universal Soul to a particular and independent exist-
ence, when they seem weary of dwelling with another,
then each of them returns to what belongs to her
individually. Now when a soul has done that for a
long while, when she withdraws from the universal
Soul, and distinguishes herself therefrom, when she

126 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [6

ceases to keep her glances directed towards the intel-
ligible world; then, isolating herself in her individual
existence, she weakens, and finds herself overwhelmed
with a crowd of cares, because she directs her glance
at something individual. Having therefore separated
herself from the universal Soul as well as from the
other souls that remain united thereto, and having at-
tached herself to an individual body, and concentrating
herself exclusively on this object, which is subjected
to the destructive action of all other beings, she ceases
to govern the whole to administer more carefully a
part, the care of which forces her to busy herself, and
mingle with external things, to be not only present in
the body, but also to interpenetrate it.

THIS PROCESS EXPLAINS THE CLASSIC EXPRES-
SIONS ABOUT HER CONDITION.

Thus, in the common expression, she has lost her
wings, and is chained by the bonds of the body, be-
cause she gave up the calm existence she enjoyed when
with the universal Soul she shared the administration
of the world; for when she was above she spent a
much happier life. The fallen soul is therefore chained
or imprisoned, obliged to have recourse to the senses
because she cannot first make use of intelligence. She
is, as it is said, buried in a tomb, or cavern. But by
her conversion towards thought, she breaks her bonds,
sh'fe returns upwards towards higher regions, when,
starting from the indications of reminiscence she rises
to the contemplation of the essences ;22 for even after
her fall she always preserves something superior to
the body.

■

SOULS AS AMPHIBIANS. *

Souls therefore are necessarily amphibians ;23 since
they alternately live in the intelligible world, and in
the sense-world; staying longer in the intelligible world

iv.8] DESCENT OF SOUL INTO BODY 127

when they can remain united to supreme Intelligence
more permanently, or staying longer or preponder-
atingly here below when nature or destiny imposes on
them a contrary fate. That is the secret meaning of
Plato's words^^ to the effect that the divinity divides
the seeds of the souls formed by a second mixture in
the cup, and that He separates them into (two) parts.
He also adds that they must necessarily fall into genera-
tion after having been divided into a definite number.
Plato's statement that the divinity sowed the souls,^'^
as well as the divinity's address to the other deities,
must be taken figuratively. For, in reference to tl\e
things contained in the universe, this implies that they
are begotten or produced; for successive enumeration
and description implies an eternal begetting, and that
those objects exist eternally in their present state.

SOULS DESCENDING TO HELP ARE SENT BY GOD.

5. Without any inherent contradiction it may
therefore be asserted either,^^ that the souls are sowed
into generation, that they descend here below for the
perfection of the universe, or that they are shut up in
a cavern as the result of a divine punishment, that their
fall is simultaneously an effect of their will and of
necessit}^ — as necessity does not exclude voluntariness
— and that they are in evil so long as they are incar-
nate in bodies. Again, as Empedocles says, they may
have withdrawn from the divinity, and have lost their
way, and have committed some fault that they are
expiating; or, as says Heraclitus, that rest consists in
flight (from heaven, and descent here below), and
that the descent of souls is neither entirely voluntary,
nor involuntary. Indeed, no being ever falls volun-
tarily; but as it is by his own motion that he descends
to lower things, and reaches a less happy condition,
it may be said that he bears the punishment of his

128 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [6

conduct. Besides, as it is by an eternal law of nature
that this being acts and suffers in that manner, we
may, without contradiction or violence to the truth,
assert that the being who descends from his rank to
assist some lower thing is sent by the divinity.^"^ In
spite of any number of intermediate parts (which
separate) a principle from its lower part, the latter i
may still be ascribed to the former.^^

THE TWO POSSIBLE FAULTS OF THE SOUL.

Here there are two possible faults for the soul. The
first consists in the motive that determines her to
descend. The second is the evil she commits after
having descended here below. The first fault is ex-
piated by the very condition of the soul after she has
descended here below. The punishment of the latter
fault, if not too serious, is to pass into other bodies
more or less promptly according to the judgment de-
livered about her deserts — and we speak of a ''judg-
ment" to show that it is the consequence of the divine
law. If however the perversity of the soul passes all
measure, she undergoes, under the charge of guardians
in charge of her chastisement, the severe punishments
she has incurred.

PROMPT FLIGHT HERE BELOW LEAVES THE SOUL
UNHARMED BY HER STAY HERE.

Thus, although the soul have a divine nature (or
"being"), though she originate in the intelligible
world, she enters into a body. Being a lower divinity,
she descends here below by a voluntary inclination, for
the purpose of developing her power, and to adorn
what is below her. If she flee promptly from here
below, she does not need to regret having become ac-
quainted with evil, and knowing the nature of vice,^^
nor having had the opportunity of manifesting her

iv.8] DESCENT OF SOUL INTO BODY 129

faculties, and to manifest her activities and deeds.
Indeed, the faculties of the soul would be useless if
they slumbered continuously in incorporeal being with-
out ever becoming actualized. The soul herself would ;j
ignore what she possesses if her faculties did not mani-
fest by procession, for everywhere it is the actualization
that manifests the potentiality. Otherwise, the latter
would be completely hidden and obscured; or rather, \
it would not really exist, and would not possess any -I
reality. It is the variety of sense-effects which illus- i •
trates the greatness of the intelligible principle, whose '
nature publishes itself by the beauty of its works.

CONTINUOUS PROCESSION NECESSARY TO THE

SUPREME.

6. Unity was not to exist alone; for if unity re-
mained self-enclosed, all things would remain hidden
in unity without having any form, and no beings would
achieve existence. Consequently, even if constituted
by beings born of unity, plurality would not exist,
unless the inferior natures, by their rank destined to \
be souls, issued from those beings by the way of pro- j i
cession. Likewise, it was not sufficient for souls to '
exist, they also had to reveal what they were capable
of begetting. It is likewise natural for each essence
to produce something beneath it, to draw it out from
itself by a development similar to that of a seed, a
development in which an indivisible principle proceeds
to the production of a sense-object, and where that
which precedes remains in its own place at the same
time as it begets that which follows by an inexpress-
ible power, which is essential to intelligible natures.
Now as this power was not to be stopped or circum-
scribed in its actions by jealousy, there was need of a
continuous procession until, from degree to degree,
all things had descended to the extreme limits of what
was possible ;3^ for it is the characteristic of an inex-

130 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [6

haustible power to communicate all its gifts to every-
thing, and not to permit any of them to be disinherited,
since there is nothing which hinders any of them from
participating in the nature of the Good in the measure
that it is capable of doing so. Since matter has existed
from all eternityj it was impossible that from the time .
since it existed, it should not participate in that which
communicates goodness to all things according to their
receptivity thereof.^^ If the generation of matter were
the necessary consequence of anterior principles, still
it must not be entirely deprived of the good by its
primitive impotence, when the cause which gratuitously
communicated ''being" to it remained self-enclosed.

SENSE-OBJECTS ARE NECESSARY AS REVEALERS OF

THE ETERNAL.

The excellence, power and goodness of intelligible
(essences) are therefore revealed by sense-objects;
and there is an eternal connection between intelligible
(entities) that are self-existent, and sense-objects,
which eternally derive their existence therefrom by
participation, and which imitate intelligible nature to
the extent of their ability.

THE SOUL'S NATURE IS OF AN INTERMEDIATE KIND.

7. As there are two kinds of being (or, existence),
one of sensation, and the other intelligible, it is prefer-
able for the soul to live in the intelligible world; never-
theless, as a result of her nature, it is necessary for
her also to participate in sense-affairs. ^^ since she
occupies only an interm.ediate rank, she must not feel
wronged at not being the best of beings.^^ Though
on one hand her condition be divine, on the other she
is located on the limits of the intelligible world, be-
cause of her affinity for sense-nature. She causes this
nature to participate in her powers, and she even re-
ceives something therefrom, when, instead of managing

iv.8] DESCENT OF SOUL INTO BODY l3l

the body without compromising her own security, she
permits herself to be carried away by her own inclina-
tion to penetrate profoundly within it, ceasing her com-
plete union with the universal Soul. Besides, the soul
can rise above the body after having learned to feel
how happy one is to dwell on high, by the experience
of things seen and suffered here below, and after
having appreciated the true Good by the comparison of
contraries. Indeed the knowledge of the good becomes
clearer by the experience of evil, especially among
souls which are not strong enough to know evil before
having experienced it.^*

THE PROCESSION OF INTELLIGENCE IS AN EXCUR-
SION DOWNWARDS AND UPWARDS.

The procession of intelligence consists in descending
to things that occupy the lowest rank, and which have
an inferior nature, ^^ for Intelligence could not rise
to the superior Nature. Obliged to act outside of
itself, and not being able to remain self-enclosed, by
a necessity and by a law of its nature, intelligence
must advance unto the soul where it stops; then, after
having communicated of itself to that which immedi-
ately follows it, intelligence must return to the intel-
ligible world. Likewise, the soul has a double action
in her double relation with what is below and above
her. By her first action, the soul manages the body to
which she is united; by the second, she contemplates
the intelligible entities. These alternatives work out,
for individual souls, with the course of time; and finally
there occurs a conversion which brings them back from
the lower to the higher natures.

THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. HOWEVER. IS NOT DIS-
TURB^vD BY THE URGENCIES BELOW HER.

The universal Soul, however, does not need to busy
herself with troublesome functions, and remains out

132 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [6

of the reach of evils. She considers what is below her
in a purely contemplative manner, while at the same
time remaining related to what is above her. She is
therefore enabled simultaneously on one side to re-
ceive, and on the other to give, since her nature com-
pels her to relate herself closely with the objects of
sense.3^

THE SOUL DOES NOT ENTIRELY ENTER INTO THE

BODY.

8. Though I should set myself in opposition to
popular views, I shall set down clearly what seems to
me the true state of affairs. Not the whole soul enters
into the body. By her higher part, she ever remains
united to the intelligible world; as, by her lower part,
she remains united to the sense-world. If this lower
part dominates, or rather, if it be dominated (by
sensation) and troubled, it hinders us from being con-
scious of what the higher part of the soul contem-
plates. Indeed that which is thought impinges on our
consciousness only in case it descends to us, and
is felt. In general, we are conscious of what goes on
in every part of the soul only when it is felt by the
entire soul. For instance, appetite, which is the actual-
ization of lustful desire, is by us cognized only when
we perceive it by the interior sense or by discursive
reason, or by both simultaneously. Every soul has a
lower part turned towards the body, and a higher part
turned towards divine Intelligence. The universal Soul
manages the universe by her lower part without any
kind of trouble, because she governs her body not as
we do by any reasoning, but by intelligence, and con-
sequently in a manner entirely different from that
adopted by art. The individual souls, each of whom
administers a part of the universe,^*^ also have a part
that rises above their body; but they are distracted
from thought by sensation, and by a perception of a

iv.8] DESCENT OF SOUL INTO BODY 133

number of things which are contrary to nature, and
which come to trouble them, and afflict them. Indeed,
the body that they take care of constitutes but a part
of the universe, is incomplete, and is surrounded by
exterior objects. That is why it has so many needs,
why it desires luxuriousness, and why it is deceived
thereby. On the contrary, the higher part of the soul
is insensible to the attraction of these transitory
pleasures, and leads an undisturbed life.

iSee iv. 3.9-17. 2 in the

Cratylus, C400. 3 As in the
Phaedo, C62. ^ Republic, vii,
C514. 5 See Jamblichus. Cave
of the Nymphs, 8. ^ Proces-
sion, or rising. '^ C246. ^ Of
the universe. ^ C34. lO Xjni-
aeus, C30. ^^ The Creator, who
is the universal Soul. ^^ gee
iv. 3.9-11. 13 See iv. 3.17. 14 As
thought Plato in his Phaedrus,
C246. 15 The First belongs to
the principal power of the uni-
versal Soul, the second to its
natural and plant power, see iii,
8.1 and iv. 4.13. i6 See iv. 4.
13. 17 See ii. 3.18. is As in

the Timaeus. C42. 19 iv. 8.1.
20 See iv. 2.2. 21 See iv. 3.6.
7. 22 As thought Plato in his
Phaedrus. C249 and Phaedo,
C72. 23 That lead an alternate
or double life. 24 in his Tim-
aeus, C42, 69. 25 In the stars.

26 As does Plato, see iv. 8.1.

27 As a messenger, see iv. 3.12.
13. 28 See ii. 9.2. 29 Without
having given herself up to it.
30 See i. 8.7. 3 1 That is, of
form, ii. 4.4. 32 See iv. 6.3.

33 See iii. 2.8.
35 See iv. 3.18.

3 4 See iv. 8.5.
36 See ii. 9.2.

37 That is, the body to which
she is united.

134 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [7

FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.

How What is After the First Proceeds Therefrom; of

the One.

NECESSITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST.

1. Everything that exists after the First is derived
therefrom, either directly or mediately, and constitutes
a series of different orders such that the second can be
traced back to the First, the third to the second, and
so forth. Above all beings there must be Something
simple and different from all the rest which would
exist in itself, and which, without ever mingling with
anything else, might nevertheless preside over every-
thing, which might really be the One, and not that
deceptive unity which is only the attribute of essence,
and which would be a principle superior even to being,
unreachable by speech, reason, or science, For if it
be. not completely simple, foreign to all complexity
and composition, and be not really one, it could not
be a principle. It is sovereignly absolute only because
it is simple and first. For what is not first, is in need
of superior things; what is not simple has need of being
constituted by simple things. The Principle of every-
thing must therefore be., one and only. If it were ad-
mitted that there was a second principle of that kind,
both would constitute but a single one. For we do
not say that they are bodies, nor that the One and
First is a body; for every body is composite and
begotten, and consequently is not a principle; for a
principle cannot be begotten.^ Therefore, since the

V.4] OF PROCESSION, OF THE ONE 135

principle of everything cannot be corporeal, because
it must be essentially one, it must be the First.

THE FIRST NECESSARILY BEGETS A SECOND. WHICH
MUST BE PERFECT.

If something after the One exist, it is no more the
simple One, but the multiple One. Whence is this
derived.^ Evidently from the First, for it could not
be supposed that it came from chance; that would be
to admit that the First is not the principle of every-
thing. How then is the multiple One derived from
the First.? If the First be not only perfect, but the
most perfect, if it be the first Pov/er, it must surely,
in respect to power, be superior to all the rest, and
the other powers must merely imitate it to the limit
of their ability. Now we see that all that arrives to •')^^
perfection cannot unfruitfully remain in itself, but •'
begets and produces. Not only do beings capable of
choice, but even those lacking reflection or soul have
a tendency to impart to other beings, what is in them;
as, for instance, fire emits heat, snow emits cold; and
plant- juices (dye and soak) into whatever they hap-
pen to touch. All things in nature imitate the First
principle by seeking to achieve immortality by pro-
creation, and by manifestation of their qualities. How
then would He who is sovereignly perfect, who is the
supreme Good, remain absorbed in Himself, as if a '^
sentiment of jealousy hindered Him from communi-
cating Himself, or as if He were powerless, though
He is the power of everything? How then would He
remain principle of everything? He must therefore
beget something, just as what He begefs milst in turn
beget. There must therefore be something beneath
the First. Now this thing (which is immediately be-
neath the First), must be very venerable, first because
it begets everything else, then because it is be-

136 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [7

gotten by the First, and because it must, as being the
Second, rank and surpass everything else.

INTELLIGENCE CANNOT BE THE FIRST. AND RANKS

ALL ELSE.

2. If the generating principle were intelligence,
what it begot would have to be inferior to intelligence,
and nevertheless approximate it, and resemble it more
than anything else. Now as the generating principle
is superior to intelligence, the first begotten thing is
necessarily intelligence. Why, however, is the gen-
erating principle not intelligence? Because the act of
intelligence is thought, and thought consists in seeing
the intelligible; for it is only by its conversion towards
it that intelligence achieves a complete and perfect
existence. In itself, intelligence is only an indeter-
minate power to see; only by contemplation of the
intelligible does it achieve the state of being determined.
This is the reason of the saying, 'The ideas and num-
bers, that is, intelligence, are born from the indefinite
doubleness, and the One.*' Consequently, instead of
being simple, intelligence is multiple. It is composed
of several elements; these are doubtless intelligible,
but what intelligence sees is none the less multiple. In \
any case, intelligence is simultaneously the object
thought, and the thinking subject; it is therefore already
jiouble.

THE FIRST AND SECOND AS HIGHER AND LOWER
INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES.

But besides this intelligible (entity, namely, intel-
ligence), there is another (higher) intelligible (the
supreme Intelligible, the First). In what way does
the intelligence, thus determined, proceed from the
(First) Intelligible? The Intelligible abides in itself,
and has need of nothing else, while there is a need

V.4] OF PROCESSION, OF THE ONE 137

of something else in that which sees and thinks (that
is, that which thinks has need of contemplating the
supreme Intelligible). But even while remaining
within Himself, the Intelligible (One) is not devoid of
sentiment; all things belong to Him, are in Him, and
with Him. Consequently, He has the conception of
Himself, a conception which implies consciousness, and
which consists in eternal repose, and in a thought, but
in a thought different from that of intelligence. If
He begets something while remaining within Himself,
He begets it precisely when He is at the highest point
of individuality. It is therefore by remaining in His
own state that He begets what He begets; He pro-
creates by individualizing. Now as He remains intel-
ligible, what He begets cannot be anything else than
thought; therefore thought, by existing, and by think-
ing the Principle whence it is derived (for it could
not think any other object), becomes simultaneously
intelligence and intelligible; but this second intelligible
differs from the first Intelligible from which it pro-
ceeds, and of which it is but the image and the re-
flection.

THE SECOND IS THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE PO-
TENTIALITY OF THE FIRST.

But how is an actualization begotten from that self-
limited (intelligible) ? We shall have to draw a dis-
tinction between an actualization of being, and an actu-
alization out of the being of each thing (actualized
being, and actualization emanating from being).
Actualized being cannot differ from being, for it is
being itself. But the actualization emanating from
being — and everything necessarily has an actualization
of this kind — differs from what produces it. It is as
if with fire: there is a difference between the heat
which constitutes its being, and the heat which radiates
exteriorly, while the fire interiorly realizes the actual-

138 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [7

ization which constitutes its being, and which makes it
preserve its nature. Here also, and far more so, the
First remains in His proper state, and yet simultan-
eously, by His inherent perfection, by the actualization
which resides in Him, has been begotten the actual-
ization which, deriving its existence from so great a
power, nay, from supreme Power, has arrived at, or
achieved essence and being. As to the First, He was
above being; for He was the potentiality of all things,
already being all things.

HOW THE FIRST IS ABOVE ALL BEING.

If this (actualization begotten by the First, this ex-
ternal actualization) be all things, then that (One) is
above all things, and consequently above being. If
then (this external actualization) be all things, and be
before all things, it does not occupy the same rank
as the remainder (of all other things) ; and must, in
this respect also, be superior to being, and consequently
also to intelligence; for there is Something superior to
intelligence. Essence is not, as you might say, dead;
it is not devoid of life or thought; for intelligence and
essence are identical. Intelligible entities do not exist"
before the intelligence that thinks them, as sense-ob-
jects exist before the sensation which perceives them.
Intelligence itself is the things that it thinks, since their
forms are not introduced to them from without. From
where indeed would intelligence receive these forms?
Intelligence exists with the intelligible things; intel-
ligence is identical with them, is one with them.
Reciprocally, intelligible entities do not exist without
their matter (that is, Intelligence).

1 As thought Plato in his Parmenides, C154.

iv.9] HOW SOULS FORM A SINGLE SOUL 139

FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.
Whether All Souls Form a Single One?

IF ALL SOULS BE ONE IN THE WORLD-SOUL, WHY
SHOULD THEY NOT TOGETHER FORM ONE?

1. Just as the soul of each animal is one, because
she is entirely present in the whole body, and because
she is thus really one, because she does not have one
part in one organ, and some other part in another;
and just as the sense-soul is equally one in all the
beings which feel, and just as the vegetative soul is
everywhere entirely one in each part of the growing
plants; why then should your soul and mine not form
a single unity? Why should not all souls form but a
single one? Why should not the universal (Soul)
which is present in all beings, be one because she is not
divided in the manner of a body, being everywhere
the same? Why indeed should the soul in myself form
but one, and the universal (Soul) likewise not be one,
similarly, since no more than my own is this universal
(Soul) either material extension, or a body? If both
my soul and yours proceed from the universal (Soul),
and if the latter be one, then should my soul and
yours together form but a single one. Or again, on
the supposition that the universal (Soul) and mine
proceed from a single soul, even on this hypothesis
would all souls form but a single one. We shall have
to examine in what (this Soul which is but) one con-
sists.

140 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [

SOULS MAY NOT FOR^I A NUMERIC UNITY. BUT MAY
FORM A GENERIC UNITY.

Let us first consider if it may be affirmed that all
souls form but one in the sense in which it is said
that the soul of each individual is one. It seems absurd
to pretend that my soul and yours form but one in this
(numerical) sense; for then you would be feeling
simultaneously with my feeling, and you would be
virtuous when I was, and you would have the same
desires as I, and not only would we both have the
same sentiments, but even the identical sentiments of
the universal (Soul), so that every sensation felt by
me would have been felt by the entire universe. If in
this manner all the souls form but one, why is one
soul reasonable, and the other unreasonable, why is
the one in an animal, and the other in a plant? On
the other hand, if we do not admit that there is a single
Soul, we will not be able to explain the unity of the
universe, nor find a single principle for (human) souls.

THE UNITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEVERAL SOULS
NEED NOT IMPLY THEIR BEING IDENTICAL.

2. In the first place, if the souls of myself and of
another man form but one soul, this does not neces-
sarily imply their being identical with their principle.
Granting the existence of different beings, the same
principle need not experience in each the same affec-
tions. Thus, humanity may equally reside in me, who
am in motion, as in you, who may be at rest, although
in me it moves, and it rests in you. Nevertheless, it
is neither absurd nor paradoxical to insist that the same
principle is both in you and in me; and this does not
necessarily make us feel the identical affections. Con-
sider a single body: it is not the left hand which feels
what the right one does, but the soul which is present
in the whole body. To make you feel the same as I

V.9] HOW SOULS FORM A SINGLE SOUL 141

lio, our two bodies would have to constitute but a
';ingle one; then, being thus united, our souls would
perceive the same affections. Consider also that the
\11 remains deaf to a multitude of impressions experi-
enced by the parts of a single and same organism, and
:hat so much the more as the body is larger. This is
:he state of affairs, for instance, with the large whales
vhich do not feel the impression received in some one
3art of their body, because of the smallness of the
Tiovement.

SYMPATHY DOES NOT FORCE IDENTITY OF SEN-
SATION.

It is therefore by no means necessary that when one
nember of the universe experiences an affection, the
atter be clearly felt by the All. The existence of
sympathy is natural enough, and it could not be denied;
3ut this does not imply identity of sensation. Nor is
t absurd that our souls, while' forming a single one
;hould be virtuous and vicious, just as it would be
30ssible that the same essence be at motion in me, but
it rest in you. Indeed, the unity that we attribute to
he unfversal (Soul) does not exclude all multiplicity,
;uch a unity as befits intelligence. We may however
;ay that (the soul) is simultaneously unity and plur-
ility, because she participates not only in divisible es-
;ence in the bodies, but also in the indivisible, which
:onsequently is one. Now, just as the impression
)erceived by one of my parts is not necessarily felt all
)ver my body, while that which happens to the prin-
:ipal organ is felt by all the other parts, likewise, the
mpressions that the universe communicates to the in-
lividual are clearer, because usually the parts perceive
he same affections as the All, while it is not evident
:hat the particular affections that we feel would be also
experienced by the Whole.

142 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [8

UNITY OF ALL BEINGS IMPLIED BY SYMPATHY.
LOVE, AND MAGIC ENCHANTMENT.

3. On the other hand, observation teaches us that
we S3^mpathize with each other, that we cannot see the
suffering of another man without sharing it, that we
are naturally inclined to confide in each other, and to
love; for love is a fact whose origin is connected with
the question that occupies us. Further, if enchant-
ments and magic charms mutually attract individuals,
leading distant persons to sympathize, these effects can
only be explained by the unity of soul. (It is well
known that) words pronounced in a low tone of voice
(telepathically? ) affect a distant person, and make
him hear what is going on at a great distance. Hence
appears the unity of all beings, which demands the unity
of the Soul. m

WHAT OF THE DIFFERENCES OF RATIONALITY, IF
THE SOUL BE ONE?

If, however, the Soul be one, why is some one soul
reasonable, another irrational, or some other one
I merely vegetative? The indivisible part of the soul
U consists in reason, which is not divided in the bodies,
^ while the part of the divisible soul in the bodies (which,
' though being one in herself, nevertheless divides her-
self in the bodies, because she sheds sentiment every-
where)j must be regarded as another power of the
soul (the sensitive power); likewise, the part which
fashions and produces the bodies is still another
. power (the vegetative power) ; nevertheless, this
i plurality of powers does not destroy the unity of the
i j soul. For instance, in a grain of seed there are also |
several powers; nevertheless this grain of seed is one,
and from this unity is born a multiplicity which forms
a unity.

iv.9] HOW SOULS FORM A SINGLE SOUL 143

THE POWERS OF THE SOUL ARE NOT EXERCISED
EVERYWHERE BECAUSE THEY DIFFER.

But why do not all the powers of the soul act every-
where? Now if we consider the Soul which is one
everywhere, we find that sensation is not similar in
all its parts (that is, in all the individual souls) ; that
reason is not in all (but in certain souls exclusively) ;
and that the vegetative power is granted to those
beings who do not possess sensation, and that all these
powers return to unity when they separate from the
body.

THE BODY'S POWER OF GROWTH IS DERIVED FROM
THE WHOLE, AND THE SOUL; BUT NOT FROM

OUR SOUL.

If, however, the body derive its vegetative power
from the Whole and from this (universal) Soul which
is one, why should it not derive it also from our soul?
Because that which is nourished by this power forms a
part of the universe, which possesses sensation only at (
the price of ''suffering." As to the sense-power which
rises as far as the judgment, and which is united to
every intelligence, there was no need for it to form
what had already been formed by the Whole, but it
could have given its forms if these forms were not
parts of the Whole which produces them.

THE UNITY OF THE SOULS IS A CONDITION OF
THEIR MULTIPLICITY.

4. Such justifications will preclude surprise at our
deriving all souls from unity. But completeness of
treatment demands explanation how all souls are but
a single one. Is this due to their proceeding from a
single Soul, or because they all form a single one?
If all proceed from a single one, did this one divide

144 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [8

herself, or did she remain whole, while begetting the
multitude of souls? In this case, how could an es-
sence beget a multitude like her, while herself remain-
ing undiminished? We shall invoke the help of the
divinity (in solving this problem) ; and say that the
existence of the one single Soul is the condition of the
existence of the multitude of souls, and that this multi-
tude must proceed from the Soul that is one.

THE SOUL CAN BEGET MANY BECAUSE SHE IS AN
INCORPOREAL ESSENCE.

If the Soul were a body, then would the division of
this body necessarily produce the multitude of souls,
and this essence would be different in its different parts.
Nevertheless, as this essence would be homogeneous,
the souls (between which it would divide itself) would
be similar to each other, because they would possess
a single identical form in its totality, but they would
differ by their body. If the essence of these souls
consisted in the bodies which would serve them as
subjects, they would be different from each other. If
the essence of these souls consisted in their form, they
would, in form, be but one single form; in other terms,
there would be but one same single soul in a mulittude
of bodies. Besides, above this soul which would be
one, but which would be spread abroad in the multi-
tude of bodies, there would be another Soul which
would not be spread abroad in the multitude of bodies;
it would be from her that would proceed the soul
which would be the unity in plurality, the multiple
image of the single Soul in a single body, like a single
seal, by impressing the same figure to a multitude of
pieces of wax, would be distributing this figure in a
multitude of impressions. In this case (if the essence
of the soul consisted in her form) the soul would be

iv.9] HOW SOULS FORM A SINGLE SOUL 145

something incorporeal, and as she would consist in an
affection of the body, there would be nothing astonish-
ing in that a single quality, emanating from a single
principle, might be in a multitude of subjects simul-
taneously. Last, if the essence of the soul consisted in
being both things (being simultaneously a part of a
homogeneous body and an affection of the body),
there would be nothing surprising (if there were a unity
of essence in a multitude of subjects). We have thus
shown that the soul is incorporeal, and an essence; we
must now consider the results of this view.

HOW AN ESSENCE CAN BE ONE IN A MULTITUDE
OF SOULS IS ILLUSTRATED BY SEED.

5. How can an essence be single in a multitude of
souls? Either this one essence is entire in all souls,
or this one and entire essence begets all souls while
remaining (undiminished) in itself. In either case,
the essence is single. It is the unity to which the in-
dividual souls are related; the essence gives itself to
this multitude, and yet simultaneously the essence does
not give itself; it can give of itself to all individual
souls, and neverthless remain single; it is powerful
enough to pass into all simultaneously, and to be
separated from none; thus its essence remains identical,
while being present in a multitude of souls. This is
nothing astonishing; all of science is entirely in each
of its parts, and it begets them without itself ceasing
to remain entire within itself. Likewise, a grain of
seed is entire in each of its parts in which it naturally
divides itself; each of its parts has the same properties
as the whole seed; nevertheless the seed remains en-
tire, without diminution; and if the matter (in which
the seed resides) offer it any cause of division, all
the parts will not any the less form a single unity.

146 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [8

THIS MIRACLE IS EXPLAINED BY THE USE OF THE
CONCEPTION OF POTENTIALITY.

It may be objected that in science a part is not the
total science. Doubtless, the notion which is actualized,
and which is studied to the exclusion of others, because
there is special need of it, is only partially an actualiza-
tion. Nevertheless, in a latent manner it potentially
comprises all the other notions it implies. Thus, all
the notions are contained in each part of the science,
and in this respect each part is the total science; for
what is only partially actualized (potentially) com-
prises all the notions of science. Each notion that one
wishes to render explicit is at one's disposition; and
this in every part of the science that is considered; but
if it be compared with the whole science, it seems to
be there only potentially. It must not, however, be
thought that the particular notion does not contain
anything of the other notions; in this case, there would
be nothing systematic or scientific about it; it would
be nothing more than a sterile conception. Being a
really scientific notion, it potentially contains all the
notions of the science; and the genuine scientist knows
how to discover all its notions in a single one, and how
to develop its consequences. The geometical ex-
pert shows in his demonstrations how each theorem
contains all the preceding ones, to which he harks back
by analysis, and how each theorem leads to all the
following ones, by deduction.

DIFFICULT AS THESE EXPLANATIONS ARE, THEY
ARE CLEAR INTELLIGIBLY.

These truths excite our incredulity, because here
below our reason is weak, and it is confused by the
body. In the intelligible world, however, all the
verities are clear, and each is evident, by itself.

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE 147

SIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.
Of the Good and the One.

UNITY NECESSARY TO EXISTENCE OF ALL BEINGS.

1. All beings, both primary, as well as those who

I are so called on any pretext soever, are beings only

because of their unity. What, indeed would they be

without it? Deprived of their unity, they would cease

to be what they are said to be. No army can exist

unless it be one. So with a choric ballet or a flock.

Neither a house nor a ship can exist without unity; by

losing it they would cease to be what they are.^ So

also with continuous quantities which would not exist

I without unity. On being divided by losing their unity,

they simultaneously lose their nature. Consider farther

the bodies of plants and animals, of which each is a

! unity. On losing their unity by being broken up into

several parts, they simultaneously lose their nature.

They are no more what they were, they have become

new beings, which themselves exist only so long as

I they are one. What effects health in us, is that the

! parts of our bodies are co-ordinated in unity. Beauty

is formed by the unity of our members. Virtue is our

soul's tendency to unity, and becoming one through

the harmony of her faculties.

THE SOUL MAY IMPART UNITY, BUT IS NOT UNITY.

The soul imparts unity to all things when producing
them, fashioning them, and forming them. Should we,

148 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [^

therefore, after rising to the Soul, say that she no-
only imparts unity, but herself is unity in itself? Cer-
tainly not. The soul that imparts form and figure tc
bodies is not identical with form, and figure. There-
fore the soul imparts unity without being unity. Sh^
unifies each of her productions only by contemplatior
of the One, just as she produces man only by com-
templating Man-in-himself, although adding to thai
idea the implied unity. Each of the things that are
called "one" have a unity proportionate to theii
nature ("being") ; so that they participate in unit}
more or less according as they share essence^ (being)
Thus the soul is something different from unity; never-
theless, as she exists in a degree higher (than the
body), she participates more in unity, without bein^
unity itself; indeed she is one, but the unity in her i;
no more than contingent. There is a difference be
tween the soul and unity, just as between the body anc
unity. A discrete quantity such as a company oi
dancers, or choric ballet, is very far from being unity
a continuous quantity approximates that further; th(
soul gets still nearer to it, and participates therein stil
more. Thus from the fact that the soul could no
exist without being one, the identity between the sou
and unity is suggested. But this may be answered ii
two ways. First, other things also possess individua
existence because they possess unity, and nevertheles
are not unity itself; as, though the body is not identica
with unity, it also participates in unity. Further, thi
soul is manifold as well as one, though she be no
composed of parts. She possesses several faculties
discursive reason, desire, and perception — all of then
faculties joined together by unity as a bond. Doubt
less the soul imparts unity to something else (thi
body), because she herself possesses unity; but thi
unity is by her received from some other principl
(namely, from unity itself).

/i.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE 149

BEING AND ESSENCE IDENTICAL WITH UNITY.

I 2. (Aristotle^) suggests that in each of the in-
lividual beings which are one, being is identical with
iinity. Are not being and essence identical with unity,
n every being and in every essence, in a manner such
i;hat on discovering essence, unity also is discovered?
s not being in itself unity in itself, so that if being be
Intelligence, unity also must be intelligence, as intel-
igence which, being essence in the highest degree, is
ilso unity in the first degree, and which, imparting es-
ence to other things, also imparts unity to them?
vVhat indeed could unity be, apart from essence and
}eing? As *'man," and **a man" are equivalent,*
ssence must be identical with unity; or, unity is the
lumber of everything considered individually; and as
)ne object joined to another is spoken of as two, so
in object alone is referred to as one.

UNITY IS NOT A NUMBERING DEVICE, BUT IS
IDENTICAL WITH EXISTENCE.

If number belongs to the class of beings, evidently
he latter must include unity also; and we shall have
0 discover what kind of a being it is. If unity be no
nore than a numbering device invented by the soul,
hen unity would possess no real existence. But we
lave above observed that each object, on losing unity,
OSes existence also. We are therefore compelled to
nvestigate whether essence and unity be identical
either when considered in themselves, or in each in-
iividual object.

EVEN UNIVERSAL ESSENCE CONTAINS MANI-

FOLDNESS.

If the essence of each thing be manifoldness, and as
inity cannot be manifoldness, unity must differ from
•ssence. Now man, being both animal and rational,
ontains a manifoldness of elements of which unity is

150 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [9

the bond. There is therefore a difference between
man and unity; man is divisible, while unity is indi-
visible. Besides, universal Essence, containing all es-
I sences, is still more manifold. Therefore it differs from
unity; though it does possess unity by participation.
■^ Essence possesses life and intelligence, for it cannot
■. be considered lifeless; it must therefore be manifold.
Besides, if essence be intelligence, it must in this re-
spect also be manifold, and must be much more so
if it contain forms; for the idea^ is not genuinely one.
Both as individual and general it is rather a number;
it is one only as the world is one.

BESIDES, ABSOLUTE UNITY IS THE FIRST, WHICH
INTELLIGENCE IS NOT.

Besides, Unity in itself is the first of all; but intel-
ligence, forms and essence are not primary. Every
form is manifold and composite, and consequently
must be something posterior; for parts are prior to
the composite they constitute. Nor is intelligence
primary, as appears from the following considerations.
For intelligence existence is necessarily thought and
the best intelligence which does not contemplate ex-
terior objects, must think what is above it; for, on
turning towards itself, it turns towards its principle.
« I \ On the one hand, if intelligence be both thinker and
'* ^ thought, it implies duality, and is not simple or unitary.
On the other hand, if intelligence contemplate some
object other than itself, this might be nothing more
than some object better than itself, placed above it.
Even if intelligence contemplate itself simultaneously
with what is better than it, even so intelligence is
only of secondary rank. We may indeed admit that
the intelligence which has such a nature enjoys the
presence of the Good, of the First, and that intellig-
ence contemplates the First; but nevertheless at the

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE l5l

same time intelligence is present to itself, and thinks |
itself as being all things. Containing such a diversity, I
intelligence is far from unity. *

UNITY AS ABOVE ALL THINGS. INTELLIGENCE AND

ESSENCE.

Thus Unity is not all things, for if so, it would no i ^

longer be unity. Nor is it Intelligence, for since intel- : 'T

ligence is all things, unity too would be all things. \ \
Nor is it essence, since essence also is all things.

UNITY IS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN BECAUSE THE

SOUL IS FEARFUL OF SUCH ABSTRUSE

RESEARCHES.

3. What then is unity? What is its nature? It is
not surprising that it is so difficult to say so, when it
is difficult to explain of what even essence or form
consist But, nevertheless, forms are the basis of our
knowledge. Everything that the soul advances towards
what is formless, not being able to understand it be-
cause it is indeterminate, and so to speak has not re-
ceived the impression of a distinctive type, the soul
withdraws therefrom, fearing she will meet nonentity.
That is why, in the presence of such things she grows
troubled, and descends with pleasure. Then, with-
drawing therefrom, she, so to speak, lets herself fall
till she meets some sense-object, on which she pauses,
and recovers; just as the eye which, fatigued by the
contemplation of small objects, gladly turns back to
large ones. When the soul wishes to see by herself,
then seeing only because she is the object that she
sees, and, further, being one because she forms but
one with this object, she imagines that what she sought
has escaped, because she herself is not distinct from
the object that she thinks.

152 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [^

THE PATH OF SIMPLIFICATION TO UNITY.

Nevertheless a philosophical study of unity will fol
low the following course. Since it is Unity that w(
seek, since it is the principle of all things, the Good
the First that we consider, those who will wish t(
reach it must not withdraw from that which is o^
primary rank to decline to what occupies the last, bu
they must withdraw their souls from sense-objectS
which occupy the last degree in the scale of existence
to those entities that occupy the first rank. Such i
man will have to free himself from all evil, since h(
aspires to rise to the Good. He will rise to the prin
ciple that he possesses within himself. From the mani
fold that he was he will again become one. Onb
under these conditions will he contemplate the supremi
principle, Unity. Thus having become intelligence
having trusted his soul to intelligence, educating an(
establishing her therein, so that with vigilant attentioi
she may grasp all that intelligence sees, he will, b;
intelligence, contemplate unity, without the use of an;
senses, without mingling any of their perceptions witi
the flashes of intelligence. He will contemplate th(
purest Principle, through the highest degree of thi
purest Intelligence. So when a man applies himsel
to the contemplation of such a principle and repre
sents it to himself as a magnitude, or a figure, or evei
a form, it is not his intelligence that guides him in thi
contemplation for intelligence is not destined to sei
such things; it is sensation, or opinion, the associate o
sensation, which is active in him. Intelligence is onl;
capable of informing us about things within its sphere

UNITY AS THE UNIFORM IN ITSELF AND FORMLESS

SUPERFORM.

Intelligence can see both the things that are above it
those which belong to it, and the things that proceec
from it. The things that belong to intelligence an

rl9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE l53

)ure; but they are still less pure and less simple than
he things that are above Intelligence, or rather than
\rhat is above it; this is not Intelligence, and is superior
0 Intelligence. Intelligence indeed is essence, while
he principle above it is not essence, but is superior to
ill beings. Nor is it essence, for essence has a special
orm, that of essence, and the One is shapeless, even
ntelligible. As Unity is the nature that begts all
hings, Unity cannot be any of them. It is therefore
leither any particular thing, nor quantity, nor quality,
lor intelligence, nor suul, nor what is movable, nor
vhat is stable; it is neither in place nor time; but it is
he uniform in itself, or rather it is formless, as it is
ibove all form, above movement and stability. These
ire my views about essence and what makes it mani-
old.«

WHY IT IS NOT STABLE, THOUGH IT DOES NOT

MOVE.

But if it does not move, why does it not possess
itability? Because either of these things, or both
ogether, are suitable to nothing but essence. Be-
ides, that which possesses stability is stable through
;tability, and is not identical with stability itself; con-
lequently it possesses stability only by accident, and
vould no longer remain simple.

BEING A primary' CAUSE, UNITY IS NOTHING
CONTINGENT.

Nor let anybody object that something contingent
s attributed to Unity when we call it the primary cause,
t is to ourselves that we are then attributing conting-
mcy, since it is we who are receiving something from
Jnity, while Unity remains within itself.

154 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [9

UNITY CANNOT BE DEFINED; WE CAN ONLY REFER
TO IT BY OUR FEELINGS OF IT.

Speaking strictly, we should say that the One is this
or that (that is, we should not apply any name to it).
We can do no more than turn around it, so to speak,
trying to express what we feel (m regard to it) ; for
at times we approach Unity, and at times withdraw
from it as a result of our uncertainty about it.

WE CANNOT COMPREHEND UNITY, WHICH WE
APPROACH ONLY BY A PRESENCE.

4. The principal cause of our uncertainty is that
our comprehension of the One comes to us neither by
scientific knowledge, nor by thought, as the knowl-
edge of other intelligible things, but by a presence!
which is superior to science. When the soul acquires
the scientific knowledge of something, she withdraws
from unity and ceases being entirely one; for science
implies discursive reason and discursive reason implies
manifoldness. (To attain Unity) we must therefore
rise above science, and never withdraw from what
is essentially One; we must therefore renounce science,
the objects of science, and every other right (except
that of the One) ; even to that of beauty; for beauty
is posterior to unity, and is derived therefrom, as the
day-light comes from the sun. That is why Plato"^
says of (Unity) that it is unspeakable and undescrib-.
able. Nevertheless v/e speak of it, we write about it,
but only to excite our souls by our discussions, and to
direct them towards this divine spectacle, just as one
might point out the road to somebody who desired
to see some object. Instruction, indeed, goes as far
as showing the road, and guiding us in the way; but to
obtain the vision (of the divinity), is the v/ork suitable
to him who has desired to obtain it.

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE 155

THOSE WHO SEE GOD WITHOUT EMOTION HAVE
FAILED TO RID THEMSELVES OF PHYSICAL
HINDRANCES, AND HAVE NOT BECOME
UNIFIED.

If your soul does not succeed in enjoying tliis
spectacle, if she does not have the intuition of the
divine light, if she remains cold and does not, within
herself, feel a rapture such as that of a lover who sees
the beloved object, and who rests within it, a rapture
felt by him who has seen the true light, and whose
soul has been overwhelmed with brilliance on ap-
proaching this light, then you have tried to rise to the
divinity without having freed yourself from the
hindrances which arrest your progress, and hinder
your contemplation. You did not rise alone, and you
retained within yourself something that separated you
from Him; or rather, you were not yet unified. Though
Me be absent from all beings, He is absent from none,
so that He is present (to all) without being present
(to them). He is present only for those who are able
to receive Him, and who are prepared for Him, and
who are capable of harmonizing themselves with Him,
to reach Him, and as it were to touch Him by virtue
of the conformity they have with Him, and also by
virtue of an innate power analogous to that which
flows from Him, when at last their souls find them-
selves in the state where they were after having com-
municated with Him; then they can see Him so far as
his nature is visible. I repeat: if you have not yet
irisen so far, the conclusion must be that you are still
at a distance from Him, either by the obstacles of
which we spoke above, or by the lack of such instruc-
tion as would have taught you the road to follow,
and which would have imbued you with faith in things
divine. In any case, you have no fault to find with
any but yourself; for, to be alone, all you need to do

156 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [9

is to detach yourself from everything. Lack of faith
in arguments about it may be remedied by the follow-
ing considerations.

HOW SUCH AS RISE AS FAR AS THE SOUL MAY
ACHIEVE FAITH IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.

5. Such as imagine that beings are governed by
luck or chance, and that they depend on material
causes are far removed from the divinity, and from
the conception of unity. It is not such men that we
are addressing, but such as admit the existence of a
nature different from the corporeal one, and who at
least rise (to an acknowledgment of the existence of)
the Soul. These should apply themselves to the study
of the nature of the soul, learning, among other truths,|
that she proceeds from Intelligence, and that she can
achieve virtue by participating in Intelligence through
reason. They must then acknowledge the existence
of an Intelligence superior to the intelligence that
reasons, namely, to discursive reason. They must
(also realize) that reasonings imply an interval (be-
tween notions), and a movement (by which the soul
bridges this interval). They must be brought to see
that scientific knowledge consists also of reasons of
the same nature (namely, rational notions), reasons
suitable to the soul, but which have become clear,
because the soul has received the succession of intel-
ligence which is the source of scientific knowledge.
By intelligence (which belongs to her), the soul sees
the divine Intellect, which to it seems sensual, in this
sense that it is perceptible by intelligence, which dom-
inates the soul, and is her father;^ that is, the intel-
ligible world, a calm intellect which vibrates without
issuing from its tranquility, which contains everything,
and which is all. It is both definite and indefinite,
manifoldness, for the ideas it contains are not distinct

yi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE l57

like the reasons (the rational notions), which are Ij
conceived one by one. Nevertheless, they do not [j
become confused. Each of them becomes distinct
from the others, just as in a science all the notions, | \
though forming an indivisible whole, yet each has |
its own separate individual existence.^ This multi- /
tude of ideas taken together constitutes the intelligible "'
world. This is the (entity) nearest to the First. Its
existence is inevitably demonstrated by reason, as
much as the necessity of the existence of the Soul her-
self; but though the intelligible world is something
superior to the Soul, it is nevertheless not yet the First,
because it is neither one, nor simple, while the one,
the principle of all beings, is perfectly simple.

THE SUPREME IS ONE ONLY IN A FIGURATIVE

SENSE.

The principle that is superior to what is highest
among beings, to Intelligence (or intellect, or intel-
ligible world) (may well be sought after). There
must indeed be some principle above Intelligence; for
intelligence does indeed aspire to become one, but it
is not one, possessing only the form of unity. Con-
sidered in itself, Intelligence is not divided, but is
genuinely present to itself. It does not dismember
itself because it is next to the One, though it dared to
withdraw therefrom. What is above Intelligence is
Unity itself, an incomprehensible miracle, of which
it cannot even be said that it is essence, lest we make
of it the attribute of something else, and to whom no
name is really suitable. If however He must be
named, we may indeed call Him in general Unity, but
only on the preliminary understanding that He was
not first something else, and then only later became
unity. That is why the One is so difficult to under-
stand in Himself; He is rather known by His offspring;

158 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [9

that is, by Being, because Intelligence leads up to Being.
The nature of the One, indeed, is the source of ex-
cellent things, the power which begets beings, while
remaining within Himself, without undergoing any
diminution, without passing into the beings to whicL
He gives birth. ^^ If we call this principle Unity, it isl
only for the mutual convenience of rising to some
indivisible conception, and in unifying our soul. But
when we say that this principle is one and indivisible,
it is not in the same sense that we say it of the (geo-
metric) point, and of the (arithmetical unity called
the) monad. What is one in the sense of the unity
of the point or the monad, is a principle of quantity,,
and would not exist unless preceded by being and the|
principle which precedes even that being. It is not
of this kind of unity that we must think; still we be-
lieve that the point and the monad have analogy with
the One by their simplicity as well as by the absence of
all manifoldness and of all division. j

THE ONE MAY BE CONCEIVED OF AS INDIVISIBLE

AND INFINITE.

6. In what sense do we use the name of unity, and
how can we conceive of it? We shall have to insist
that the One is a unity much more perfect than the
point of the monad; for in these, abstracting (geo-
metric) magnitude, and numerical plurality, we do
indeed stop at that which is most minute, and we
come to rest in something indivisible; but this existed
already in a divisible being, in a subject other than
itself, while the One is neither in a subject other than
itself, nor in anything divisible. If it be indivisible,
neither is it of the same kind as that which is most
minute. On the contrary, it is that which is greatest,
not by (geometric) magnitude, but by power; pos-
sessing no (geometric) magnitude, it is indivisible in

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE 159

its power; for the beings beneath it are indivisible in
their powers, and not in their mass (since they are ,
incorporeal). We must also insist that the One is !'
infinite, not as would be a mass of a magnitude which \ i
could be examined serially, but by the incommensur- \[
ability of its power. Even though you should con-
ceive of it as of intelligence or divinity, it is still
higher. When by thought you consider it as the most
perfect unity, it is still higher. You try to form for
yourself an idea of a divinity by rising to what in your
intelligence is most unitary (and yet He is still sim-
pler) ; for He dwells within Himself, and contains
nothing that is contingent.

THE ONE IS SELF-SUFFICIENT AND NEEDS NOTHING
FOR ESTABLISHMENT.

His sovereign unity may best be understood by His
being self-sufficient; for the most perfect principle is
necessarily that which best suffices Himself, and which
least needs anything else. Now anything that is not
one, but manifold, needs something else. Not being
one, but being composed of multiple elements, its
being demands unification; but as the One is already
one. He does not even need Himself. So much the
more, the being that is manifold needs as many things
as it contains; for each of the contained things exists
only by its union with the others, and not in itself, and
finds that it needs the others. Therefore such a being
needs others, both for the things it contains, as for
their totality. If then there must be something that
fully suffices itself, it must surely be the One, which
alone needs nothing either relatively to Himself, or
to the other things. It needs nothing either to exist,
or to be happy, or to be composed. To begin with, as
He is the cause of the other beings. He does not owe
His existence to them. Further, how could He derive

160 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [9

His happiness from outside Himself? Within Him,
happiness is not something contingent, but is His very
nature. Again, as He does not occupy any space, He
does not need any foundation on which to be edified,
as if He could not sustain Himself. All that needs
compounding is inanimate; without support it is no
more than a mass ready to fall. (Far from needing
any support) the One is the foundation of the edifica-
tion of all other things; by giving them existence. He
has at the same time given them a location. However,
that which needs a location is not (necessarily) self-
sufficient.

THE SUPREME, AS SUPERGOODNESS, COULD NOT
ASPIRE TO ANYTHING ELSE.

A principle has no need of anything beneath it. The
Principle of all things has no need of any of them.
Every non-self-sufficient being is not self-sufficient
chiefly because it aspires to its principle. If the One
aspired to anything, His aspiration would evidently tend
to destroy His unity, that is, to annihilate Himself.
Anything that aspires evidently aspires to happiness
and preservation. Thus, since for the One there is
no good outside of Himself, there is nothing that He
could wish. He is the super-good; He is the good,
not for Himself, but for other beings, for those that
can participate therein.

THE ONE IS NOT THINKER BUT THOUGHT ITSELF.

Within the One, therefore, is no thought, because
there can be no difference within Him; nor could He
contain any motion, because the One is prior to
motion, as much as to thought. Besides, what would
He think? Would He think Himself? In this case,
He would be ignorant before thinking, and thought

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE l6l

I would be necessary to Him, who fully suffices to Him-
self. Neither should He be thought to contain ignor-
ance, because He does not know Himself, and does
not think Himself. Ignorance presupposes a relation,
and consists in that one thing does not know another.
But the One, being alone, can neither know nor be
ignorant of anything. Being with Himself, He has no
need of self-knowledge. We should not even predicate

. of Him presence with Himself, if we are to conceive
of Him Unity in sheer purity. On the contrary, we
should have to leave aside intelligence, consciousness,
and knowledge of self and of other beings. We should
not conceive of Him as being that which thinks, but
rather as of thought. Thought does not think; but is
the cause which makes some other being think; now
the cause cannot be identical with that which is caused.
So much the more reason is there then to say that that
which is the cause of all these existing things cannot
be any one of them. This Cause, therefore, must not
be considered identical with the good He dispenses,
but must be conceived as the Good in a higher sense,
the Good which is above all other goods.

THE SOUL MUST BE STRIPPED OF FORM TO BE
ILLUMINATED BY PRIMARY NATURE.

7. Your mind remains in uncertainty because the
divinity is none of these things (that you know).
Apply it first to these things, and later fix it on the
divinity. While doing so, do not let yourself be dis-
tracted by anything exterior for the divinity is not in
any definite place, depriving the remainder of its
presence, but it is present wherever there is any person
who is capable of entering into contact therewith. It
is absent only for those who cannot succeed therein.
Just as, for other objects, one could not discover what
one seeks by thinking of something else, and as one

162 WORKS OF PL0TIN05 [9

should not add any alien thing to the object that is
thought if one wishes to identify oneself therewith;
likewise here one must be thoroughly convinced that
it is impossible for any one v/hose soul contains any
alien image to conceive of the divinity so long as such
an image distracts the soul's attention. It is equally
impossible that the soul, at the moment that she is
attentive, and attached to other things, should assume
the form of what is contrary to them. Just as it is
said of matter that it must be absolutely deprived of
all qualities to be susceptible of receiving all forms;
likewise, and for a stronger reason, the soul must be
stripped of all form, if she desire to be filled with and
illuminated by the primary nature without any in-
terior hindrance. Thus, having liberated herself from
all exterior things, the soul will entirely turn to what
is most intimate in her; she will not allow herself to
be turned away by any of the surrounding objects and
she will put aside all things, first by the very effect
of the state in which she will find herself, and later by
the absence of any conception of form. She will not
even know that she is applying herself to the con-
templation of the One, or that she is united thereto. [
Then, after having sufficiently dwelt with it, she will,
if she can, come to reveal to others this heavenly
communion. Doubtless it was enjoyment of this com-
munion that was the basis of the traditional conversa-
tion of Minos with Jupiter.^"-^ Inspired with the
memories of this interview, he made laws which repre-
sented it, because, while he was drawing them up, he
was still under the influence of his union with the
divinity. Perhaps even, in this state, the soul may ^
look down on civil virtues as hardly worthy of her,^^
inasmuch as she desires to dwell on high; and this
does indeed happen to such as have long contemplated
the divinity.

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE 163

ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS RECOGNITION OF
DIVINE KINSHIP.

(In short), the divinity is not outside of any being.
On the contrary, He is present to all beings, though
these may be ignorant thereof. This happens because
they are fugitives, wandering outside of Him or rather,
outside of themselves. They cannot reach Him from
whom they are fleeing, nor, having lost themselves,
can they find another being. A son, if angry, and
beside himself, is not likely to recognize his father.
But he who will have learnt to know himself will at
the same time discover from where he hails.^^

TO BE ATTACHED TO THE CENTRE CONSTITUTES

DIVINITY.

8. Self-knowledge reveals the fact that the soul's
natural movement is not in a straight line, unless
indeed it have undergone some deviation. On the
contrary, it circles around something interior, around
a centre. Now the centre is that from which proceeds
the circle, that is, the soul.^^ The soul will therefore
move around the centre, that is, around the principle
from which she proceeds; and, trending towards it,
she will attach herself to it, as indeed all souls should
do. The souls of the divinities ever direct themselves
towards it; and that is the secret of their divinity; for
divinity consists in being attached to the Centre (of
all souls). Anyone who v/ithdraws much therefrom
is a man who has remained manifold (that is, who has
never become unified), or who is a brute.^^

THE CELEBRATED SIMILE OF THE MAN WHOSE FEET
ARE IN A BATH-TUB.

Is the centre of the soul then the principle that we
are seeking? Or must we conceive some other prin-

164 WORKS OF PLOTINOS

ciple towards which all centres radiate? To begin
with, it is only by analogy that the words "centre'
and "circle" are used. By saying that the soul is a
circle, we do not mean that she is a geometrical figure,
but that in her and around her subsists primordial
nature.^^ (By saying that she has a centre, we mean
that) the soul is suspended from the primary Principle
(by the highest part of her being), especially when
she is entirely separated (from the body). Now, how-
ever, as we have a part of our being contained in the
the body, we resemble a man whose feet are plunged _
in water, with the rest of his body remaining above it. ^1
Raising ourselves above the body by the whole part
which is not immerged, we are by our own centre
reattaching ourselves to the Centre common to all
beings, just in the same way as we make the centres
of the great circles coincide with that of the sphere
that surrounds them. If the circles of the soul were
corporeal, the common centre would have to occupy
a certain place for them to coincide with it, and for
them to turn around it. But since the souls are of
the order of intelligible (essences), and as the One
is still above Intelligence, we shall have to assert that \
the intercourse of the soul with the One operates by
means different from those by which Intelligence unites
with the intelligible. This union, indeed, is much closer
than that which is realized between Intelligence and the
intelligible by resemblance or identity; it takes place
by the intimate relationship that unites the soul with
unity, without anything to separate them. Bodies
cannot unite mutually ;^'^ but they could not hinder
the mutual union of incorporeal (essences) because
that which separates them from each other is not a
local distance, but their distinction and difference.
When there is no difference between them, they are
present in each other.

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE 165

THE FAMOUS ILLUSTRATION OF THE COSMIC
CHORAL BALLET

As the One does not contain any difference, He is
always present; and we are ever present to Him as
soon as we contain no more difference. It is not He
who is aspiring to us, or who is moving around us;
on the contrary, it is we who are aspiring to Him.
Though we always move around Him, we do not
always keep our glance fixed on Him. We resemble
a chorus which always surrounds its leader, but (the
members of) which do not always sing in time be-
cause they allow their attention to be distracted to
some exterior object; while, if they turned towards
the leader, they would sing well, and really be with
him. Likewise, we always turn around the One, even
when we detach ourselves from Him, and cease know-
ing Him. Our glance is not always fixed on the One;
but when we contemplate Him, we attain the purpose
of our desires, and enjoy the rest taught by Heracli-
tus.^^ Then we disagree no more, and really form a
divine choric ballet around Him.

FOLLOWING NUMENIUS, PLOTINOS DESCRIBES THE
SUPREME AS GIVER.

9. In this choric ballet, the soul sees the source
of life, the source of intelligence, the principle of
being, the cause of the good, and the root of love. All
these entities are derived from the One without dimin-
ishing Him. He is indeed no corporeal mass; other-
wise the things that are born of Him would be perish-
able. However, they are eternal, because their prin-
ciple ever remains the same, because^^ He does not
divide Himself to produce them, but remains entire.
They persist, just as the light persists so long as the
sun remains.20 Nor are we separated from the One;
we are not distant from Him, though corporeal nature,

166 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [9

by approaching us, has attracted us to it (thus draw-
ing us away from the One).2i But it is in the One
that we breathe and have our being.,^^ He gave us
Hfe not merely at a given moment, only to leave us
later; but His giving is perpetual, so long as He re-
mains what He is, or rather, so long as we turn
towards Him. There it is that we find happiness, while
to withdraw from Him is to fall, it is in Him that our
soul rests; it is by rising to that place free from' all
evil that she is delivered from evils; there she really
thinks, there she is impassible, there she really lives.
Our present life, in which we are not united with the
divinity, is only a trace or adumbration of real life.
Real life (which is presence with the divinity) is the
actualization of intelligence. It is this actualization
of intelligence which begets the divinities by a sort
of silent intercourse with the One; thereby begetting
beauty, justice and virtue. These are begotten by the
soul that is filled with divinity. In Him is her principle
and goal; her principle, because it is from there that
she proceeds; her goal, because there is the good to
which she aspires, so that by returning thither she
again becomes what she was. Life here below, in the
midst of sense-objects, is for the soul a degradation,
an exile, a loss of her wings.^^ I

THE PARABLE OF CUPID AND PSYCHE. LEADING
UP TO DIVINIZATION.

Another proof that our welfare resides up there is
the love that is innate in our souls, as is taught in the
descriptions and myths which represent love as the
husband of the soul.^^ in fact, since the soul, which
is different from the divinity, proceeds from Him, she
must necessarily love Him; but when she is on high^^'
her love is celestial; here below, her love is only
commonplace; for it is on high that dwells the celestial

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE 167

Venus (Urania) ; while here below resides the vulgar
and adulterous Venus.^^ Now every soul is a Venus,
as is indicated by the myth of the birth of Venus and
Cupid, who is supposed to be born simultaneously with
her. 2^ So long as she remains faithful to h&r nature,
the soul therefore loves the divinity, and desires to
unite herself to Him, who seems like the noble father
of a bride who has fallen in love with some hand-
some lover. When however the soul has descended
into generation, deceived by the false promises of an
adulterous lover, she has exchanged her divine love
for a mortal one. Then, at a distance from her father,
she yields to all kinds of excesses. Ultimately, how-
ever, she grows ashamed of these disorders; she puri-
fies herself, she returns to her father, and finds true
happiness with Him. How great her bliss then is can
be conceived by such as have not tasted it only by
comparing it somewhat to earthly love-unions, ob-
serving the joy felt by the lover who succeeds in
obtaining her whom he loves. But such mortal and
deceptive love is directed only to phantoms; it soon
disappears because the real object of our love is not
these sense-presentations, which are not the good we
are really seeking. On high only is the real object
of our love; the only one with which we could unite
or identify ourselves, which we could intimately pos-
sess, because it is not separated from our soul by the
covering of our flesh. This that I say will be ac-
knowledged by any one who has experienced it;
he will know that the soul then lives another life, that
she advances towards the Divinity, that she reaches
Him, possesses Him, and in his condition recognizes
the presence of the Dispenser of the true life. Then
she needs nothing more. On the contrary, she has
to renounce everything else to fix herself in the
Divinity alone, to identify herself with Him, and to
cut off all that surrounds Him. We must therefore

4 68 WORKS OF PLOTINOS

[9}

hasten to issue from here below, detaching ourselves
so far as possible from the body to which we still have
the regret of being chained, making the effort to em-
brace the Divinity by our whole being, without leaving
in us any part that is not in contact with Him. Then
the soul can see the Divinity and herself, so far as is
possible to her nature. She sees herself shining
brilliantly, filled with intelligible light; or rather, she
sees herself as a pure light, that is subtle and weight-
less. She becomes divinity, or, rather, she is divinity.
In this condition, the soul is a shining light. If later
she falls back into the sense-world, she is plunged into
darkness.

WHY DOES THE SOUL AFTER REACHING YONDER
NOT STAY THERE?

10. Why does the soul which has risen on high not

stay there? Because she has not yet entirely detached

herself from things here below. But a time will come

when she will uninterruptedly enjoy the vision of the

divinity, that is, when she will no longer be troubled

by the passions of the body. The part of the soul

that sees the divinity is not the one that is troubled

(the irrational soul), but the other part (the rational

]i soul). Now she loses the sight of the divinity when

; I she does not lose this knowledge which consists in

H demonstratings, conjectures and reasonings. In the

H vision of the divinity, indeed, that which sees is not
the reason, but something prior and superior to rea-
son; if that which sees be still united to reason, it then
is as that which is seen. When he who sees himself
sees, he will see himself as simple, being united to him-
self as simple, and will feel himself as simple. We
should not even say that he will see, but only that he
will be what he sees, in case that it would still here
be possible to distinguish that which sees from that

(

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE l69

which is seen, or to assert that these two things do not
form a single one. This assertion, however, would
be rash, for in this condition he who sees does not,
in the strict sense of the word, see; nor does he j?
imagine two things. He becomes other, he ceases ^
to be himself, he retains nothing of himself. Absorbed
in the divinity, he is one with it,, like a centre that
coincides with another centre. While they coincide,
they form but one, though they form two in so far as
they remain distinct. In this sense only do we here
say that the soul is other than the divinity. Conse-
\ quently this manner of vision is very difficult to de-
scribe. How indeed could we depict as different from
us Him who, while we were contemplating Him, did
not seem other than ourselves, having come into per-
fect at-one-ment with us?

ILLUSTRATION FROM THE SECRECY OF THE
MYSTERY-RITES.

11. That, no doubt, is the meaning of the mystery-
rites' injunction not to reveal their secrets to the un-
initiated. As that which is divine is unspeakable, it is
ordered that the initiate should not talk thereof to any
(uninitiated person) who have not had the happiness
of beholding it (the vision).

THE TRANCE OR ENTHEASM OF ECSTASY.

As (this vision of the divinity) did not imply (the
existence of) two things, and as he who was identical to
Him whom he saw, so that he did not s'ee Him, but was
united thereto, if anyone could preserve the memory
of what he was while thus absorbed into the Divinity,
he would within himself have a faithful image of the
Divinity. Then indeed had he attained at-one-ment,

170 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [9

containing no difference, neither in regard to himself,
nor to other beings. While he was thus transported
into the celestial region, there was within him no
activity, no anger, nor appetite, nor reason, nor even
thought. So much the more, if we dare say so, was
he no longer himself, but sunk in trance of enthusiasm,
^ \ tranquil and solitary with the divinity, he enjoyed an
\ \ imperturable calm. Contained within his own ''being,"
" ; (or, essence), he did not incline to either side, he did
/ not even turn towards himself, he was indeed in a
\ state of perfect stability, having thus, so to speak, be-
come stability itself.

ABOVE BEAUTY AND ABOVE VIRTUE THIS ECSTATIC
SIMPLIFICATION IS A COMMUNION.

In this condition, indeed, the soul busies herself not
even with the beautiful things, for she rises above
beauty, and passes beyond even the (Stoic) "choir of
virtues." Thus he who penetrates into the interior
of a sanctuary leaves behind him the statues placed
(at the entrance) of the temple. These indeed are .
the first objects that will strike his view on his exit |
from the sanctuary, after he shall have enjoyed the
interior spectacle, after having entered into intimate ^
communion, not indeed with an image or statue, which ^
would be considered only when he comes out, but
with the divinity. The very word "divine spectacle"
does not, here, seem sufficient (to express the con-
templation of the soul) ; it is rather an ecstasy, a
simplification, a self-abandonment, a desire for inter-
course, a perfect quietude, and last, a wish to become
indistinguishable from what was contemplated in the
sanctuary.2^ Any one who would seek to see the
Divinity in any other way would be incapable of en-
joying His presence.

vi.9] OF THE GOOD AND THE ONE 171

THE SPIRITUAL TRUTH OF THE ANCIENT
MYSTERIES.

' By making use of these mysterious figures, wise
interpreters wished to indicate how the divinity might
be seen. But the wise hierophant, penetrating the
mystery, may, when he has arrived thither, enjoy the
veritable vision of what is in the sanctuary. If lie have
not yet arrived thither, he can at least conceive the
invisibility (for physical sight) of That which is in the
sanctuary; he can conceive the source and principle
of everything, and he recognizes it as the one par-
ticular principle worthy of the name. (But when he
has succeeded in entering into the sanctuary) he sees
the Principle, enters into communication with it, unites
like to like, leaving aside no divine thing the soul is
capable of acquiring.

SUBSEQUENT ECSTATIC EXPERIENCES OF THE

SOUL.

Before obtaining the vision of the divinity, the soul
desires what yet remains to be seen. For him, how-
ever, who has risen above all things, what remains
to be seen is He who is above all other things. Indeed,
the nature of the soul will never reach absolute nonen-
tity. Consequently, when she descends, she will fall
into evil, that is, nonentity, but not into absolute
nonentity. Following the contrary path, she will ar-
rive at something different, namely, herself. From
the fact that she then is not in anything different from
herself, it does not result that she is within anything,
for she remains in herself. That which, without being
in essence, remains within itself, necessarily resides
in the divinity. Then it ceases to be ''being," and so
far as it comes into communion with the Divinity it
grows superior to "being" (it becomes supra-being).
Now he who sees himself as having become divinity,
possesses within himself an image of the divinity. If

(

172

WORKS OF PLOTINOS

he rise above himself, he will achieve the limit of his
ascension, becoming as it were an image that becomes
indistinguishable from its model. Then, when he shall
have lost sight of the divinity, he may still, by arousing
the virtue preserved within himself, and by considering
the perfections that adorn his soul, reascend to the
celestial region, by virtue rising to Intelligence, and by
wisdom to the Divinity Himself. i

THE SOUL'S ULTIMATE FATE IS DETACHMENT AND

FLIGHT.

Such is the life of the divinities; such is also that
of divine and blessed men; detachment from all
things here below, scorn of all earthly pleasures, and
flight of the soul towards the Divinity that she shall
see face to face (that is, ''alone with the alone, as
thought Numenius).29

1 See vi. 6.13. J "Being." It
has been found impossible, in
order to preserve good English
idiom, to translate "oiisia" by
"being," and "to on" by "es-
sence," with uniformity. Where
the change has been made, the
proper word has been added in
parentheses, as here. ^ Jn \^\^
Methaphysics, iv. 2. ^ Aris-
totle, Met. iv. 2. 5 Evidently
a pun on forms and ideas.
^ See vi. 2.7. '^ In the Timaeus
not accurately quoted. ^ As
Plato said in the Timaeus, 27.
»See iv. 9.5. lo See vi. 8.11.
11 Odyss. xix. 178. 12 See
i, 2.2. 13 See iv. 3.1. 14 See

n. 2.2. 15 See the beginning
of Plato's Republic, ix. 16 See
i. 8.7. 1*^ Because they do not
allow of mutual penetration.
18 See iv. 8.5. 19 As thought
Numenius 29. 20 See ii. 3.

21 See i. 8.14.
xvii. 25, 27, 28.
following the

22 See Acts,
23 See iv. Z.7,
Phaedrus of

Plato. 24 Cupid and Psyche, as
interpreted by Apuleius. 25 See
iii. 5.2. 26 See iii. 5.4. 27 See
iii. 5.7-9. 28 See v. 5.11; i. 6.7,
8; V. 8.4; vi. 9.11.^ It has been
contended that this was a de-
scription of the Isiac temple in
Rome. 29 Num. 10.

V.I J THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES ,173

FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK ONE.

The Three Principal Hypostases, or Forms of

Existence.

AUDACITY THE CAUSE OF HUMAN APOSTASY FROM

THE DIVINITY.

1. How does it happen that souls forget their
paternal divinity? Having a divine nature, and having
originated from the divinity, how could they ever mis-
conceive the divinity or themselves? The origin of
their evil is ''audacity,"^ generation, the primary diver-
sity, and the desire to belong to none but themselves.^
As soon as they have enjoyed the pleasure of an in-
dependent life, and by largely making use of their
power of self-direction, they advanced on the road
that led them astray from their principle, and now
they have arrived at such an "apostasy" (distance)
from the Divinity, that they are even ignorant that they
derive their life from Him. Like children that were
separated from their family since birth, and that were
long educated away from home finally lose knowl-
edge of their parents and of themselves, so our souls,
no longer seeing either the divinity or themselves, have
become degraded by forgetfulness of their origin, have
attached themselves to other objects, have admired
anything rather than themselves, have like prodigals
scattered their esteem and love on exterior objects,
and have, by breaking the bond that united them to the
divinities, disdainfully wandered away from it. Their
ignorance of the divinity is therefore caused by ex-
cessive valuation of external objects, and their scorn

174 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [10

of themselves. The mere admiration and quest after
what is foreign implies, on the soul's part, an acknowl-
edgment of self-depreciation. As soon as a soul thinks
that she is worth less than that which is born and which
perishes, and considers herself as more despicable and
perishable than the object she admires, she could no
longer even conceive of the nature and power of the
divinity.

CONVERSION IS EFFECTED BY DEPRECIATION OF

EXTERNALITIES, AND APPRECIATION OF THE

SOUL HERSELF.

Souls in such conditions may be converted to the
Divinity, and raised to the supreme Principle, to the
One, to the First, by being reasoned with in two ways.
First, they may be led to see the worthlessness of the
objects they at present esteem ;3 then they must be
reminded of the origin and dignity of the soul. The i
demonstration of the latter point logically precedes
that of the former; and if clearly done, should support
it

KINSHIP OF THE HUMAN SOUL WITH THE DIVINE.

It is the second point, therefore, that we shall here
discuss. It is related to the study of the object we
desire to know; for it is the soul that desires to know
that object. Now the soul must first examine her own
nature in order to know whether she possess the
faculty of contemplating the divinity, if this study be

^ suited to her, and if she may hope for success therein.

j For indeed if the soul be foreign to divine things, the
soul has no business to ferret out their nature. If
however a close kinship obtains between them, she
both can and should seek to know them.

v.lj THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES 175

SOULS ARE DIVINE BECAUSE THE WORLD WAS
CREATED BY THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.

2. This is the first reflection of every souL^ By
an influx of the spirit of life, the universal Soul pro-
duced all the animals upon earth, in the air and in the
sea, as well as the divine stars, the sun, and the im-
mense heaven. It was the universal Soul that gave
form to the heavens, and which presides over their
regular revolutions; and she effects all that without
; mingling with the being to whom she communicates
I form, movement and life. The universal Soul is far
I superior to all created things. While' the latter are
I born 01 die in the measure that she imparts to them,
or withdraws from them their life, she herself is
''being" and eternal life, because she could not cease
Being herself. To understand how life can simultane-
ously be imparted to the universe and to each in-
alvidual, we must contemplate the universal Soul. To
I rise to this contemplation, the soul must be worthy
of it by nobility, must have liberated herself from
error, and must have withdrawn from the objects
that fascinate the glances of worldly souls, must have
' immersed herself in a profound meditation, and she
must have succeeded in effecting the silence not only
of the agitations of the body that enfolds her, and the
tumult of sensations, but also of all that surrounds
, her. Therefore Jet silence be kept by all, — namely,
earth, air, sea, and even heaven. Then let the sovil
represent to herself the great Soul which, from all
j sides, overflows into this immovable mass, spreading
I within it, penetrating into it intimately, illuminating
I it as the rays of the sun light and gild^a dark cloud.
I Thus the universal Soul, by descending into this world
' redeemed this great body from the inertia in which it
lay, imparting to it movement, life and immortality.
Eternally moved by an intelligent power, heaven be-

176 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

came a being full of life and felicity. The presence
of the Soul made an admirable whole from what be-
fore was no more than in inert corpse, water and,
earth, or rather, darkness of matter, which, as Homer^j
says, was an ''object of horror for the divinities."

SOUL-POWER REVEALED IN THE SIMULTANEITY
OF CONTROL OVER THE WORLD.

The nature and power of the Soul reveal themselvesj
still more gloriously in the way she embraces and
governs the world at will. She is present in every
point of this immense body, she animates all its parts,
great and small. Though these may be located in
different parts, she does not divide as they do, she
does not split up to vivify each individual. She vivi-
fies all things simultaneously, ever remaining whole
and indivisible, resembling the intelligence from which
she was begotten by her unity and universality.^ It'
is her power which contains this world of infinite mag-
nitude and variety within the bonds of unity. Only
because of the presence of the Soul are heaven, sun,
and stars divinities; only because of her are we any-
thing; for "a corpse is viler than the vilest dung-hill."'^

AS LIFE TRANSFIGURES MATTER, SO THE UNIVER-
SAL SOUL GLORIFIES US.

But if the deities owe their divinity to the universal
Soul, she herself must be a divinity still more vener-
able. Now our soul is similar to the universal Soul.
Strip her of all coverings, consider her in her pristine
purity, and you will see how precious is the nature of
the 9Dul, how superior she is to everything that is
body.^ Without the soul, no body is anything but
earth. Even if you add to earth fire, water and air,
still there is nothing that need claim your veneration.
If it be the Soul that imparts beauty to the body, why

v.l] . THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES 177

should we forget the souls within ourselves, while
prostituting our admiration on other objects? If 't
be the soul that you admire in them, why do you not
admire her within yourselves?

THE SOUL AS THE HYPOSTATIC ACTUALIZATION
OF INTELLIGENCE.

3. Since the nature of the Soul is so divine and
precious, you may be assured of being able to reach
the divinity through her; with her you can ascend to
Him. You will not need to search for Him far from
yourself; nor will there be several intermediaries be-
tween yourself and Him. To reach Him, take as guide
the divinest and highest part of the Soul, the power
from which she proceeds, and by which she impinges
on the intelligible world. Indeed, in spite of the
divinity which we have attributed to her, the Soul is
no more than an image of Intelligence. As the ex-
terior word (speech) is the image of the (interior)
word (of thought?) of the soul, the Soul herself is
the word and actualization of Intelligence.^ She 'S
the life which escapes from Intelligence to form an-
other hypostatic form of existence, just as the fire
contains the latent heat which constitutes its essence
("being"), and also the heat that radiates from it
outside. Nevertheless, the Soul does not entirely
issue from within Intelligence; she does partly reside
therein, but also forms (a nature) distinct therefrom.-^
As the Soul proceeds frorfi Intelligence, she is intel-
ligible; and the manifestation of her intellectual
power is discursive reason. From Intelligence the Soul
derives her perfection, as well as ber existence; only
in comparison with Intelligence does the Soul seem
imperfect. The Soul, therefore, is the hypostatic sub-
stance that proceeds from Intelligence, and when the
Soul contemplates Intelligence the soul is reason actual-

178 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [10

ized. Indeed, while the soul contemplates Intelligence,
the Soul intimately possesses the things she thinks;
from her own resources she draws the actualizations
she produces; these intellectual and pure actualizations
are indeed the Soul's only characteristic activities.
Those of an inferior nature really proceed from a <
foreign principle; they are passions. M

THE SOUL'S RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE IS THAT
OF MATTER TO FORM.

Intelligence therefore, makes the Soul diviner, be- :
cause Intelligence (as a father) begets the Soul, and i
grants its (helpful) presence to the Soul. Nothing
intervenes between them but the distinction between
their natures. The Soul is to Intelligence in the same
relation as that obtaining between form and matter.^^
Now the very matter of Intelligence is beautiful be-
cause it has an intellectual form, and is simple. How
great then, must Intelligence be, if it be still greater
than the Soul.

THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS THE ARCHETYPE

OF OURS.

4. The dignity of Intelligence may be appreciated
in still another way. After having admired the magni-
tude and beauty of the sense-world, the eternal regu-
larity of its movement, the visible or hidden divinities,
the animals and plants it contains, we may (taking our
direction from all this), rise to this world's archetype,
a more real World. There we may contemplate all
the intelligible entities which are as eternal as the
intelligible world, and which there subsist within per-
fect knowledge and life. There preside pure intel-
ligence and ineffable wisdom; there is located the real
Saturnian realm,^^ which is nothing else than pure in-
telligence. This indeed embraces every immortal es-
sence, every intelligence, every divinity, every soul;

v.l] • THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES 179

everything there is eternal and immutable. Since its
condition is blissful, why should Intelligence change?
Since it contains everything, why should it aspire to
anything? Since it is sovereignly perfect, what need of
development would it have? Its perfection is so much
completer, since it contains nothing but perfect things,
and since it thinks them; it thinks them, not because it
seeks to know them, but because it possesses them.^^ its
felicity is not in any way contingent on anything else;
itself is true eternity, of which time furnishes a moving
image of the sphere of the soul. Indeed, the soul's
action is successive, and divided by the different objects
that attract its attention. Now it thinks Socrates, and
then it thinks a horse; never does it grasp but one part
of reality, while intelligence always embraces all
things simultaneously. Intelligence, therefore, pos-
sesses all things immovable in identity. It is; it never
has anything but the present ;^^ it has no future, for it
already is all it could ever later become; it has no past,
for no intelligible entity ever passes away; all of them
subsist in an eternal present, all remain identical, satis-
fied with their present condition. Each one is both
intelligence and existence; all together, they are uni-
versal Intelligence, universal Existence.

• ABOVE INTELLIGENCE AND EXISTENCE IS THEIR
SIMULTANEOUS PRINCIPLE.

Intelligence exists (as intelligence) because it thinks
existence. Existence exists (as existence) because, on
being thought, it makes intelligence exist and thinks.^^
There must therefore exist something else which makes
intelligence think, and existence exist, and which con-
sequently is their common principle. In existence they
are contemporaneous and substantial, and can never
fail each other. As intelligence and existence consti-
tute a duality, their common principle in this consub-
stantial unity that they form, and which is simul-

180 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [10

taneously existence and intelligence, the thinking sub-
ject and the object thought; intelligence as thinking
subject, and existence as object thought; for thought
simultaneously implies difference and identity.

THE SIX CATEGORIES FROM WHICH ALL THINGS

ARE DERIVED. j

] \ The first principles, therefore, are existence and]
intelligence, identity and difference, movement and]
rest.^^ Rest is the condition of identity; movement is^
the condition of thought, since the latter presupposes
the differences of the thinking subject and of the object
thought, and because it is silent if reduced to unity.
The elements of thought (subject and object) must
/ j thus stand in the relation of differences, but also in that
i j of unity, because they form a consubstantial unity, and
! ' because there is a common element in all that is de-
rived therefrom. Besides, here difference is nothing
else than distinction. The plurality formed by ele-
ments of thought constitutes quantity and number;^®
and the characteristic of every element, quality.^^
From these first principles (the categories, that are
the genera of being) all things are derived.

THE SOUL AS NUMBER CONNECTED WITH
INTELLIGENCE.

5. Thus the human soul is full of this divinity (of
Intelligence); she is connected therewith by these
(categories), unless the soul (purposely) withdraws
from (that intelligence). The Soul approaches Intel-
ligence, and thus having been unified, the Soul wonders,
'Who has begotten this unity? ' It must be He who is
simple, who is prior to all multiplicity, who imparts to
Intelligence its existence and manifoldness, and who
consequently produces number. Number, indeed, is
not something primitive; for the One is prior to the

V.i] THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES 181

"pair." The latter ranks only second, being begotten
and defined by unity, by itself being indefinite. As
soon as it is defined, it is a number in so far as it is a
"being"; for these are the grounds on which the Soul
also is a number.^^

THOUGHT IS ACTUALIZATION OF SIGHT. AND
BOTH FORM BUT ONE THING.

I Besides everything that is a mass or a magnitude
could not occupy the first rank in nature; those gross
^objects which are by sensation considered beings must
jbe ranked as inferior. In seeds, it is not the moist
'element that should be valued, but the invisible prin-
ciple, number, and the (seminal) reason. Number
and "pair" are only names for the reasons (ideas) and
intelligence. The "pair" is indeterminate so far as it
plays the part of substrate (in respect to unity). The
number tliat is derived from the pair, and the one,
constitute every kind of form, so that Intelligence has
a shape which is determined by the ideas^^ begotten
within it. Its shape is derived in one respect from the
one, and in another respect, from itself, just like
actualized sight. Thought, indeed, is actualized sight,
and both these entities (the faculty and the actualiza-
tion) form but one.

MYSTERY OR DERIVATION OF SECOND FROM FIRST.

6. How does Intelligence see, and what does it see?
How did the Second issue from the First, how was it
born from the First, so as that the Second might see
the First? For the soul now understands that these
principles must necessarily exist. She seeks to solve
the problem often mooted by ancient philosophers.
"If the nature of the One be such as we have outlined,
how does everything derive its hypostatic substance
(or, form of existence), manifoldness, duality, and

182 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [10

number from the First? Why did the First not remain
within Himself, why did He allow the leakage of mani-
foldness seen in all beings, and which we are seeking
to trace back to the First?" We shall tell it. But
we must, to begin with, invoke the Divinity, not by the
utterance of words, but by raising our souls to Him in
prayer. Now the only way to pray is (for a person),
when alone, to advance towards the One, who is en-
tirely alone. To contemplate Unity, we must retire
to our inner sanctuary, and there remain tranquil above
all things (in ecstasy) ; then we must observe the
statues which as it were are situated outside of (soul
and intelligence), and in front of everything, the statue
that shines in the front rank (Unity), contemplating
it in a manner suitable to its nature (in the mys-
teries).^^

GENERATION IS THE RADIATION OF AN IMAGE.

All that is moved must have a direction towards
v/hich it is moved; we must therefore conclude that that
which has no direction towards which it is moved must
be at a stand-still, and that anything born of this prin-
ciple must be born without causing this principle to
cease being turned towards itself. We must, however,
remove from our mind the idea of a generation oper-
ated within time, for we are here treating of eternal
things. When we apply to them the conception of
generation, we mean only a relation of causality and
effect. What is begotten by the One must be begotten
by Him without any motion on the part of the One;
if He were moved, that which was begotten from Him
would, because of this movement, be ranked third,
instead of second.^^ Therefore, since the One is im-
movable. He produces the hypostatic (form of exist-
ence) which is ranked second, without volition, con-
sent, or any kind of movement. What conception are
we then to form of this generation of Intelligence by

v;i.] THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES 183

this immovable Cause? It is a radiation of light which
I escapes without disturbing its quietness, like the
I splendor which emanates perpetually from the sun,
j without affecting its quietness, which surrounds it with-
I out leaving it. Thus all things, in so far as they remain
I within existence, necessarily draw from their own es-
i sence (''being") and produce externally a certain
' nature that depends on their power, and that is the
image of the archetype from which it is derived. ^^
, Thus does fire radiate heat; thus snow spreads cold.
! Perfumes also furnish a striking example of this pro-
cess; so long as they last, they emit exhalations in
which everything that surrounds them participates.
Everything that has arrived to its point of perfection
begets something. That which is eternally perfect be-
gets eternally; and that which it begets is eternal though
inferior to the generating principle. What then should
we think of Him who is supremely perfect? Does He
not beget? On the contrary. He begets that which,
after Him, is the greatest. Now that which, after Him,
is the most perfect, is the second rank principle. In-
telligence. Intelligence contemplates Unity, and needs
none but Him; but the Unity has no need of Intel-
ligence. That which is begotten by the Principle
superior to Intelligence can be nothing if not Intelli-
gence; for it is the best after the One, since it is su-
perior to all other beings. The Soul, indeed, is the
word and actualization of Intelligence, just as Intelli-
gence is word and actualization of the One. But the
Soul is an obscure word. Being an image of Intelli-
gence, she must contemplate Intelligence, just as the
latter, to subsist, must contemplate the One. Intel-
ligence contemplates the One, not because of any
separation therefrom, but only because it is after the
One. There is no intermediary between the One and
Intelligence, any more than between Intelligence and
the Soul. Every begotten being desires to unite with

184 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [1

the principle that begets it, and loves it, especially
when the begetter and the begotten are alone. Now
when the begetter is supremely perfect, the begotten
must be so intimately united to Him as to be separated,
from Him only in that it is distinct from Him.

INTELLIGIBLE REST IS THE DETERMINATION AND
FORM BY WHICH THEY SUBSIST.

7. We call Intelligence the image of the One. Let
us explain this. It is His image because Intelligence
is, in a certain respect, begotten by Unity, because
Intelligence possesses much of the nature of its father,
and because Intelligence resembles Him as light re-[
sembles the sun. But the One is not Intelligence; how
then can the hypostatic (form of existence) begotten
by the One be Intelligence ? By its conversion towardsj
the One, Intelligence sees Him; now it is this vision^*
which constitutes Intelligence. Every faculty that per-
ceives another being is sensation or intelligence; but
sensation is similar to a straight line, while intelligence)
resembles a circle.^^ Nevertheless, the circle is divis-i
ible, while Intelligence is indivisible; it is one, but,,
while being one, it also is the power of all things. Now:
thought considers all these things (of which Intelli-'
gence is the power), by separating itself, so to speak,
from this power; otherwise. Intelligence would not;
exist. Indeed, Intelligence has a consciousness of the
reach of its power, and this consciousness constitutes
its nature. Consequently, Intelligence determines its
own nature by the means of the power it derived from
the One; and at the same time Intelligence sees that
its nature ("being") is a part of the entities whicji
belong to the One, and that proceed from Him. Intel-
ligence sees that it owes all its force to the One, and
that it is due to Him that Intelligence has the privilege
of being a **being" (or, essence). Intelligence sees
that, as it itself is divisible, it derives from the One,
which is indivisible, all the entities it possesses, life and

vA] THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES 185

thought; because the One is not any of these things.
Everything indeed is derived from the One, because
it is not contained in a determinate form; it simply is
the One, while in the order of beings Intelligence is
all things. Consequently the One is not any of the
things that Intelligence contains; it is only the principle
from which all of them are derived. That is why
they are ''being," for they are already determined, and
each has a kind of shape. Existence should be com-
templated, not in indetermination, but on the contrary
lin determination and rest. Now, for Intelligible en-
tities, rest consists in determination, and shape by which
they suTisist.

MYTHS OF SATURN, JUPITER AND RHEA.

The Intelligence that deserves to be called the purest
intelligence, therefore, cannot have been born from
any source, other than the first Principle. It must.
From its birth, have begotten all beings, all the beauty
3f ideas, all the intelligible deities; for it is full of the
things it has begotten; it devours them in the sense
that it itself retains all of them, that it does not allow
them to fall into matter, nor be born of Rhea.^^ That
!s the meaning of the mysteries and myths; ''Saturn,
the wisest of the divinities, was born before Jupiter,
ind devoured his children." Here Saturn represents
ntelligence, big with its conceptions, and perfectly
3ure.26 They add, "Jupiter, as soon as he was grown,
n his turn begat." As soon as Intelligence is perfect,
t begets the Soul, by the mere fact of its being perfect,
and because so great a power cannot remain sterile.
Here again the begotten being had to be inferior to its
principle, had to represent its image, had, by itself, to
be indeterminate, and had later to be determined and
formed by the principle that begat it. What Intelli-
gence begets is a reason, a hypostatic form of existence

186 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [10

whose nature it is to reason. The latter moves around i
IntelHgence; is the light that surrounds it, the ray that
springs from it. On the one hand it is bound to In-
telligence, fills itself with it; enjoys it, participates in
it, deriving its intellectual operations from it. On the
other hand, it i^ in contact with inferior things, or
rather, begets them. Being thus begotten by the Soul,
these things are necessarily less good than the Soul,
as we shall further explain. The sphere of divine
things ends with the Soul.

PLATO TEACHES THREE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE.47

8. This is how Plato establishes three degrees in
the hierarchy of being^^: "Everything is around the
king of all." He is here speaking of first rank entities.
He adds, ''What is of the second order is around the
second principle; and what is of the third order is
around the third principle." Plato^^ further says that
"God is the father of the cause." By cause, he means
Intelligence; for, in the system of Plato, it is Intelli-
gence which plays the part of demiurgic creator. Plato
adds that it is this power that forms the Soul in the
cup. 2^ As the cause is intelligence, Plato applies the
name of father to the absolute Good, the principle su-
perior to Intelligence and superior to "Being." In
several passages he calls the Idea "existence and in-
telligence." He therefore really teaches that Intelli-
gence is begotten from the Good, and the Soul from
Intelligence. This teaching, indeed, is not new; it has
been taught from the most ancient times, but without
being brought out in technical terms. We claim to be
no more than the interpreters of the earlier philos-
ophers, and to show by the very testimony of Plato that
they held the same views as we do. m

r.l] THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES 187

THIS DOCTRINE TAUGHT BY PARMENIDES.
The first philosopher who taught this was Parmen-
des, who identified Existence and Intelligence, and
/ho does not place existence among sense-objects,
Tor, thought is the same thing as existence. "^^ He
dds^^ that existence is immovable, although being
hought. Parmenides thus denies all corporeal move-
aent in existence, so as that it might always remain
he same. Further, Parmenides"^ compares existence

0 a sphere, because it contains everything, drawing
hought not from without, but from within itself. When
'arrnenides, in his writings, mentions the One, he
aeans the cause, as if he recognized that this unity (of
he intelligible being) implied manifoldness. In the
ialogue of Plato he speaks with greater accuracy, and
istinguishes three principles: the First, the absolute
)ne; the second, the manifold one; the third, the one
nd the manifold. He therefore, as we do, reaches
hree natures.

ANAXAGORAS TEACHES THE SAME THING.

9. Anaxagoras, who teaches a pure and unmingled
ntelligence^^ also insists that the first Principle is
imple, and that the One is separated from sense-
bjects. But, as he lived in times too ancient, he has
ot treated this matter in sufficient detail.

HERACLITUS ALSO TAUGHT THE SAME THING.

Heraclitus also taught the eternal and intelligible
|)ne; for Heraclitus holds that bodies are ceaselessly
•becoming" (that is, developing), and that they are

1 a perpetual state of flux.^-*

EMPEDOCLES TAUGHT THE SAME THING.

In the system of Empedocles, discord divides, and
oncord unites; now this second principle is posited as
icorporeal, and the elements play the part of matter.^^

:i88 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [10

ARISTOTLE TAUGHT THE SAME THING.

Aristotle, who lived at a later period, says that the
First Principle is separated from (sense-objects), and
that it is intelligible.^^ But when Aristotle says that
He thinks himself, Aristotle degrades Him from the
first rank. Aristotle also asserts the existence of other
intelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial
spheres, so that each one of them might have a prin-
ciple of motion. About the intelligible entities, there-
fore, Aristotle advances a teaching different from* that
of Plato, and as he has no plausible reason for this

f change, he alleges necessity. A well-grounded objec-
tion might here be taken against him. It seems more
reasonable to suppose that all the spheres co-ordinated
in a single system should, all of them, stand in relation
to the One and the First. About Aristotle's views this
question also might be raised: do the intelligible entities
depend on the One and First, or are there several
principles for the intelligible entities? If the intel-
ligible entities depend on the One, they will no doubt
be arranged symmetrically, as, in the sense-sphere,
are the spheres, each of which contains another, and
of which a single One, exterior to the others, contains
them, and dominates them all. Thus, in this case, the
first intelligible entity will contain all entities up there,
and will be the intelligible world. Just as the spheres
are not empty, as the first is full of stars, and as each
of the others also is full of them, so above their motors

i will contain many entities, and everything will have
a more real existence. On the other hand, if each of
the intelligible entities is a principle, all will be con-
tingent. How then will they unite their action, and
will they, by agreement, contribute in producing a
single effect, which is the harmony of heaven? Why
should sense-objects, in heaven, equal in number their
intelligible motors? Again, why are there several of

v.l] THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES 189

' these, since they are incorporeal, and since no matter
separates them from each other?

WHAT THE PYTHAGOREANS TAUGHT ON THE

SUBJECT.

Among ancient philosophers, those who most faith-
fully followed the doctrine of Pythagoras, of his dis-
ciples, and of Pherecydes, have specially dealt with
the intelligible.^'^ Some of them have committed
their opinions to their written works; others have set
them forth only in discussions that have not been pre-
served in writing. There are others of them., also, who
have left us nothing on the subject.

TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES IN THE UNIVERSE
MUST CORRESPOND THREE PRINCIPLES IN US.

10. Above existence, therefore, is the One. This
has by us been proved as far as could reasonably be
expected, and as far as such subjects admit of demon-
stration. In the second rank are Existence and Intel-
ligence; in the third, the Soul. But if these three prin-
ciples, the One, Intelligence, and the Soul, as we have
said, obtain in nature, three principles must also ob-
tain within us. I do not mean that these three prin-
ciples are in sense-objects, for they are separate there-
from; they are outside of the sense-world, as the three
divine principles are outside of the celestial sphere,
and, according to Plato's expression, ^^ they constitute
I the ''the interior man." Our soul, therefore, is some-
1 thing divine; it has a nature different (from sense-
nature), which conforms to that of the universal Soul.
Now the perfect Soul possesses intelligence; but we
must distinguish between the intelligence that reasons
(the discursive reason), and the Intelligence that fur-
nishes the principles of reasoning (pure intelligence).
The discursive reason of the soul has no need, for . q
operation, of any bodily organ ;3^ in its operations, it l^

190 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [10

preserves all its purity, so that it is capable of reason-
ing purely. When separated from the body, it must,
without any hesitation, be ranked with highest intel-
lectual entities. There is no need of locating it in
space; for, if it exist within itself, outside of body, in
an immaterial condition, it is evidently not mingled
with the body, and has none of its nature. Conse-
quently Plato^^ says, "The divinity has spread the
Soul around the world." What he here means is that
a part of the Soul remains in the intelligible world.
Speaking of our soul he also says, "she hides her head
in heaven. "^^ He also advises us to wean the soul
from the body; and he does not refer to any local
separation, which nature alone could establish. He
means that the soul must not incline towards the body,
must not abandon herself to the phantoms of imagina-
tion, and must not, thus, become alienated from rea-
son. He means that the soul should try to elevate to^
the intelligible world her lower part which is estab-
lished in the sense-world, and which is occupied in
fashioning the body.^^

THERE MUST BE AN OBJECTIVE JUSTICE AND
BEAUTY TO WHICH WE ARE INTIMATELY

UNITED.

1 1. Since the rational soul makes judgments about
what is just or beautiful, and decides whether some
object is beautiful, whether such an action be just, there
must exist an immutable justice and beauty from which
discursive reason draws its principles.^^ Otherwise,
how could such reasonings take place? If the soul
at times reasons about justice and beauty, but at times
does not reason about them, we must possess within
ourselves the intelligence which, instead of reasoning,
ever possesses justice and beauty; further, we must
within us possess the cause and Principle of Intelli-
gence, the Divinity, which is not divisible, which sub-

V.I] THREE PRINCIPAL HYPOSTASES 191

sists, not in any place, but in Himself; who is con-
templated by a multitude of beings, by each of the
beings fitted to receive Him, but which remains dis- -
tinct from these beings, just as the centre subsists
within itself, while all the radii come from the circum- \
ference to centre themselves in it.^^ Thus we . our- ^
selves, by one of the parts of ourselves, touch the
divinity, unite ourselves with Him and are, so to speak,
suspended from Him; and we are founded upon Him
(we are "edified" by Him) when we turn towards Him.

THESE PRINCIPLES LAST EVER; EVEN THOUGH WE
ARE DISTRACTED FROM' THEM.

12. How does it happen that we possess principles
that are so elevated, almost in spite of ourselves, and
for the most part without busying ourselves about
them? For there are even men who never notice
them. Nevertheless these principles, that is, intelli-
gence, and the principle superior to intelligence, which
ever remains within itself (that is, the One), these two
principles are ever active. The case is similar with
the soul. She is always in motion; but the operations' •^^^''^^
that go on within her are not always perceived; they
reach us only when they succeed in making them-
selves felt. When the faculty that is active within us
does not transmit its action to the power that feels,
this action is not communicated to the entire soul;
however, we may not be conscious thereof because,
although we possess sensibility, it is not this power,
but the whole soul that constitutes the man.^^ So
long as life lasts, each power of the soul exercises its
proper function by itself; but we know it only when
communication and perception occur. In order to
perceive the things within us, we have to turn our
perceptive faculties towards them, so that (our soul)
may apply her whole attention thereto. ^^ The person

192

WORKS OF PLOTINOS

[10

that desires to hear one sound must neglect all others,
and listen carefully on its approach. Thus we must
here close our senses to all the noises that besiege us,
unless necessity force us to hear them, and to pre-
serve our perceptive faculty pure and ready to listen to
the voices that come from above.

1 By virtue of which, accord-
ing to the Pythagoreans, the
dyad "dared" to issue from the
unity. 2 That is the desire
which leads souls to separate
themselves primitively from
the divinity, and to unite them-
selves to bodies. ^ We have
seen this elsewhere, i. 3.1. ^ See
ii. 2.3. 5 Iliad xx. 65. 6 See vi.
4.4. '^ As said Heraclitus,
Plutarch, Banquet, iv. 4. ^ See
iv. 7.10. 9 See i. 2.3; iv. 3.11.
10 See iii. 9.5. n As thought
Plato in his Cratylus, C. xi. 39,
ind Macrobins, in his Commen-
tary»'on the Dream of Scipio, i,
11. i2Seei.8.2;ii.9.2. isseeiii.
7.2-4. 14 See v. 9.2, 7. i5 See
vi. 2. 16 See vi. 8. i"^ See vi.
3. 18 See iii. 6.1. 19 Pun on
"ideas" and "forms." 20 vi. 9.
11. This seems to refer to the
Roman temple of Isis in front
of which stood the statues of
the divinities, vi. 9.11. 2iWould
be soul, instead of intelligence.

22 See v. 4.1. 23 See iii. 8.10.
24 As thought Plato, Laws, x;
seeii. 2.3. 25 See iii. 6.19. 2C As
thought Plato, in the Cratylos,
C. xi. 39. 2 7 See Plato's Sec-
ond Letter, 312; in English,
Burges, p. 482; i. 8.2. 28 !„
Timaeus, 34. 29 Jn his Tim-
aeus, C43. 30 As quoted
by Clemens Al. Strom, vi. p.
627. 31 In Simplicius, Comm.
in Phys. Arist, 9. 32 See
Plato's Sophists, C244. 33See
ii. 7.7. 34 See ii. 1.2. 35 See
ii. 4.7. 36 See Metaph. xii. 7.8.

37 Referring to Numenius's
work on "The Good," and on
the "Immateriality of the Soul."

38 In the Acibiades, C36. 39 See
i. 1.9. 40 In his Timaeus, C30.
41 In the Phaedrus. 4 2 See iii.
6.5. 4 3 See v. ZX 4 4 Prom
the circumference, see, iii. 8.7.
45 Cicero, Tusculans, i. 22.
4 6 See i. 4.9. 4 7 This para-
graph is founded on Numeniur
36, 39.

V.2] OF GENERATION 193

FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.

Of Generation, and of the Order of things that
Rank Next After the First.

WHY FROM UNITY THIS MANIFOLD WORLD WAS
ABLE TO COME FORTH.

1. The One is all things, and is none of these
things. The Principle of all things cannot be all
things.^ It is all things only in the sense that all
things coexist within it. But in it, they "are" not yet,
but only *Vill be."^ How then could the manifold-
ness of all beings issue from the One, which is simple
and identical, which contains no diversity or duality?
It is just because nothing is contained within it, that
everything can issue from it.^ In order that essence
might exist, the One could not be (merely) essence,
but had to be the 'father' of essence, and essence had
to be its first-begotten. As the One is perfect, and
acquires nothing, and has no need or desire. He has,
so to speak, superabounded, and this superabundance
has produced a different nature.^ This different
nature of the One turned towards Him, and by its
conversion, arrived at the fulness (of essence), then
it had the potentiality of contemplating itself, and
thus determined itself as Intelligence. Therefore, by
resting near the One, it became Essence; and by con-
templating itself, became Intelligence. Then by fixing
itself within itself to contemplate itself, it simultane-
ously became Essence-and-Intelligence.

194 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [11

BY SIMILAR EFFUSION OF SUPERABUNDANCE
INTELLIGENCE CREATED THE SOUL.

Just like the One, it was by effusion of its power
that IntelHgence begat something similar to itself.
Thus from Intelligence emanated an image, just as
Intelligence emanated from the One. The actualiza-
tion that proceeds from Essence (and Inelligence) is
the universal Soul. She is born of Intelligence, and
determines herself without Intelligence issuing from
itself, just as Intelligence itself proceeded from the
One without the One ceasing from His repose.

SIMILARLY THE UNIVERSAL SOUL. BY PROCESSION.
BEGETS NATURE.

Nor does the universal Soul remain at rest, but
enters in motion to beget an image of herself. On
the one hand, it is by contemplation of the principle
from which she proceeds that she achieves fulness;
on the other hand, it is by advancing on a path dif-
ferent from, and opposed to (the contemplation of
Intelligence), that she begets an image of herself,
sensation, and the nature of growth.^ Nevertheless*
nothing is detached or separated from the superior
principle which begets her. Thus the human .soul
seems to reach down to within that of (plant) growth.^
She descends therein inasmuch as the plant derives
growth from her. Nevertheless it is not the whole

/ soul that passes into the plant. Her presence there is
limited to her descent towards the lower region, and

* in so far as she produces another hypostatic substance,
by virtue of her procession, which occurs by her con-
descension to care for the things below her. But the
higher part of the Soul, that which depends on Intel-
ligence, allows the Intelligence to remain within it-
self. . . .

What^ then does the soul which is in the plant

V.2] OF GENERATION 19S

do? Does she not beget anything? She begets the
plant in which she resides. This we shall have to
study from another standpoint.

PROCESSION IS UNIVERSAL FROM HIGHEST TO

LOWEST.

2. We may say that there is a procession from the
First to the last; and in this procession each occupies
its proper place. The begotten (being) is subordin-
ated to the begetting (being). On the other hand,
it becomes similar to the thing to which it attaches,
50 long as it remains attached thereto. When the soul
passes into the plant, there is one of her parts that
unites thereto (the power of growth) ; but besides, it
is only the most audacious^ and the most senseless
part of her that descends so low. When the soul
passes into the brute, it is because she is drawn thereto
by the predominance of the power of sensation. ^^
When she passes into man, it is because she is led to
io so by the exercise of discursive reason, either by
'he movement by which she proceeds from Intelli-
^'ence, because the soul has a characteristic intellectual
Dower, and consequently has the power to determine
iierself to think, and in general, to act.

rHE SOUL IS NOWHERE BUT IN A PRINCIPLE THAT
IS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE.

Now, let us retrace our steps. When we cut the
twigs or the branches of a tree, where goes the plant-
soul that was in them? She returns to her principle,^^
'or no local difference separates her therefrom. If
ive cut or burn the root, whither goes the power of
growth present therein? It returns to the plant-
3ower of the universal Soul, which does not change
place, and does not cease being where it was. It
:eases to be where it was only when returning to its
principle; otherwise, it passes into another plant; for

196 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [11

it is not obliged to contract, or to retire within itself.
If, on the contrary, it retire, it retires within the
superior power.^^ Where, in her turn, does the latter
reside? Within Intelligence, and without changing,
location; for the Soul is not within any location, and
Intelligence still less. Thus the Soul is nowhere; she
is in a principle which, being nowhere, is everywhere. ^^

THE SOUL MAY REMAIN IN AN INTERMEDIATE LIFE.j

If, while returning to superior regions, the soul
stops before reaching the highest, she leads a life of
intermediary nature.^^

ALL THESE THINGS ARE IN INTELLIGENCE. WITH-
OUT CONSTITUTING IT.

All these entities (the universal Soul and her images)
are Intelligence, though none of them constitutes In-
telligence. They are Intelligence in this respect, that
they proceed therefrom. They are not Intelligence in
this respect that only by dwelling within itself Intel-
ligence has given birth to them.^^

THE WHOLE UNIVERSE IS ONE IMMENSE CONCAT-
ENATION OF ALL THINGS.

Thus, in the universe, life resembles an immense
chain in which every being occupies a point, begetting
the following being, and begotten by the preceding
one, and ever distinct, but not separate from the
(upper) generating Being, and the (lower) begotten
being into which it passes without being absorbed.

1 See iii. 9.9. 2 See iii. 8.9. iii. 4.2. n See iv. 4.29; iv. 5.7.

3 iii. 9.4. 4 iii 8.9. ^ See v. i2Xhat is, in the principal

1.7. ^ See i. 1.8; iv. 9.3. "^ See power of the universal soul,

iii. 4.1, 2, 8 Fragment belong- see ii. 3.18. ^^ gee vi. 5; that

ing here, apparently, but mis- is, within intelligence, i^ Be-

placed at end of next para- tween celestial and terrestrial

graph. 9 See v. 1.1. ^^ See life; see iii. 4.6. i^ See iii. 8.7.

ii.4] pF MATTER 197

SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.
Of Matter.

MATTER AS SUBSTRATE AND RESIDENCE OF FORMS.

1. Matter is a substrate (or subject) underlying
nature, as thought Aristotle,^ and a residence for
forms. Thus much is agreed upon by all authors who
have studied matter, and who have succeeded in form-
ing a clear idea of this kind of nature; but further
than this, there is no agreement. Opinions differ as
to whether matter is an underlying nature (as thought
Aristotle), 2 as to its receptivity, and to what it is
receptive.

THE STOIC CONCEPTION OF MATTER.

(The Stoics, who condensed Aristotle's categories
to four, substrate, quality-mode and relation),^ who
admit the existence of nothing else than bodies, ac-
knowledge no existence other than that contained by
bodies. They insist that there is but one kind of
matter, which serves as substrate to the elements,
and that it constitutes ''being"; that all other things
are only affections ("passions") of mattter, or modi-
fied matter: as are the elements. The teachers of
this doctrine do not hesitate to introduce this matter
into the (very nature of the) divinities, so that their
supreme divinity is no more than modified matter.*
Besides, of matter they make a body, calling it a
"quantityless body," still attributing to it magnitude.

198 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [

MATTER ACCORDING TO THE PYTHAGOREANS,
PLATONISTS AND AJilSTOTELIANS.

Others (Pythagoreans, Platonists and Aristotelians]
insist that matter is incorporeal.^ Some even dis
tinguish two kinds of matter, "first, the (Stoic) sub
strate of bodies, mentioned above; the other mattei
being of a superior nature, the substrate of forms an(j
incorporeal beings.

THE ARISTOTELIAN INTELLIGIBLE MATTER.

2. Let us first examine whether this (latter Intel
ligible) matter exists, how it exists, and what it is
If (the nature) of matter be something indeterminate
and shapeless, and if in the perfect (intelligible beingsj
there must not be anything indeterminate or shape
less, it seems as if there could not be any matter iij
the intelligible world. As every (being) is simple, i
could not have any need of matter which, by uniting
with something else, constitutes something conJ
posite. Matter is necessary in begotten beings, whicfl
make one thing arise out of another; for it is sucl
beings that have led to the conception of matter (a:
thought Aristotle).^ It may however be objectec
that in unbegotten beings matter would seem useless
Whence could it have originated to enter in (amon|
intelligible beings), and remain there? If it wen
begotten, it must have been so by some principle; i
it be eternal, it must have had several principles; ii
which case the beings that occupy the first rank woulc
seem to be contingent. Further, if (in those beings)
form come to join matter, their union will constitute
a body, so that the intelligible (entities) will be cor
poreal.

INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IS NOT SHAPELESS.

3. To this it may first be answered that the in!
determinate should not be scorned everywhere, noi

1.4] OF MATTER 199

that which is conceived of as shapeless, even if this
be the substrate of the higher and better entities; for
we might call even the soul indeterminate, in respect
to intelligence and reason, which give it a better shape
and nature. Besides, when we say that intelligible
things are composite (of matter and form), this is
not in the sense in which the word is used of bodies.
Even j:ea§Qns. would thus be called composite, and by
their actualization form another alleged composite,
nature, which aspires to form. If, in the intelligible
world, the composite tend toward some other prin-
ciple, or depend thereon, the difference between this
composite and bodies is still better marked. Besides,
the matter of begotten things ceaselessly changes
form, while the matter of the intelligible entities ever
remains identical. Further, matter here below is
subject to other conditions (than in the intelligible
world). Here below, indeed, matter is all things only
partly, and is all things only successively; conse-
quently, amidst these perpetual changes nothing is
identical, nothing is permanent. Above, on the con-
trary, matter is all things simultaneously, and possess-
ing all things, could not transform itself. Conse-
quently, matter is never shapeless above; for it is not
even shapeless here below. Only the one (intelligible
matter) is situated differently from the other (sense-
matter). Whether, however, (intelligible matter) be
begotten, or be eternal, is a question that cannot be
determined until we know what it is.

THE NATURE OF IDEAS IMPLIES AN INDIVIDUAL
FORM, WHICH AGAIN IMPLIES A SUBSTRATE.

4. Granting now the existence of ideas, whose
reality has been demonstrated elsewhere,^ we must
draw their legitimate consequences. N_ecessarily ideas^ .
have something irL_common, inasmuch as they are | j I j
^manifold; and since tliey differ from each other, they

200 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12^

must also have something individual. Now the in-
dividuality of any idea, the difference that distin-
guishes it from any other, consists of its particular
shape. But form, to be received, implies a substrate,
that might be determined by the difference. There is
therefore always a matter that receives form, and
there is always a substrate (even jn ideas^ whose matter
is genus, and whose form is its dilTerenceJ.

RELYING ON THE PUN BETWEEN WORLD AND

ADORNMENT, PLOTINOS CONCLUDES THAT IF

THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD BE THE IMAGE

OF THIS, IT MUST ALSO BE A COMPOSITE

OF FORM AND MATTER.

Besides, our world is an image of the intelligible
world. Now as our world is a composite of matter
(and form), there must be matter also on high (that
is, in the intelligible world). Otherwise, how could
we call the intelligible world "kosmos'' (that is, either
world, or adornment), unless we see matter (receiv-
ing) form therein? How could we find form there,
without (a residence) that should receive it? That
world is indivisible, taken in an absolute sense; but
in a relative sense, is it divisible? Now if its parts be
distinct from each other, their division or distinction
is a passive modification of matter; for what can be
divided, must be matter. If the multitude of ideals
constitute an indivisible being, this multitude, which
resides in a single being, has this single being as sub-
strate, that is, as matter and is its shapes. This single,
yet varied substrate conceives of itself as shapeless,
before conceiving of itself as varied. If then by
thought you abstract from it variety, forms, reasonSj^
and intelligible characteristics, that which is pnor is
indeterminate and shapeless; then there will remain
in this (subject) none of the things that are in it and
with it.

ii.4] OF MATTER 201

THE BOTTOM OF EVERYTHING IS MATTER. WHICH
IS RELATIVE DARKNESS.

5. If, we were to conclude that there were no
matter in intelligible entities, because they were im-
mutable, and because, in them, matter is always com-
bined with (shape), we would be logically compelled
to deny the existence of matter in bodies; for the
matter of bodies always has a form, and every body
is always complete (containing a form and a matter).
Each body, however, is none the less composite, and
intelligence observes its doubleness; for it splits until it
arrives to simplicity, namely, to that which can no
longer be decomposed; it does not stop until it reaches
the bottom things. Now the bottom of each thing is
matter. Every matter is dark, because the reason (the
form) is the light, and because intelligence is the
reason.*^ When, in an object, intelligence considers
Ifie reason, it considers as dark that which is below
reason, or light. Likewise, the eye, being luminous,
and directing its gaze on light and on the colors which
are kinds of light, considers what is beneath, and hid-
den by the colors, as dark and material.

INTELLIGIBLE MATTER CONSISTS OF REAL BElNa

ESPECIALLY AS SHAPED.

Besides, there is a great difference between the"
dark bottom of intelligible things and that of sense-
objects; there is as much difference between the matter
of the former and of tne latter as there is between
their form. The divine matter, on receiving the form
that determines it, possesses an intellectual and de-
terminate life. On the contrary, even when the matter
of the bodies becomes something determinate, it is
neither alive nor thinking; it is dead, in spite of its
borrowed beauty.^ As the shape (of sense-objects)

202 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12

is only an image, their substrate also is only an image.
But as the shape (of intelligible entities) possesses
veritable (reality), their substrate is of the same nature.
We have, therefore, full justification for calling mattiSJ^
''being," that is, when referring to intelligible matter;
for the substrate of intelligible entities really is "being,"
especially if conceived of together with its inherent
(form). For ''being" is the luminous totality (or
complex of matter and form). To question the etern-
ity of intelligible matter is tantamount to questionTng
that of ideas; indeed, intelligible entities are begotten
in the sense that they have a principle; but they are
non-begotten in the sense that their existence had no
beginning, and that, from all eternity, they derive
their existence from their principle. Therefore they
do not resemble the things that are always becoming,
as our world; but, like the intelligible world, they
ever exist.

THE CATEGORIES OF MOVEMENT AND DIFFERENCE
APPLIED TO INTELLIGIBLES.

The difference that is in the intelligible world ever
produces matter; for, in that world, it is the difference
that is the principle of matter, as well as of primary
motion. That is why the latter is also called differ-
ence, because difference and primary motion were
born simultaneously.^

The movement and difference, that proceed from
the First (the Good), are indeterminate, and need
it, to be determinate. Now they determine each
other when they turn towards it. Formerly, matter
was as indeterminate as difference; it was not good
because it was not yet illuminated by the radiance of
the First. Since the First is the source of all UgbX,
the object that receives light from the First does not

ii.4] OF MATTER 203

always possess light; this object differs from lights and
possesses light as something alien, because it derives
light from some other source. That is the nature of
matter as contained in intelligible (entities). Perhaps
this treatment of the subject is longer than necessary.

SUBSTRATE IS DEMANDED BY TRANSFORMATION^

OF ELEMENTS. BY THEIR DESTRUCTION AND

DISSOLUTION.

6. Now let us speak of bodies. The mutual trans-
formation of elements demonstrates that they must
have a substrate. Their transformation is not a com-
plete destruction; otherwise (a general) "being"^^
would perish in nonentity. Whereas, what is begotten
would have passed from absolute non-entity to es-
sence; and all change is no more than the passing of
one form into another (as thought Aristotle). ^^ It pre-
supposes the existence of permanent (subject) which
would receive the form of begotten things only after
having lost the earlier form. This is demonstrated by
destruction, which affects only something composite;
therefore every dissolved object must have been a
composite. Dissolution proves it also. For instance,
where a vase is dissolved, the result is gold; on being
dissolved, gold leaves water; and so analogy would
suggest that the dissolution of water would result in
something else, that is analogous to its nature. Finally,
elements necessarily are either form, or primary mat-
ter, or the composites of form and matter. However,
they cannot be form, because, without matter, they
could not possess either mass nor magnitude. Nor
can they be primary matter, because they are subject
to destruction. They must therefore be composites of
form and matter; form constituting their shape and
quality, and matter a substrate that is indeterminate,
because it is not a form.

204 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12

THE VIEWS OF EMPEDOCLES AND ANAXAGORAS

ON MATTER.

7. (Acceding to Aristotle), ^^ Empedocles thinks
matter consists of elements; but this opinion is refuted
by the decay to which they are exposed. (According
to Aristotle), ^3 Anaxagoras supposes that matter is a
mixture and, instead of saying that this (mixture) is
capable of becoming all things, he insists that it con-
tains all things in actualization. Thus he annihilates
the intelligence that he had introduced into the world;
for, according to him, it is not intelligence that endows
all the rest with shape and form; it is contemporaneous
with matter, instead of preceding it.^^ Now it is im-
possible for intelligence to be the contemporary of
matter, for if mixture participate in essence, then must

'' essence precede it; if, however, essence itself be the
mixture, they will need some third principle. There-
fore if the demiurgic creator necessarily precede, what
need was there for the forms in miniature to exist in
matter, for intelligence to unravel their inextricable

J confusion, when it is possible to predicate qualities of
matter, because matter had none of its own, and thus
to subject matter entirely to shape? Besides, how
could (the demiurgic creator) then be in all?

REFUTATION OF ANAXIMANDER'S VIEWS ABOUT

MATTER. 4

(Anaximander)^^ had better explain the consistence
of the infinity by which he explains matter. Does he,
by infinity, mean immensity? In reality this would be
impossible. Infinity exists neither by itself, nor in any
other nature, as, for instance, the accident of a body.
The infinite does not exist by itself, because each of its
parts would necessarily be infinite. Nor does the in-
finite exist as an accident, because that of which it
would be an accident would, by itself, be neither in-

ii.4] OF MATTER 205

finite, nor simple; and consequently, would not be
matter.

REFUTATION OF DEMOCRITUS'S ATOMS AS
EXPLANATIONS OF MATTER.

(According to Aristotle's account of Democritus),^^
neither could the atoms fulfil the part of matter be-
cause they are nothing (as before thought Cicero). ^"^
Every body is divisible to infinity. (Against the sys-
tem of the atoms) might further be alleged the contin-
uity and humidity of bodies. Besides nothing can exist
without intelligence and soul, which could not be com-
posed of atoms. Nothing with a nature different from
the atoms could produce anything with the atoms, be-
cause no demiurgic creator could produce something
with a matter that lacked continuity. Many other ob-
jections against this system have and can be made;
but further discussion is unnecessary.

MATTER IS NOTHING COMPOSITE. BUT BY NATURE
SIMPLE AND ONE.

8. What then is this matter which is one, con-
tinuous, and without qualities.? Evidently, it could
not be a body, since it has no quality; if it were a body,
it would have a quality. We say that it is the matter
of all sense-objects, and not the matter of some, and
the form of others, just as clay is matter, in respect to
the potter, without being matter absolutely (as thought
Aristotle). ^^ As we are not considering the matter of
any particular object, but the matter of all things, we
would not attribute to its nature anything of what falls
under our senses — no quality, color, heat, cold, light-
ness, weight, density, sparseness, figure or magnitude;
for magnitude is something entirely different from
being large, and figure from the figured object. Matter
therefore is not anything composite, but something
simple, and by nature one (according to the views of

206 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12

Plato and Aristotle combined). ^^ Only thus could
matter be deprived of all properties (as it is).

MATTER AND THE INFORMING PRINCIPLE MUST

BE CONTEMPORARIES TO ACCOUNT FOR THEIR

MUTUAL RELATIONS.

The principle which informs matter will give it form
, as something foreign to its nature; it will also intro-
; duce magnitude and all the real properties. Other-
wise, it would be enslaved to the magnitude of matter,
and could not decide of the magnitude of matter, and
magnitude would be dependent on the disposition of
matter. A theory of a consultation between it and the
magnitude of matter would be an absurd fiction. On
the contrary, if the efficient cause precede matter,
matter will be exactly as desired by the efficient cause,
and be capable of docilely receiving any kind of form,
including magnitude. If matter possessed magnitude,
it would also possess figure, and would thus be rather
difficult to fashion. Form therefore enters into matter
by importing into it (what constitutes corporeal being) ;
I now every form contains a magnitude and a quantity
/which are determined by reason (''being"), and with
' reason. That is why in all kinds of beings, quantity
is determined only along with form; for the quantity
(the magnitude) of man is not the quantity of the
bird. It would be absurd to insist on the difference
between giving to matter the quantity of a bird, and
impressing its quality on it, that quality is a reason,
while quantity is not a form; for quantity is both
measure and number.

ANTI-STOIC POLEMIC, AGAINST THE CORPOREITY
OF MATTER AND QUANTITY.

I 9. It may be objected that it would be impossible

I to conceive of something without magnitude. The

fact is that not everything is identical with quantity,

ii.4] OF MATTER 207

Essence is distinct from quantity; for many other
things beside it exist. Consequently no incorporeal
nature has any quantity. JVLa±t£r+^.llierefiQx.^..is.Jjicpr-
4iai£al. Besides, even__quantity itself is not quantative,
which characterizes only what participates in quan-
tity (in general) ; a further proof that quantity is a
form, as an object becomes white by the presence of
whiteness; and as that which, in the animal, produces
whiteness and the different colors, is not a varied color,
but a varied reason; likewise that which produces
a quantity is not^Tefinite quantity, but either quantity
in itself, or quantity as such, or the reason of quantity.
Does quantity, on entering into matter extend matter,
so as to give it magnitude? By no means, for matter
had not been condensed. Form therefore imparts to
matter the magnitude which it did not possess, just as
form impresses on matter the quality it lacked. ^^

BY ABSTRACTION. THE SOUL CAN FIND AND DES-
CRY THE QUALITY-LESS THING-IN-ITSELF: THIS
PROCESS IS CALLED "BASTARD REASONING."

10. (Some objector) might ask how one could
conceive of matter without quantity? This might be
answered by a retort. How then do you (as you do)
manage to conceive of it without quality? Do you
again object, by what conception or intelligence could
it be reached ? By the very indetermination of the soul.
Since that which knows must be similar to that which
is known (as Aristotle^^ quotes from Empedocles), the
indeterminate must be grasped by the indeterminate.
Reason, indeed, may be determined in respect to the in-
determinate; but the glance which reason directs on
the indeterminate itself is indeterminate. If every-
thing were known by reason and by intelligence,
reason here tells us about matter what reason
rightly should tell us about it. By wishing to
conceive of matter in an intellectual manner, intelli-

208 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12

gence arrives at a state which is the absence of intel-
ligence, or rather, reason forms of matter a "bastard"
or "illegitimate" image, which is derived from the
other, which is not true, and which is composed of the
other (deceptive material called) reason. That is why
Plato-2 said that matter is perceived by a "bastard
reasoning." In what does the indetermination of the
soul consist.? In an absolute ignorance, or in a com-
plete absence of all knowledge? No: the indeterminate
condition of the soul implies something positive (be-
) sides something negative). As for the eye, darkness
is the matter of all invisible color, so the soul, by
making abstraction in sense-objects of all things that
> somehow are luminous, cannot determine what then
V remains; and likewise, as the eye, in darkness (becomes
assimilated to darkness), the soul becomes assimilated
to what she sees. Does she then see anything else?
Doubtless, she sees something without figure, without
color, without light, or even without magnitude. ^^ if
this thing had any magnitude, the soul would lend it a
form.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MENTAL BLANK AND
IMPRESSION OF THE SHAPELESS.

(An objector might ask) whether there be identity
of conditions between the soul's not thinking, and her
experience while thinking of matter? By no means;
when the soul is not thinking of anything, she neither
asserts anything, nor experiences anything. When she
thinks of matter, she experiences something, she re-
ceives the impression of the shapeless. When she pre-
sents to herself objects that possess shape and magni-
tude, she conceives of them as composite; for she sees
them as distinct (or, colored? ) and determined by qual-
ities they contain. She conceives of both the totality
and its two constituent elements. She also has a clear
perception, a vivid sensation of properties inherent (in

ii.4] OF MATTER 209

matter). On the contrary, the soul receives only an \
jobscure,^g£rcep_tion of the shapeless subject, for there is ^
ho form there. Therefore, when the soul considers
matter in general, in the composite, with the qualities
inherent in this composite, she separates them, ana-
lyzes them, and what is left (after this analysis), the
soul perceives it vaguely, and obscurely, because it is
something vague and obscure; she thinks it, without
really thinking it. On the other hand, as matter does
not remain shapeless, as it is always shaped, within
objects, the soul always imposes on matter the form
of things, because only with difficulty does she sup-
port the indeterminate, since she seems to fear to
fall out of the order of beings, and to remain long in
nonentity.

THE COMPOSITION OF A BODY NEEDS A SUBSTRATE.

11. (Following the ideas of Aristotle,^^ Plotinos
wonders whether some objector) will ask whether the
composition of a body requires anything beyond ex-
tension and all the other qualities? Yes: it demands
a substrate to receive them (as a residence). This^
substrate is not a mass; for in this case, it would be an
extension. But if this substrate have no extension, how
can it be a residence (for form) ? Without extension,
it could be of no service, contributing neither to form
nor qualities, to magnitude nor extension. It seems
that extension, wherever it be, is given to bodies by
matter. Just as actions, effects, times and movements. *
though they do not imply any matter, nevertheless are
beings, it would seem that the elementary bodies do
not necessarily imply matter (without extension), being
individual beings, whose diverse substance is constituted
by the mingling of several forms. Matter without ex- v .
tension, therefore, seems to be no niore than a mean- ) \ I
ingless name. '

210 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12

MATTER AS THE IMAGE OF EXTENSION. CAN YET
BE RESIDENCE OF FORM.

(Our answer to the above objection is this:) To
begin with, not every residence is necessarily a mass,
unless it have already received extension. The soul,
which possesses all things, contains them all simul-
taneously. If it possessed extension, it would possess
all things in extension. Consequently matter receives
all it contains in extension, because it is capable there-
of. Likewise in animals and plants there is a corre-
spondence between the growth and diminution of their
magnitude, with that of their quality. It would be
wrong to claim that magnitude is necessary to matter
because, in sense-objects, there exists a previous mag-
nitude, on which is exerted the action of the forming
principle; for the matter of these objects is not pure
matter, but individual matter (as said Aristotle). ^^
Matter pure and simple must receive its extension from
some other principle. Therefore the residence of form
could not be a mass; for in receiving extension, it
would also receive the other qualities. Matter there-
fore, is the image of extension, because as it is primary
matter, it possesses the ability to become extended.
People often imagine matter as emp_ty_ extension; con-
sequently several philosophers have claimed Jii_a^tjnaJ-
ter is identical with emptiness. I repeat: matter^The
image of extension because the soul, when considering
matter, is unable to determine anything, spreads into
indetermination, without being able to circumscribe or
mark anything; otherwise, matter would determine
something. This substrate could not properly be called
big or little; it is simultaneously big and little (as said
Aristotle). 26 It is simultaneously extended and non-
extended, because it is the matter of extension. If it
were enlarged or made smaller, it would somehow
move in extension. Its indetermination is an extension
which consists in being the very residence of extension,

ii.4] OF MATTER 211

but really in being only imaginary extension, as has
been explained above. Other beings, that have no
extension, but which are forms, are each of them de-
terminate, and consequently imply no other idea of
extension. On the contrary, matter, being indetermin-
ate, and incapable of remaining within itself, being
moved to receive air forms everywhere, ever being
docile, by this very docility, and by the generation (to
which it adapts itself), becomes manifold. It is in
this way its nature seems to be extension.

POLEMIC AGAINST MODERATUS OF GADES, FORMS
DEMAND A RESIDENCE, VASE, or LOCATION.

12. Extensions therefore contribute to the con-
stitutions of bodies; for the forms of bodies are in ex-
tensions. These forms produce themselves not in ex-
tension (which is a form), but in the substrate that has
received extension. If they occurred in extension, in-^
stead of occurring in matter, they would nevertheless
have neither extension nor (hypostatic) substance; for
they would be no more than reasons. Now as reasons
i:eside in the soul, there would be no body. Therefore,
in the sense-world, the multiplicity of forms must have
a single substrate which has received extension, and
therefore must be other than extension. All things
that mingle form a mixture, because they contain
matter; they have no need of any other substrate, be-
cause each of them brings its matter along with it. But
(forms) need a receptacle (a residence), a "vase"
(or stand), a location (this in answer to the objection
at the beginning of the former section). Now location
is posterior to matter and to bodies. Bodies, there-
fore, presuppose matter. Bodies are not necessarily
immaterial, merely because actions and operations are. <?
In the occurrence of an action, matter serves as sub-
strate to the agent; it remains within him without -
itself entering into action; for that is not that which is

212 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12

sought by the agent. One action does not change into
another, and consequently has no need of containing
matter; it is the agent who passes from one action to
another, and who, consequently, serves as matter to
the actions (as thought Aristotle). ^'^

NOT EVEN CORPOREITY INHERES IN MATTER
WHICH IS REACHED BY BASTARD REASONING.

Matter, therefore, is necessary to quality as well as
to quantity, and consequently, to bodies. In this sense,
matter is not an empty name, but a substrate, though
it be neither visible nor extended. Otherwise, for the
same reason, we would be obliged also to deny quali-
ties and extension; for you might say that each of these
things, taken in itself, is nothing real. If these things
possess existence, though their existence be obscure,
so much the more must matter possess existence,
though its existence be neither clear nor evident to the
senses. Indeed, matter cannot be perceived by sight,
since it is colorless; nor by hearing, for it is soundless;
nor by smell or taste, because it is neither volatile nor
wet. It is not even perceived by touch, for it is not a
body. Touch cognizes only body, recognizes that it is
dense or sparse, hard or soft, wet or dry; now none
of these attributes is characteristic of matter. The
latter therefore can be perceived only by a reasoning
which does not imply the presence of intelligence,
which, on the contrary, implies the complete absence
of matter; which (unintelligent reasoning therefore)
deserves the name of ''bastard" (or, illegitimate)
reasoning.28 Corporeity itself,^^ is not characteristic
of matter. If corporeity be a reason (that is, by a pun,
a 'form'), it certainly differs from matter, both being
entirely distinct. If corporeity be considered when it
has already modified matter and mingled with it, it is a
body; it is no longer matter pure and simple.

ii.4] OF MATTER 213

THE SUBSTRATE IS NOT A QUALITY COMMON TO

ALL ELEMENTS; FOR THUS IT WOULD NOT BE

INDETERMINATE.

13. Those who insist that the substrate of things is
a quahty common to all elements are bound to explain
first the nature of this quality; then, how a quality
could serve as substrate; how an unextended, im-
material ( ? ) quality could be perceived in something
that lacked extension; further, how, if this quality be
determinate, it can be matter; for if it be something
indeterminate, it is no longer a quality, but matter itself
that we seek.

EVEN THIS PRIVATION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED A

QUALITY; BUT SUCH A USE OF THE TERM WOULD

DESTROY ALL COHERENT REASONING.

Let us grant that matter has no quality, because, by
virtue of its nature, it does not participate in a quality
of any other thing. What, however, would hinder
this property, because it is a qualification in matter,
from participating in some quality? This would be a
particular and distinctive characteristic, which consists
of the privation of all other things (referring to Aris-
totle) ? ^^ In man, the privation of something may be
considered a quality; as, for instance, the privation of
sight is blindness. If the privation of certain things
inhere in matter, this privation is also a qualification
for matter. If further the privation in matter extend
to all things, absolutely, our objection is still better
grounded, for privation is a qualification. Such an
objection, however, amounts to making qualities and
qualified things of everything. In this case quantity,
as well as ''being," would be a quality. Every qualified
thing must possess some quality. It is ridiculous to
suppose that something qualified is qualified by what
itself has no quality, being other than quality.

214 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12

BY A PUN BETWEEN "DIFFERENCE" AND "OTHER-
NESS," PLOTINOS DEFINES THE CHARACTERISTIC
OF MATTER AS BEING A DISPOSITION TO
BECOME SOMETHING ELSE.

Some one may object that that is possible, because
''being something else" is a quality. We would then'
have to ask whether the thing that is other be otherness- j
in-itself? If it be otherness-in-itself, it is so not be-1
cause it is something qualified, because quality is not
something qualified. If this thing be only other, it is
not such by itself, it is so only by otherness, as a thing
that is identical by identity. Privation, therefore, is,
not a quality, nor anything qualified, but the absence
of quality or of something else, as silence is the absence
of sound. Privation is something negative; qualifica-
tion is something positive. The property of matter is
not a form; for its property consists precisely in having
neither qualification nor form. It is absurd to insist
that it is qualified, just because it has no quality; this
would be tantamount to saying that it possessed ex-
tension by the very fact of its possessing no extension.
The individuality (or, property) of matter is to be
7/hat it is. Its characteristic is not an attribute; it con-
sists in a disposition to become other things. Not only
are these other things other than matter, but besides
each of them possesses an individual form. The only
name that suits matter is "other," or rather, "others,"
because the singular is too determinative, and the
plural better expresses indetermination.

PRIVATION IS A FORM OF MATTER.
14. Let us now examine if matter be privation, oi
if privation be an attribute of matter. If you insisj
that privation and matter are though logically distinct
substantially one and the same thing, you will have tc
explain the nature of these two things, for instance, de^
fining matter without defining privation, and coi

ii.4] OF MATTER 215

versely. Either, neither of these two things implies the
other, or they imply each other reciprocally, or only
one of them implies the other. If each of them can be
defined separately, and if neither of them imply the
other, both will form two distinct things, and matter
will be different from privation, though privation be an
accident of matter. But neither of the two must even
potentially be present in the definition of the other.
Is their mutual relation the same as that of a stub nose,
and the man with the stub nose (as suggested by
Aristotle) ? ^^ Then each of these is double, and there
are two things. Is their relation that between fire and
heat? Heat is in fire, but fire is not necessarily con-
tained in heat; thus matter, having privation (as a
quality), as fire has heat (as a quality), privation will
be a form of matter, and has a substrate different from
itself, which is matter.22 Not in this sense, therefore,
is there a unity (between them).

PRIVATION IS NONENTITY, AND ADDS NO NeW

CONCEPT.

Are matter and privation substantially identical, yet
logically distinct, in this sense that privation does not
signify the presence of anything, but rather its absence?
That it is the negation of beings, and is synonymous
with nonentity? Negation adds no attribute; it limits
itself to the assertion that something is not. In a cer-
tain sense, therefore, privation is nonentity.

BEING SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL. BUT LOGICALLY
DISTINCT IS NONSENSE.

If matter be called nonentity in this sense that it is
not essence, but something else than essence, there is
still room to draw up two definitions, of which one
would apply to the substrate, and the other to the
privation, merely to explain that it is a disposition to

216 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12

become something else? It would be better to ac*
knowledge that matter, like the substrate, should be
defined a disposition to become other things. If the
definition of privation shows the indetermination o1
matter, it can at least indicate its nature. But we could
not admit that matter and privation are one thing ir
respect to their substrate, though logically distinct; foi
how could there be a logical distinction into twc
things, if a thing be identical with matter as soon as i'
is indeterminate, indefinite, and lacking quality.?

MATTER AS THE INFINITE IN ITSELF.

15. Let us further examine if the indeterminate, oi
infinite, be an accident, or an attribute of some othei
nature; how it comes to be an accident, and whethei
privation ever can become an accident. The thing!
that are numbers and reasons are exempt from all in
determination, because they are determinations, orders
and principles of order for the rest. Now these prin
ciples do not order objects already ordered, nor do the;
order orders. The thing that receives an order is dif
ferent from that which gives an order, and the prin
ciples from which the order is derived are determina
tion, limitation and reason. In this case, that whicl
receives the order and the determination must neces
sarily be the infinite (as thought Plato ).2^ Now thaj
which receives the order is matter, with all the thingi
which, without being matter, participate therein, an^
play the part of matter. Therefore matter is the infinite
itself. ^^ Not accidentally is it the infinite; for the infiniti
is no accident. Indeed, every accident must be a reasod
now of what being can the infinite be an accident? O
determination, or of that which is determined? Nov
matter is neither of these two. Further, the infinitr
could not unite with the determinate without destroy
ing its nature. The infinite, therefore, is no acciden
of matter (but is its nature, or ''being"). Matter i

i.4] OF MATTER 217

he infinite itself. Even in the intelligible world, matter
s the infinite.

fHE INFINITE MAY BE EITHER IDEAL OR REAL,
INFINITE OR INDEFINITE.

The infinite seems born of the infinity of the One,
either of its power, or eternity; there is no infinity in
;he One, but the One is creator of the infinite. How -
:an there be infinity simultaneously above and below
(in the One and in matter) ? Because there are two
Infinities (the infinite and the indefinite; the infinite 1
n the One, the indefinite in matter). Between them /
obtains the same difference as the archetype and its '
Image.^^ Is the infinite here below less infinite? On
the contrary, it is more so. By the mere fact that the
mage is far from veritable ''being," it is more infinite,
nfinity is greater in that which is less determinate (as
[bought Aristotle). 3^ Now that which is more distant
Tom good is further in evil. Therefore the infinite on
jiigh, possessing the more essence, is the ideal infinite;
lere below, as the infinite possesses less essence, be-
:ause it is far from essence and truth, it degenerates
nto the image of essence, and is the truer (indefinite)
nfinite.

MATTER AS THE INFINITE IN ITSELF.

Is the infinite identical with the essence of the in-
"inite? There is a distinction between them where
[here is reason and matter; where however matter is
done, they must be considered identical; or, better,
ye may say absolutely that here below the infinite does
lot occur; otherwise it would be a reason, which is
:ontrary to the nature of the infinite. Therefore
natter in itself is the infinite, in opposition to reason.
Just as reason, considered in itself, is called reason, so
natter, which is opposed to reason by its infinity, and

218 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [12

which is nothing else (than matter), must be called
infinite.

MATTER IS NONESSENTIAL OTHERNESS. ^

16. Is there any identity between matter and other-',
ness? Matter is not identical with otherness itself, but
with that part of otherness which is opposed to real
beings, and to reasons, It is in this sense that one can
say of nonentity that it is something, that it is identical
with privation, if only privation be the opposition to
things that exist in reason. Will privation be de-
stroyed by its union with the thing of which it is an
attribute? By no means. That in which a (Stoic)
''habit" occurs is not itself a ''habit," but a privation.
That in which determination occurs is neither deter^,
mination, nor that which is determined, but the infinite,'
so far as it is infinite. How could determination unite
with the infinite without destroying its nature, since '
this infinite is not such by accident? It would destroy ^
this infinite, if it were infinite in quantity; but that is |
not the case. On the contrary, it preserves its "being"
for it, realizes and completes its nature; as the earth
which did not contain seeds (preserves its nature) when
it receives some of them; or the female, when she is
made pregnant by the male. The female, then, does
not cease being a female; on the contrary she is so far
more, for she realizes her nature ("being").

INDIGENCE IS NECESSARILY EVIL.

Does matter continue to be evil when it happens to
participate in the good ? Yes, because it was formerly >
deprived of good, and did not possess it. That which
lacks something, and obtains it, holds the middle be-
tween good and evil, if it be in the middle between the
two. But that which possesses nothing, that which is
in indigence, or rather that which is indigence itself,
must necessarily be evil; for it is not indigence of

ii.4]

OF MATTER

219

wealth, but indigence of wisdom, of virtue, of beauty,
of vigor, of shape, of form, of quality. How, indeed,
:ould such a thing not be shapeless, absolutely ugly
and evil?

THE RELATION OF BOTH KINDS OF MATTER TO

ESSENCE.

In the intelligible world, matter is essence; for what
Is above it (the One), is considered as superior to es-
sence. In the sense-world, on the contrary, essence is
above matter; therefore matter is nonentity, and
thereby is the only thing foreign to the beauty of es-
sence.

iMet. vii. 3. 2 Met. v. 8.
3 Diog. Laertes vii. 61. •* See
Cicero, de Nat. Deor. i. 15.
5 Met. vlii. 1. 6 See vi. 7. "^ See
i. 8.4. 8 See i. 8.15. spiotinos's
six categories are identity, dif-
ference, being, life, motion and
rest. See v. 1 ; v. 2 ; vi. 2.

10 Not the absolute eternal
existence, nor the totality
of the constitutive qualities
of a thing, as in ii. 6.

11 Met. xii. 2. 12 Met. i. 3.
18 Met. xi. 6. 14 See v. 1.9.
15 As reported by Diog. Laert.
ii. 2. 16 Met. i. 4; vii. 13. 17 de

Nat. Deor. i. 24. is Met. viii. 4.
19 In the Timaeus, C49-52, Met.
vii. 3. 20 See ii, 1 .Z. 21 in Met.
iii. 4 and de Anima i. 2.5 ; ii. 5.
22 In the Timaeus. 23 See i.
8.9; ii. 4.12. 24 Met. vii. 3, see
iii. 6.7-19. 25 Met. viii. 4.
2 6 Met. i. 6. 27 Met. vii. 7.
28 See ii. 4.10. 29 See ii. 1 .Z.
30 Met. xii. 2. 31 Met. vi. 1;
vii. 5. 32 See i. 2.1. 33 in the
Philebus, 252. 34 The same
definition is given of "evil" in
i. 8.10-14. 35 See i. 8.8.
36 Physics, iii. 7.

220 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [13

(

THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.

Fragments About the Soul, the Intelligence, and the

Good.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE
EXISTING ANIMAL.

1. Plato says, 'The intelligence sees the ideas com-
prised within the existing animal." He adds, 'The
demiurge conceived that this produced animal was to
comprise beings similar and equally numerous to those
that the intelligence sees in the existing animal."
Does Plato mean that the ideas are anterior to intel-
ligence, and that they already exist when intelligence
thinks them? We shall first have to examine whether
the animal is identical with intelligence, or is some-
thing different. Now that which observes is intelli-
gence; so the Animal himself should then be called,
not intelligence, but the intelligibile. Shall we there-
from conclude that the things contemplated by intel-
ligence are outside of it? If so, intelligence possesses
only images, instead of the realities themselves — that
is, if we admit that the realities exist up there; for, i
according to Plato, the veritable reality is up there
within the essence, in which everything exists in itself.

RELATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE
INTELLIGIBLE.

(This consequence is not necessary). Doubtless In-
telligence and the intelligible are different; they are
nevertheless not separated. Nothing hinders us from

iii.9] FRAGMENTS ABOUT THE SOUL 221

saying that both form but one, and that they are
separated only by thought; for essence is one, but it
is partly that which is thought, and partly that which
thinks. When Plato says that intelligence sees the
ideas, he means that it contemplates the ideas, not in
another principle, but in itself, because it possesses the
intelligible within itself. The intelligible may also be
the intelligence, but intelligence in the state of repose,
of unity, of calm, while Intelligence, which perceives
this Intelligence which has remained within itself, is
the actuality born therefrom, and which contemplates
it. By contemplating the intelligible, intelligence is
assimilated thereto and is its intelligence, because In-
telligence thinks the intelligible it itself becomes in-
telligible by becoming assimilated thereto, and on the
other hand" also something thought.

It is (intelligence), therefore, which conceived the
design in producing in the universe the four kinds of
living beings (or elements), which it beholds up there.
Mysteriously, however, Plato here seems to present
the conceiving-principle as different from the other two
principles, while others think that these three prin-
ciples, the animal itself (the universal Soul), Intel-
ligence and the conceiving principle form but a single
thing. Shall we here, as elsewhere, admit that opinions
differ, and that everybody conceives the three prin-
ciples in his own manner?

THE WORLD-SOUL IS THE CONCEIVING-PRINCIPLE.

We have already noticed two of these principles
(namely, intelligence, and the intelligible, which is
called the Animal-in-itself, or universal Soul). What
is the third? It is he who has resolved to produce, to
form, to divide the ideas that intelligence sees in the
Animal. Is it possible that in one sense intelligence is
the dividing principle, and that in another the dividing
principle is not intelligence? As far as divided things

222 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [13

proceed from intelligence, intelligence is the dividing
principle. As far as intelligence itself remains un-
divided, and that the things proceeding from it (thai
is, the souls) are divided, the universal Soul is the
principle of this division into several souls. That is wh>
Plato says that division is the work of a third principle,
and that it resides in a third principle that has con-
ceived; now, to conceive is not the proper function oi
intelligence; it is that of the Soul which has a dividing
action in a divisible nature.

HOW THE SOUL ASCENDS TO THE INTELLIGIBLE

WORLD. THE INTELLIGIBLE IS POSSESSED BY .

TOUCHING IT WITH THE BEST PART OF J

ONESELF. I

2. (As Nicholas of Damascus used to say) the
totality of a science is divided into particular propoj
sitions, without, however, thereby being broken u^
into fragments, inasmuch as each proposition contain?
potentially the whole science, whose principle and goal
coincide. Likewise, we should so manage ourselves
that each of the faculties we possess within ourselves
should also become a goal and a totality; and then sd
arrange all the faculties that they will be consummatecf
in what is best in our nature (that is, intelligence),
Success in this constitutes "dwelling on high" (living
spiritually) ; for, when one posssesses the intelligible,
one touches it by what is best in oneself.

OF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO THE BODY

THE SOUL IS NOT IN THE BODY; BUT THE BODY

IS IN THE SOUL.

3. The universal Soul has not come into any place
nor gone into any; for no such place could have ex-
isted. However, the body, which was in its neighbor-
hood, participated in her, consequently, she is no
inside a body. Plato, indeed, does not say that the

ii.9] FRAGMENTS ABOUT THE SOUL 223

oul is in a body; on the contrary, he locates the body
n the soul.

NDIVIDUAL SOULS, HOWEVER. MAY BE SAID TO

COME AND GO.

As to individual souls, they come from somewhere,
or they proceed from the universal Soul; they also
lave a place whither they may descend, or where they
nay pass from one body into another; they can like-
vise reascend thence to the intelligible world.

THE UNIVERSAL SOUL EVER REMAINS IN THE
INTELLIGIBLE.

The universal Soul, on the contrary, ever resides in
;he elevated region where her nature retains her; and
:he universe located below her participates in her just
IS the object which receives the sun's rays participates
:herein.

HOW THE SOUL INCARNATES.

The individual soul is therefore illuminated when she
urns towards what is above her; for then she meets
he essence; on the contrary, when she turns towards
^hat is below her, she meets non-being. This is what
happens when she turns towards herself; on wishing
to belong to herself, she somehow falls into emptiness,
becomes indeterminate, and produces what is below
her, namely, an image of herself which is non-being
(the body). Now the image of this image (matter),
is indeterminate, and quite obscure; for it is entirely
unreasonable, unintelligible, and as far as possible from
essence itself. (Between intelligence and the body)
the soul occupies an intermediary region, which is her
own proper domain; when she looks at the inferior
region, throwing a second glance thither, she gives a
form to her image (her body) ; and, charmed by this
image, she enters therein.

224 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [l3

BY ITS POWER. THE ONE IS EVERYWHERE.

4. How does manifoldness issue from Unity? Unity
is everywhere; for there is no place where it is not;
therefore it fills everything'. By Him exists manifold- j
ness; or rather, it is by Him that all things exist. If the -
One were only everywhere, He would simply be all
things; but, as, besides. He is nowhere, all things exist;
by Him, because He is everywhere; but simultaneously
all things are distinct from Him, because He is nowhere. I
Why then is Unity not only everywhere, but also no- j
where? The reason is, that Unity must be above all ■
things, He must fill everything, and produce every-
thing, without being all that He produces.

THE SOUL RECEIVES HER FORM FROM
INTELLIGENCE.

5. The soul's relation to intelligence is the same
as that of sight to the visible object; but it is the inde-
terminate sight which, before seeing, is nevertheless
disposed to see and think; that is why the soul bears
to intelligence the relation of matter to form.

WE THINK AN INTELLECTUAL NATURE BY
THINKING OURSELVES.

6. When we think, and think ourselves, we see a
thinking nature; otherwise, we would be dupes of an
illusion in believing we were thinking. Consequently,
if we think ourselves, we are, by thinking ourselves,
thinking an intellectual nature. This thought presup-
poses an anterior thought which implies no movement.
Now, as the objects of thought are being and life, there
must be, anterior to this being, another being; and
anterior to this life, another life. This is well-known
to all who are actualized intelligences. If the intelli-
gences be actualizations which consist in thinking
themselves, we ourselves are the intelligible by the real

iii.9] FRAGMENTS ABOUT THE SOUL 225

foundation of our essence, and the thought that we
have of ourselves gives us its image.

THE ONE IS SUPERIOR TO REST AND MOTION.

7. The First (or One) is the potentiality of move-
ment and of rest; consequently, He is superior to both
things. The Second principle relates to the First by
its motion and its rest; it is Intelligence, because, differ-
ing from the First, it directs its thought towards Him,
while the First does not think (because He comprises
both the thinking thing, and the thing thought) ; He
thinks himself, and, by that very thing. He is defective,
because His good consists in thinking, not in its ''hypo-
stasis" (or existence).

OF ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY.

8. What passes from potentiality to actuality, and
always remains the same so long as it exists, approaches
actuality. It is thus that the bodies such as fire may
possess perfection. But what passes from potentiality
to actuality cannot exist always, because it contains
matter. On the contrary, what exists actually, and
what is simple, exists always. Besides, what is actual
may also in certain respects exist potentially.

THE GOOD IS SUPERIOR TO THOUGHT; THE HIGH-
EST DIVINITIES ARE NOT THE SUPREME.

9. The divinities which occupy the highest rank
are nevertheless not the First; for Intelligence (from
which proceed the divinities of the highest rank, that
is, the perfect intelligences) is (or, is constituted by)
all the intelligible essences, and, consequently, com-
prises both motion and rest. Nothing like this is in the
First. He is related to nothing else, while the other
things subsist in Him in their rest, and direct their
motion towards Him. Motion is an aspiration, and the
First aspires to nothing. Towards what would He, in

226 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [13

any case, aspire? He does not think himself; and they
who say that He thinks Himself mean by it only that
He possesses Himself. But when one says that a thing
thinks, it is not because it possesses itself, it is because
it contemplates the First; that is the first actuality,
thought itself, the first thought, to which none other
can be anterior; only, it is inferior to the principle from
which it derives its existence, and occupies the second
rank after it. Thought is therefore not the most sacred
thing; consequently, not all thought is sacred; the only
sacred thought is that of the Good, and this (Good) is
superior to thought.

THE GOOD IS SUPERIOR EVEN TO SELF-CONSCIOUS-
NESS AND LIFE.

Will the Good not be self-conscious? It is claimed
by some that the Good would be good only if it pos-
sessed self-consciousness. But if it be Goodness, it is
goodness before having self-consciousness. If the Good
be good only because it has self-consciousness, it was
not good before having self-consciousness; but, on the
other hand, if there be no goodness, no possible con-
sciousness can therefore exist. (Likewise, someone
may ask) does not the First live? He cannot be said
to live, because He Himself gives life.

THE SUPREME IS THEREFORE ABOVE THOUGHT.

Thus the principle which is self-conscious, which
thinks itself (that is. Intelligence), occupies only the
second rank. Indeed, if this principle be self-conscious,
it is only to unite itself to itself by this act of conscious-
ness; but if it study itself, it is the result of ignoring
itself, because its nature is defective, and it becomes
perfect only by thought. Thought should therefore
not be attributed to the First; for, to attribute some-
thing to Him would be to imply that He had been de-
prived thereof, and needed it.

ii.2] MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENS 227

SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.

About the Movement of the Heavens.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MOVEMENTS OF THE

HEAVENS.

1. Why do the heavens move in a circle? Be- /,
cause they imitate Intelligence. But to what does this
movement belong? To the Soul, or to the body? Does
it occur because the Soul is within the celestial sphere,
which tends to revolve about her? Is the Soul
within this sphere without being touched thereby?
Does she cause this sphere to move by her own motion?
Perhaps the Soul which moves this sphere should not
move it in the future, although she did so in the past;
that is, the soul made it remain immovable, instead of
ceaselessly imparting to it a circular movement. Per-
haps the Soul herself might remain immovable; or, if
she move at all, it will at least not be a local move-
ment.

THREE KINDS OF MOVEMENT.

How can the Soul impart to the heavens a local
movement, herself possessing a different kind of
motion? Perhaps the circular movement, when con-
sidered by itself, may not seem a local movement.
If then it be a local movement only by accident,
what is its own nature, by itself? It is the reflec-
tion upon itself, the movement of consciousness,
of reflection, of life; it withdraws nothing from the
world, it changes the location of nothing, while em-

228 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [14

bracing all. Indeed, the power which governs the
universal Animal (or world) embraces everything, and
unifies everything. If then it remained immovable, it
would not embrace everything either vitally or
locally; it would not preserve the life of the interior
parts of the body it possesses, because the bodily life
implies movement. On the contrary, if it be a local
movement, the Soul will possess a movement only
such as it admits of. She will move, not only as soul,
but as an animated body, and as an animal; her move-
ment will partake both of the movement proper to the
soul, and proper to the body. Now the movement
proper to the body is to mobilize in a straight line;
the movement proper to the Soul, is to contain; while
both of these movements result in a third, the circular
movement which includes both transportation and
permanence.

FIRE MOVES STRAIGHT ONLY PRELIMINARILY.

To the assertion that the circular movement is a
corporeal movement, it might be objected that one
can see that every body, even fire, moves in a straight
line. However, the fire moves in a straight line only
till it reaches the place assigned to it by the universal
order (it constitutes the heavens, which are its proper
place) . By virtue of this order its nature is permanent,
and it moves towards its assigned location. Why then
does the fire as soon as it has arrived there, not abide
there quiescently? Because its very nature is constant
movement; if it went in a straight line, it would dis-
sipate; consequently, it necessarily possesses a circular
motion. That is surely a povidential arrangement.
Providence placed fire within itself (because it con-
stitutes the heavens, which are its location) ; so that,
as soon as it finds itself in the sky it must spontaneously
move in a circle.

11:2] MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENS 229,

WHY SOUL ASSUMES A CIRCULAR MOTION.

We might further say that, if the fire tended to move
in a straight Hne, it must effect a return upon itself
in the only place where it is possible (in the heavens),
inasmuch as there is no place outside of the world
where it could go. In fact there is no further place,
beyond the celestial fire, for itself constitutes the last
place in the universe; it therefore moves in a circle
in the place at its disposal; it is its own place, but not
to remain immovable, but to move. In a circle, the
centre is naturally immovable; and were the circum-
ference the same, it would be only an immense centre.
It is therefore better that the fire should turn around
the centre in this living and naturally organized body.
Thus the fire will tend towards the centre, not in stop-
ping, for it would lose its circular form, but in moving
itself around it; thus only will it be able to satisfy its
tendency (towards the universal Soul). However, if
this power effect the movement of the body of the
universe, it does not drag it like a burden, nor give
it an impulsion contrary to its nature. For nature is
constituted by nothing else than the order established
by the universal Soul. Besides, as the whole Soul is
everywhere, and is not divided into parts, it endows
the sky with all the ubiquity it can assimilate, which
can occur only by traversing all of it. If the Soul re-
mained immovable in one place, she would remain
immovable as soon as the- heavens reached this place;
but as the Soul is everywhere, they would seek to reach
her everywhere. Can the heavens never reach the
Soul? On the contrary, they reach her ceaselessly;
for the Soul, in ceaselessly attracting them to herself,
endues them with a continual motion by which she
carries them, not towards some other place, but to-
wards herself, and in the same place, not in a straight
line, but in a circle, and thus permits them to possess
her in all the places which she traverses.

230 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [14

WHY THE HEAVENS DO NOT REMAIN STILL.
The heavens would be immovable if the Soul rested,
that is, if she remained only in the intelligible world,
where everything remains immovable. But because
the Soul is in no one determinate place, and because
the whole of her is everywhere, the heavens move
through the whole of space; and as they cannot go
out of themselves, they must move in a circle.

HOW OTHER BEINGS MOVE, i

2. How do the other beings move? As none of
them is the whole, but only a part, consequently, each
finds itself situated in a particular place. On the con-
trary, the heavens are the whole; they constitute the
place which excludes nothing, because it is the universe.
As to the law according to which men move, each of
them, considered in his dependence towards the uni-
verse, is a part of all; considered in himself, he is a
whole.

WHY THE HEAVENS MOVE IN A CIRCLE.

Now, if the heavens possess the Soul, wherever they
are, what urges them to move in a circle? Surely be-
cause the Soul is not exclusively in a determinate place
(and the world does not exclusively in one place desire
to possess her). Besides, if the power of the Soul
revolve around the centre, it is once more evident that
the heavens would move in a circle.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CENTRE OF THE SOUL

AND THE BODY.

Besides, when we speak of the Soul, we must not
understand the term "centre" in the same sense as
when it is used of the body. For the Soul, the centre
is the focus of (the intelligence) whence radiates a
second life (that is, the Soul) ; as to the body, it is a

ii.2] MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENS 231

locality (the centre of the world). Since, however,
both soul and body need a centre, we are forced to use
this word in an analogous meaning which may suit
both of them. Speaking strictly, however, a centre
can exist only for a spherical body, and the analogy
consists in this, that the latter, like the Soul, effects a
reflection upon itself. In this case, the Soul moves '^
around the divinity, embraces Him, and clings to Him
with all her might; for everything depends from Him. j
But, as she cannot unite herself to Him, she moves \
around Him.

THE ADDITION OF OUR BODIES INTRODUCES
CONFLICTING MOTIONS.

Why do not all souls act like the universal Soul?
They do act like her, but do so only in the place
where they are. Why do our bodies riot move in a
circle, like the heavens? Because they include an
element whose natural motion is rectilinear; because
they trend towards other objects, because the spherical
element^ in us can no longer easily move in a circle,
because it has become terrestrial, while in the celestial
region is was light and movable enough. How indeed
could it remain at rest, while the Soul was in motion,
whatever this movement was? This spirit (ual body)
which, within us, is spread around the soul, does the
same thing as do the heavens. Indeed, if the divinity
be in everything, the Soul, which desires to unite herself
to Him, must move around Him, since He resides in
no determinate place. Consequently, Plato attributes
to the stars, besides the revolution which they perform
in common with the universe, a particular movement
of rotation around their own centre. Indeed, every
star, in whatever place it may be, is transported with
joy while embracing the divinity; and this occurs not
by reason, but by a natural necessity.

232 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [14

HOW MOTION IS IMPARTED TO LOWER EXISTENCES.

3. One more subject remains to be considered.
The lowest power of the universal Soul (the inferior
soul),^ rests on the earth, and thence radiates abroad
throughout the universe. The (higher, or celestial)
power (of the world-Soul) which, by nature, pos-
sesses sensation, opinion, and reasoning, resides in the
celestial spheres, whence it dominates the inferior
power, and communicates life to it. It thereby moves
the inferior power, embracing it in a circle; and it
presides over the universe as it returns (from the
earth) to the celestial spheres. The inferior power,
being circularly embraced by the superior power, re-
flects upon itself, and thus operates on itself a con-
version by which it imparts a movement of rotation
to the body within which it reacts. (This is how
motion starts) in a sphere that is at rest: as soon as a
part moves, the movement spreads to the rest of it,
and the sphere begins to revolve. Not otherwise is
our body; when our soul begins to move, as in joy, or
in the expectation of welfare, although this movement
be of a kind very different from that natural to a body,
this soul-movement produces local motion in the body.
Likewise the universal Soul, on high, while approach-
ing the Good, and becoming more sensitive (to its
proximity), thereby impresses the body with the
motion proper to it, namely, the local movement.
(Our own human) sense- (faculty), while receiving its
good from above, and while enjoying the pleasures
proper to its nature, pursues the Good, and, inasmuch
as the Good is everywhere present, it is borne every-
where. The intelligence is moved likewise; it is simul-
taneously at rest and in motion, reflecting upon itself.
Similarly the universe moves in a circle, though simul-
taneously standing still.

1 This paragraph interrupts in the Timaeus, C79. 3 The
the argument. 2 Plato's spirit inferior soul, see ii. 3.18.

iii.4] OF OUR INDIVIDUAL GUARDIAN 233

THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.
Of Our Individual Guardian.

OUTLINE OF NATURES IN THE UNIVERSE.

Other principles remain unmoved while producing
and exhibiting their (''hypostases," substantial acts,
or) forms of existence. The (universal) Soul, how-
ever, is in motion while producing and exhibiting her
(''substantial act," or) forms of existence, namely, the
functions of sensation and growth, reaching down as
far as (the sphere of the) plants. In us also does the
Soul function, but she does not dominate us, constitut-
ing only a part of our nature. She does, however,
dominate in plants, having as it were remained alone
there. Beyond that sphere, however, nature begets
nothing; for beyond it exists no life, begotten (matter)
being lifeless. All that was begotten prior to this was
shapeless, and achieved form only by trending towards
its begetting principle, as to its source of life. Conse-
quently, that which is begotten cannot be a form of
the Soul, being lifeless, but must be absolute in de-
termination. The things anterior (to matter, namely,
the sense-power and nature), are doubtless indeter-
minate, but only so within their form; the are not abso-
lutely indeterminate; they are indeterminate only
in respect of their perfection. On the contrary,
that which exists at present, namely, (mattter),
is absolutely indeterminate. When it achieves perfec-
tion, it becomes body, on receiving the form suited to

234 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [15

its power. This (form) is the receptacle of the prin-
ciple which has begotten it, and which nourishes it.
It is the only trace of the higher things in the body,
which occupies the last rank amidst the things below.

AFTER DEATH, MAN BECOMES WHAT HE HAS LIVED.

\ 2. It is to this (universal) Soul especially that may
I be applied these words of Plato :^ 'The general Soul
I cares for all that is inanimate." The other (individual)
I souls are in different conditions. 'The Soul (adds
Plato), circulates around the heavens successively as-
suming divers forms"; that is, the forms of thought,
sense or growth. The part which dominates in the soul
fulfills its proper individual function; the others remain
inactive, and somehow seem exterior to them. In man,
it is not the lower powers of the soul that dominate.
They do indeed co-exist with the others. Neither is it I
always the best power (reason), which always domin- *
ates; for the inferior powers equally have their place.
Consequently, man (besides being a reasonable being)
is also a sensitive being, because he possesses sense-
organs. In many respects, he is also a vegetative
being; for his body feeds and grows just like a plant.
All these powers (reason, sensibility, growth), there-
fore act together in the man ; but it is the best of them
that characterizes the totality of the man (so that he
is called a "reasonable being"). On leaving the body
' the soul becomes the power she had preponderatingly
developed. Let us therefore flee from here below, and
let us raise ourselves to the intelligible world, so as not
to fall into the pure sense-life, by allowing ourselves
to follow sense-images, or into the life of growth, by
abandoning ourselves to the pleasures of physical love,
and to gormandizing; rather, let us rise to the intel-
ligible world, to the intelligence, to the divinity!

iii.4] OF OUR INDIVIDUAL GUARDIAN 235

LAWS OF TRANSMIGRATION.
Those who have exercised their human faculties are
re-born as men. Those who have made use of their
senses only, pass into the bodies of brutes, and par-
ticularly into the bodies of wild animals, if they have
yiedled themselves to the transports of anger; so that,
even in this case, the difference of the bodies they
animate is proportioned to the difference of their in-
clinations. Those whose only effort it was to satisfy
their desires and appetites pass into the bodies of
lascivious and gluttonous animals.^ Last, those who
instead of following their desires or their anger, have
rather degraded their senses by their inertia, are re-
duced to vegetate in plants; for in their former exist-
ence they exercised nothing but their vegetative power,
and they worked at nothing but to make trees of
themselves.^ Those who have loved too much the
enjoyments of music, and who otherwise lived purely,
"pass into the bodies of melodious birds. Those who
have reigned tyrannically, become eagles, if they have
no other vice.^ Last, those who spoke lightly of
celestial things, having kept their glance directed up-
wards, are changed into birds which usually fly towards
the high regions of the air.^ He who has acquired
civil virtues again becomes a man; but if he does not
possess them to a sufficient degree, he is transformed
into a sociable animal, such as the bee, or other animal
of the kind.

OUR GUARDIAN IS THE NEXT HIGHER FACULTY
OF OUR BEING.

3. What then is our guardian? It is one of the
powers of our soul. What is our divinity? It is also
one of the powers of our soul. (Is it the power which
acts principally in us as some people think? ) For the
power which acts in us seems to be that which leads
us, since it is the principle which dominates in us. Is

236 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [iS

that the guardian to which we have been allotted dur-
ing the course of our life?'^ No: our guardian is the
power immediately superior to the one that we ex-
ercise, for it presides over our life without itself being
active. The power which is active in us is inferior to
the one that presides over our life, and it is the one
■ which essentially constitutes us. If then we live on
.' the plane of the sense-life, our guardian is reason; if
i we live on the rational plane, our guardian will be the
I principal superior to reason (namely, intelligence) ;
it will preside over our life, but it itself does not act,
leaving that to the inferior power. Plato truly said
that "we choose our guardian"; for, by the kind of life
that we prefer, we choose the guardian that presides
over our life. Why then does He direct us? He
directs us during the course of our mortal life (because
he is given to us to help us to accomplish our (destiny) ; J
but he can no longer direct us when our destiny is ac- ;
complished, because the power over the exercise of]
which he presided allows another power to act in his
place (which however is dead, since the life in which
it acted is terminated). This other power wishes to
act in its turn, and, after having established its pre- .
ponderance, it exercises itself during the course of a 1
new life, itself having another guardian. If then we
should chance to degrade ourselves by letting an in- j
ferior power prevail in us, we are punished for it. ^
Indeed, the evil man degenerates because the power
which he has developed in his life makes him descend
to the existence of the brute, by assimilating him to it
by his morals. If we could follow the guardian who
is superior to him, he himself would become superior
by sharing his life. He would then take as guide a part
of himself superior to the one that governs him, then
another part, still more elevated until he had arrived
at the highest. Indeed, the soul is several things, or
rather, the soul is all things; she is things both inferior

iii.4] OF OUR INDIVIDUAL GUARDIAN 237

and superior; she contains all the degrees of life. Each
of us, in a certain degree, is the intelligible world; by
our inferior part we are related to the sense-world,
and by our superior part, to the intelligible world; we
remain there on high by what constitutes our intelligible
essence; we are attached here below by the powers
which occupy the lowest rank in the soul. Thus we
cause an emanation, or rather an actualization which
implies no loss to the intelligrble, to pass from the in-
telligible into the sense-world.

THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DESCEND; IT IS THE
SENSE-WORLD THAT RISES.

4. Is the power which is the act of the soul always
united to a body? No; for when the soul turns to-
wards the superior regions, she raises this power with
her. Does the universal (Soul) also raise with herself
to the intelligible world the inferior power which is
her actualization (nature)? No: for she does not
incline towards her low inferior portion, because she
neither came nor descended into the world; but, whila
she remains in herself, the body of the world comes to
unite with her, and to offer itself to receive her light's
radiation; besides, her body does not cause her any
anxiety, because it is not exposed to any peril. Does
not the world, then, possess any senses? *'It has no
sight" (says Plato^) ''for it has no eyes. Neither has it
ears, nostrils, nor tongue." Does it, then, as we, pos-
sess the consciousness of what is going on within it?
As, within the world, all things go on uniformly ac-
cording to nature, it is, in this respect, in a kind of
repose; consequently, it does not feel any pleasure.
The power of growth exists within it without being
present therein; and so also with the sense-power. Be-
sides, we shall return to a study of the question. For
the present, we have said all that relates to the ques-
tion in hand.

238 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [l5

THE GUIDANCE OF THE GUARDIAN DOES NOT
INTERFERE WITH MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.

5. But if (before coming on to the earth) the soul
chooses her hfe and her guardian, how do we still
preserve our liberty? Because what is called ''choice"
designates in an allegorical manner the character of
the soul, and her general disposition everywhere.
Again, it is objected that if the character of the soul
preponderate, if the soul be dominated by that part
which her former life rendered predominantly active,
it is no longer the body which is her cause of evil; for
if the character of the soul be anterior to her union
with the body; if she have the character she has
chosen; if, as said (Plato), she do not change her
guardian, it is not here below that a man may become
\ good or evil. The answer to this is, that potentially
\ man is equally good or evil. (By his choics) however
j he may actualize one or the other.

THE SOUL HAS THE POWER TO CONFORM TO HER
CHARACTER THE DESTINY ALLOTED TO HER.

What then would happen if a virtuous man should
have a body of evil nature, or a vicious man a body of
a good nature? The goodness of the soul has more
or less influence on the goodness of the body. Ex-
terior circumstances cannot thus alter the character
chosen by the soul. When (Plato) says that the lots
are spread out before the souls, and that later the dif-
ferent kinds of conditions are displayed before them,
and that the fortune of each results from the choice
made amidst the different kinds of lives present — a
choice evidently made according to her character —
(Plato) evidently attributes to the soul the power of
conforming to her character the condition allotted to
her.

iii.4] OF OUR INDIVIDUAL GUARDIAN 239

OUR GUARDIAN IS BOTH RELATED TO US. AND
INDEPENDENT OF US.

Besides, our guardian is not entirely exterior to us;
and, on the other hand, he is not bound to us, and is
not active in us; he is ours, in the sense that he has a
certain relation with our soul; he is not ours, in the
sense that we are such men, living such a life under his
supervision. This is the meaning of the terms used
(by Plato) in the Timaeus.^ If these be taken in the
above sense, all explains itself; if not, Plato contradicts
himself.

OUR GUARDIAN HELPS US TO CARRY OUT THE
DESTINY WE HAVE CHOSEN.

One can still understand thus why he says that our
guardian helps us to fulfil the destiny we have chosen.
In fact, pesiding over our life, he does not permit us to
descend very far below the condition we have chosen.
But that which then is active is the principle below the
guardian and which can neither transcend him, nor
equal him; for he could not become different from
what he is.

THAT MAN IS VIRTUOUS WHOSE HIGHEST PRIN-
CIPLE IS ACTIVE WITHIN HIM.

6. Who then is the virtuous man? He in whom
is active the highest part of the soul. If his guardian
contributed to his actions, he would not deserve being
called virtuous. Now it is the Intelligence which is
active in the virtuous man. It is the latter, then, who
is a guardian, or lives according to one; besides, his
guardian is the divinity. Is this guardian above Intel-
ligence? Yes, if the guardian have, as guardian, the
principle superior to Intelligence (the Good). But why
does the virtuous man not enjoy this privilege since the
beginning? Because of the trouble he felt in falling
into generation. Even before the exercise of reason,

240 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [iS

he has within him a desire which leads him to the
things which are suitable to him. But does this desire
direct with sovereign influence? No, not with sover-
eignty; for the soul is so disposed that, in such circum-
stances becoming such, she adopts such a life, and
follows such an inclination.

BETWEEN INCARNATIONS IS THE TIME OF JUDG-
MENT AND EXPIATION.

(Plato) says that the guardian leads the soul to the
hells,^^ and that he does not remain attached to the
same soul, unless this soul should again choose the
same condition. What does the guardian do before
this choice? Plato teaches us that he leads the soul to
judgment, that after the generation he assumes again!
the same form as before; and then as if another exist-
ence were then beginning, during the time between'
generations, the guardian presides over the chastise-
ments of the souls, and this period is for them not so
much a period of life, as a period of expiation.

EVEN THE SOULS ENTERING INTO ANIMAL
BODIES HAVE A GUARDIAN.

Do the souls that enter into the bodies of brutes also!
have a guardian ? Yes, doubtless, but an evil or stupid,
one.

CONDITION OF SOULS IN THE HIGHER REGIONS.

What is the condition of the souls that have raised
themselves on high? Some are in the sensible world,
others are outside of it. The souls that are in the
sense-world dwell in the sun, or in some other planet,!
or in the firmament, according as they have more or[
less developed their reason. We must, indeed, remem-
ber that our soul contains in herself not only the in-
telligible world, but also a disposition conformable tc^
the Soul of the world. Now as the latter is spread ou^

m.4] OF OUR INDIVIDUAL GUARDIAN 241

in the movable spheres and in the immovable sphere
by her various powers, our soul must possess powers
conformable to these, each of which exercise their
proper function. The souls which rise from here below
[into the heavens go to inhabit the star which harmon-
izes with their moral life, and with the power which
they have developed; with their divinity, or their
guardian. Then they will have either the same guard-
ian, or the guardian which is superior to the power
which they exert. This matter will have to be con-
sidered more minutely.

FATE OF THE DIVISIBLE HUMAN SOUL.

As to the souls which have left the sense-world, so
!ong as they remain in the intelligible world, they are
ibove the guardian condition, and the fatality of gener-
ition. Souls bring with them thither that part of their
lature which is desirous of begetting, and which may
•easonably be regarded as the essence which is divisible
n the body, and which multiplies by dividing along
vith the bodies. Moreover, if a soul divide herself,
t is not in respect to extension; because she is entirely
n all the bodies. On the other hand, the Soul is one;
ind from a single animal are ceaselessly born many
^oung. This generative element splits up like the
vegetative nature in plants; for this nature is divisible
n the bodies. When this divisible essence dwells in
he same body, it vivifies the body, just as the vegeta-
ive power does for plants. When it retires, it has
ilready communicated life, as is seen in cut trees, or
n corpses where putrefation has caused the birth of
fi.yeral animals from a single one. Besides, the vege-
ative power of the human soul is assisted by the vege-
ative power that is derived from the universal (Soul),
:nd which here below is the same (as on high).

242 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [15

FATE CONSISTS IN THE UNPREDICTABLE CIRCUM-
STANCES WHICH ALTER THE LIFE-CURRENTS.

If the soul return here below, she possesses, accord-
ing to the life which she is to lead, either the same
guardian, or another. With her guardian she enters
into this world as if in a skiff. Then she is subjected to
the power (by Plato) called the Spindle of Necessity;^^
and, embarking in this world, she takes the place as-
signed to her by fortune. Then she is caught by the
circular movement of the heavens, whose action, as if
it were the wind, agitates the skiff in which the soul is
seated; or rather, is borne along. Thence are born
varied spectacles, transformations and divers incidents
for the soul which is embarked in this skiff; whether
because of the agitation of the sea which bears it, or
because of the conduct of the passenger who is sailing
in the bark, and who preserves her freedom of action
therein. Indeed, not every soul placed in the same
circumstances makes the same movements, wills the
same volitions, or performs the same actions. For]
different beings, therefore, the differences arise from!
circumstances either similar or different, or even the
same events may occur to them under different circum-,
stances. It is this (uncertainty) that constitutes
Providence.

1 In his Phaedrus. C246. 7 piato, Rep. x. p. 617-620.

2 Plato. Phaedo. C- i. 242. 8 in the Timaeus. 9 C90.

3 Plato. Tim. C77. 4 piato. lo phaedo, p. 107, c. i. p. 300.
Rep. X. p. 291. 5 Plato, Tim. n Rep. x. 616, p. 234.

91. 6 The text is very difficult.

i.9] OF SUICIDE 243

FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.
Of Suicide.

EVIL EFFECTS OF SUICIDE ON THE SOUL HERSELF.

1. (As says pseudo-Zoroaster, in his Magic
Oracles), "The soul should not be expelled from the
body by violence, lest she go out (dragging along with
her something foreign," that is, corporeal). In this
case, she will be burdened with this foreign element
whithersoever she may emigrate. By "emigrating," I
mean passing into the Beyond. On the contrary, one
should wait until the entire body naturally detaches
itself from the soul; in which case she no longer needs
to pass into any other residence, being completely un-
burdened of the body.

HOW TO DETACH THE SOUL FROM THE BODY

NATURALLY.

How will the body naturally detach itself from the
soul? By the complete rupture of the bonds which
keep the soul attached to the body, by the body's
impotence to fetter the soul, on account of the com-
plete destruction of the harmony which conferred this
power on it.

VOLUNTARY SOUL-DETACHMENT IS FORBIDDEN.

One may not voluntarily disengage oneself from the
fetters of the body. When violence is employed, it is
not the body which disengages itself from the soul,

244 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [16

it is the soul which makes an effort to snatch herself
from the body, and that by an action which accom-
plishes itself not in the state of impassibility (which
suits a sage), but as the result of grief, or suffering, or
of anger. Now such an action is forbidden, or un-
worthy.

SUICIDE UNAVAILABLE EVEN TO AVOID INSANITY^

May one not forestall delirium or insanity, if one
become aware of their approach? To begin with,
insanity does not happen to a sage, and if it does, this
accident should be considered one of those inevitable
things which depend from fatality, and in which case
one should direct one's path less according to his in-
trinsic quality than according to circumstances; for
perhaps the poison one might select to eject the soul
from the body might do nothing but injure the soul.

SUICIDE IS UNADVISABLE. FOR TWO REASONS.

If there be an appointed time for the life of each"
of us, it is not well to forestall the decree of Prov-
idence, unless, as we have said,^ under absolute com-
pulsion.

Last, if rank obtained above depend on the state;
obtaining at the time of exit from the body, no man
should separate himself from it so long as he might
still achieve progress.^

1 In i. 2.8. 16. 2 See ii. 9.18.

ii.6] OF ESSENCE AND BEING 245

SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK SIX.
Of Essence and Being.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND BEING.

1. Is "essence" something different from ''being"?
Does essence indicate an abstraction of the other (four
categories), and is being, on the contrary, essence with
the other (four categories), motioa and rest identity
and difference? Are these the' elements of being? "Yes:
**being" IS the totality of these things, of which one is
essence, the other is motion, and so forth. Motion,
therefore, is accidental essence. Is it also accidental
**being? " Or is it being completely? Motion is being,
because all intelligible things are beings. But why is.
not each of the sense-things a being? The reason is, \
flTat on high all things form only a single group of
totality, while here below they are distinct one from
another because they are images that have been dis-
tinguished. Likewise, in a seminal (reason), all things
are together, and each of them is all the others; the .
hand is not distinct from the head; while, on the con- |
trary, in a body all the organs are separate, because
thy are images instead of being genuine beings. *

DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPLEMENTS OF BEING.

AND QUALITIES.

We may now say that, in the intelligible world, qual-
ities are the characteristic differences in being or es-
sence. These differences effect distinction between the

246 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [17

beings; in short, they cause them to be beings. This
definition seems reasonable. But it does not suit the
qualities below (in the sense-world) ; some are differ-
ences of being, as biped, or quadruped (as thought
Aristotle) ;^ others are not differences, and on that very
account are called qualities. Still, the same thing may
•appear a difference when it is a complement of the
being, and again it may not seem a difference when it
is not a complement of the being, but an accident: as,
for instance, whiteness is a complement of being in a
\ swan, or in white lead ; but in a human being like you,
I it is only an accident (as thought Aristotle). ^ So long
I as the whiteness is in the (''seminal) reason," it is a
■1 complement of being, and not a quality; if it be on the
surface of a being, it is a quality.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENTIAL AND MODAL

QUALITIES.

Two kinds of qualities must be distinguished; the
essential quality, which is a peculiarity of its being,
and the mere quality, which affects the being's classi-
fication. The mere quality introduces no change in
the essence, and causes none of its characteristics to
disappear; but, when the being exists already, and is
complete, this quality gives it a certain exterior dis-
position; and, whether in the case of a soul or body,
adds something to it. Thus visible whiteness, which is
of the very being of white lead, is not of the being of
the swan, because a swan may be of some color other
than white. Whiteness then completes the being of
white lead, just as heat completes the being of fire.
If igneousness is said to be the being of fire, white-
ness is also the being of white lead. Nevertheless,
the igneousness of the visible fire is heat, which con-
stitutes the complement of its being; and whiteness
plays the same part with respect to white lead. There-
"fore (differing according to the difference of various

ii.6] OF ESSENCE AND BEING 247

beings) the same things will be complements of being,
and will not be qualities, or they will not be comple-
ments of being, and will be qualities; but it would not
be reasonable to assert that these qualities are different
according to whether or not they are complements of
being, since their nature is the same.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHATNESS AND AFFEC-
TIONS OF BEING.

We must acknowledge that the reasons which pro-
duce these things (as heat, and whiteness) are beings,
if taken in their totality; but on considering their pro-
duction, we see that what constitutes a whatness or
quiddity (the Aristotelian ''what it were to be") in the
intelligible world, becomes a quality in the sense-
world. Consequently, we always err on the subject of
the quiddity, when we try to determine it, mistaking
the simple quality for it (as thought Plato), ^ for, when
we perceive a quality, the fire is not what we call fire,
but a being. As to the things which arrest our gaze,
we should distinguish them from the quiddity, and
define them by the qualities of sense (objects) ; for they
do not constitute the being, but the affections of being.

ACTUALIZED BEING LESS PERFECT THAN ESSENCE.

We are thus led to ask how a being can be com-
posed of non-beings? It has already been pointed
out that the things subject to generation could not be
identical with the principles from which they proceed.
Let us now add that they could not be beings. But
still, how can one say that the intelligible being is con-
stituted by a non-being? The reason is that in the
[intelligible world since being forms a purer and more
(refined essence, being really is somelTow constituted
by the differences of essence; or rather, we feel it
ought to be called being from considering it together
with its energies (or, actualizations). This being seems

248 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [17

to be a perfecting of essence; but perhaps being is less
perfect when it is thus considered together with its
actualizations; for, being less simple, it veers away
from essence.

SUCHNESS IS LATER THAN BEING AND QUIDDITY.

2. Let us now consider what quality in general is;
for when we shall know this, our doubts will cease.
First, must it be admitted that one and the same thing
is now a quality, and then a complement of being?
Can one say that quality is the complement of being,
or rather of such a being? The suchness of being Im-
plies a previously existing being and quiddity.

BEING CANNOT PRECEDE SUCH BEING.

Taking the illustration of fire, is it "mere being"
before it is "such being?" In this case, it would be
a body. Consequently, the body will be a being; fire
will be a hot body. Body and heat combined will not
constitute being; but heat will exist in the body as in
you exists the property of having a stub nose (as said
Aristotle).^ Consequently, if we abstract heat, shine
and lightness, which seem to be qualities, and also
impenetrability, nothing will remain but tridimensional
extension, and matter will be "being." But this hy-
pothesis does not seem likely; it is rather form which
will be "being."

FORM IS NOT A QUALITY; BUT A REASON.

Is form a quality? No: form is a reasoru Now
what is constituted by (material) substance, and rea-
son? (In the warm body) it is neither what burns, i
nor what is visible; it is quality. If, however, it be said
that combustion is an act emanating from reason,
that being hot and white are actualities, we could not
find anything to explain quality.

i.6] OF ESSENCE AND BEING 249

QUALITIES ARE ACTS OF BEING, PROCEEDING FROM
REASONS AND ESSENTIAL POTENTIALITIES.

What we call a complement of being should not be
termed a quality, because they are actualizations of
being, actualizations which proceed from the reasons
ind the essential potentialities. Qualities are therefore
lomething outside of being; something which does not
it times seem to be, and at other times does not seem
(lot to be qualities; something which adds to being
something that is not necessary; for example, virtues
and vices, ugliness and beauty, health, and individual
resemblance. Though triangle, and tetragon, each
considered by itself, are not qualities; yet being "trans-
formed into triangular appearance" is a quality; it is
not therefore triangularity, but triangular formation,
which is a quality. The same could be said of the arts
and professions. Consequently, quality is a dispo-
sition, either adventitious or original, in already exist-
ing beings. Without it, however, being would exist
just as much. It might be said that quality is either
mutable or immutable; for it forms two kinds, accord-
ing to whether it be permanent or changeable.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN? INTELLIGIBLE AND
SENSE-QUALITY.

3. The whiteness that I see in you is not a quality,
but an actualization of the potentiality of whitening.
In the intelligible world all the things that we call qual-
ities are actualizations. They are called qualities be-
cause they are properties, because they differentiate
the beings from each other, because in respect to them-
selves they bear a particular character. But since
quality in the sense-world is also an actualization, in
what does it differ from the intelligible quality? The
sense-quality does not show the essential quality of
every being, nor the difference or character of sub-

250 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [17

stances, but simply the thing that we properly call
quality, and which is an actualization in the intelligible
world. When the property of something is to be a
being, this thing is not a quality. But when reason
separates beings from their properties, when it removes
nothing from them, when it limits itself to conceiving
and begetting different from these beings, it begets
quality, which it conceives of as the superficial part of
being. In this case, nothing hinders the heat of the fire,
so far as it is natural to it, from constituting a form, an
actualization, and not a quality of the fire; it is a
quality when it exists in a substance where it no longer
constitutes the form of being, but only a trace, an
adumbration, an image of being, because it finds itself
separated from the being whose actualization it is.

QUALITIES ARE ACCIDENTAL SHAPES OF BEING.

Qualities, therefore, are everything that, instead of
being actualizations and forms of beings, are only its
accidents, and only reveal its shapes. We will there-
fore call qualities the habituations and the dispositions
which are not essential to substances. The archetypes
(or models) of qualities are the actualizations of the
beings, which are the principles of these qualities. It
is impossible for the same thing at one time to be, and,
at another not to be a quality. What can be separated
from being is quality; what remains united to being is
being, form, and actualization. In fact, nothing can
be the same in itself, and in some other condition where
it has ceased to be form and an actualization. What,
instead of being the form of a being, is always its
accident, is purely and exclusively a quality.

1 As thought Aristotle, Met. Letter 7, 343. "* As said Aris-
V. 14. 2 As thought Aristotle, totle. Met. vii. 5.
Met. V. 30. 3 As thought Plato,

V.7] IDEAS OF INDIVIDUALS 251

FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN.
Do Ideas of Individuals Exist?

TWO POSSIBLE HYPOTHESES OF IDEAS OF
INDIVIDUALS.

1. Do ideas of individuals (as well as of classes
Df individuals), exist? This means that if I, in com-
pany with some other man, were to trace ourselves
back to the intelligible world, we would there find
separate individual principles corresponding to each of
js. (This might imply either of two theories.) Either, ;
f the individual named Socrates be eternal, and if the
;;oul of Socrates be Socrates himself, then the soul of i
iach individual is contained in the intelligible world. I
Or if, on the contrary, the individual named Socrates !
!3e not eternal, if the same soul can belong successively
:o several individuals, such as Socrates or Pythagoras,
hen (as Alcino.ous, e. g., and other Platonists insist),
iach indiviHuaTdoes not have his idea in the intelligible
vorld.

THE FIRST (NON-PLATONIC) HYPOTHESIS ALONE

RIGHT.

If the particular soul of each man contains ("sem- JM /
nal) reasons" of all the things she does, then each (' \ I
ndividual corresponds to his idea in the intelligible
v^orld, for we admit that each soul contains as many
'"seminal) reasons" as the entire world. In this case,
he soul would contain not only the ("seminal) rea-
ons" of men but also those of all animals, the nuniFer
)f these reasons will be infinite, unless (as the Stoics

Ill

252 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [18

teach) the world does not re-commence the identical
series of existences in fixed periods; for the only means
of limiting the infinity of reasons, is that the same
things should reproduce themselves.

DIFFERENCE OF THINGS DEPEND ON THEIR

SEMINAL REASONS. j|

/ But, if produced things may be more numerous than
[ their specimens, what would be the necessity for the
''reasons" and specimens of all individuals begotten
during some one period? It would seem that the
(idea of) the "man himself" to explain the existence
of all men, and that the souls of a finite number of
them could successively animate men of an infinite
number. (To this contention we demur: for) it is
impossible for different things to have an identical
(''seminal) reason." The (idea of) the man himself
would not, as model, suffice (to account) for men
who differ from each other not only by matter, but
also by specific differences. They cannot be com-
pared to the images of Socrates which reproduce their
model. Only the difference of the ( "seminal) re_a-:
sons" could give rise to individual differences. (As^
Plato said),^ the entire period contains all the ("sem-
inal) reasons." When it recommences, the same
things 7earise through the same "reasons." We need
not fear that, as a consequence, there would be an
infinite (number or variety) of them in the intelligible
world; for the multitude (of the seminal reasons) con-
stitutes an indivisible principle from which each issues-
forth whenever active.

SEX ALONE WOULD NOT ACCOUNT FOR THIS
DIVERSITY.

2. (First objection) : The manner in which the
("seminal) jeasons" of the male and female unite, in
the act of generation, suffices to account for the divers-

V.7] IDEAS OF INDIVIDUALS 253

ity of individuals, without implying that each of them
possesses its own (''seminal) reason." The gener-
ating principle, the male, for eaxmple, will not prop-
agate according to different ("seminal) reasons,"
since it possesses all of them, but only according to its
own, or those of its father. Since it possesses all of
the (''seminal) reasons," nothing would hinder it from
begetting according to different "jceasons," only, there
are always some which are more disposed to act than
are others.

EXPLANATION OF THE DIVERSITY FROM SAME

PARENTS.

(Second objection) : Please explain how differing
individuals are born from the same parents. This
diversity, if it be anything more than merely apparent,
depends on the manner in which the two generating
principles concur in the act of generation; at one time
the male predominates, at other times, the female;
again, they may both act equally. In either case, the
("seminal) reason" is given in its entirety, and domin-
ates the matter furnished by either of the generating
principles.

VARIETY MAY DEPEND ON THE LATENCY OF PART
OF SEMINAL REASONS.

(Third objection) : What then is the cause of the
difference of the individuals conceived in some other
place (than the womb, as in the mouth), (as Aristotle^
and Sextus Empiricus^ asked) ? Would it arise from
matter being penetrated by the ("seminal) reason" in
differing degrees? In this case, all the individuals,
except one, would be beings against nature (which, of
course, is absurd). The varieties of the individuals are
a principle of beauty; consequently, form cannot be
one of them; ugliness alone should be attributed to
the predominance of matter. In the intelligible world,

254 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [18

the (''seminal) reasons" are perfect, and they are not
given aiiy less entirely for being hidden.

LEIBNITZ'S DOCTRINE OF THE INDISCERNIBLES.

(Fourth objection): Granting that the (''s^rftinaD^
reasons" of the individuals are different, why shoulcf
there be as many as there are individuals which achieve
existence in any one period? It is possible that iden-
tical ''reasons" might produce individuals differing in
external appearance; and we have even granted that
this may occur when the ("seminal) reasons" are
given entirely. It is asked, is fhrs""possTbTe'when
the same "reasons" are developed? We teach thatj
I absolutely similar things might be reproduced in dif-j

I ferent periods; but, within the same period, there h
\ nothing absolutely identical.

THERE ARE DIFFERENT IDEAS FOR TWINS.
BRETHREN. OR WORKS OF ART.

3. (Fifth objection) : But how could ("seminal'
reasons" be different in the conception of twms, ah(
iiT the act of generation in the case of animals who
procreate multiple offspring? Here it would seem that
when the individuals are similar, there could be but one
single "reason," No so; for in that case there would
not be so many "reasons" as there are individuals;
and, on the contrary, it will have to be granted that
there are as many as there are individuals that differ
by specific differences, and not by a mere lack of form.
Nothing therefore hinders us from admitting that there
are different "reasons," even for animal offspring
which show no difference, if there were such. An artist
/ who produces similar works cannot produce this resem-

I I blance without introducing in it some difference which
f ! depends on reasoning; so that every work he produces
j i differs from the others, because he adds some difference
* : to the similarity. In nature, where the difference does

V.7] IDEAS OF INDIVIDUALS 255

not derive from reasoning, but only from differing
(''seminal) reasons" the (individual) difference will
have to be added to the specific form, even though we
may not be able to discern it. The (''seminal) reason"
would be different if generation admitted chance as to
quantity (the number of offspring begotten). But
if the number of things to be born is determinate, the ^
quantity will be limited by the evolution and develop- 1
ment of all the "reasons," so that, when the series of |
all things will be finished, another period may recom-
mence. The quantity suitable to the world, and the
number of beings who are to exist therein, are things
regulated and contained in the principle which contains
all the "reasons" (that is, the universal Soul), from
the very beginning.

1 Phaedros C1.217. 2 de Gen. An. 4.2. 3 Adv. Math. 5.102 p.
355.

256 WORKS OR PLOTINOS [19

FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.

Concerning Virtue.

VIRTUE THE ROAD TO ESCAPE EVILS.

1. Man must flee from (this world) here below
(for two reasons) : because it is the nature of the soul
to flee from evil, and because inevitable evil prevails
and dominates this world here below. What is this
flight (and how can we accomplish it)? (Plato), ^'
tells us it consists in "being assimilated to divinity."
This then can be accomplished by judiciously conform-
ing to justice, and holiness; in short, by virtue.

CAN THESE VIRTUES BE ASCRIBED TO THE

DIVINITY?

If then it be by virtue that we are assimilated (to
divinity), does this divinity to whom we are trying to
achieve assimilation, Himself possess virtue? Besides,
what divinity is this? Surely it must be He who must
most seem to possess virtue, the world-Soul, together
with the principle predominating in her, whose wisdom
is most admirable (supreme Intelligence) — for it is
quite reasonable that we should be assimilated to Him.
Nevertheless, one might, unreflectingly, question
whether all virtues might suit this divinity; whether,
for instance, moderation in his desires, or courage
could be predicated of Him; for, as to courage, nothing
can really harm Him, and He therefore has nothing
to fear; and as to moderation, no pleasant object whose
presence would excite His desires, or whose absence
would in Him awaken regrets, could possibly exist.
But inasmuch as the divinity, just as we ourselves,

i.2] CONCERNING VIRTUE 257

aspires to intelligible things, He is evidently the source
of our gracious sanity and virtues. So we are forced
to ask ourselves, ''Does the divinity possess these
virtues? "

HOMELY VIRTUES ASSIMILATE US TO DIVINITY
ONLY PARTIALLY.

It would not be proper to attribute to Him the
homely (or, civil) virtues, such as prudence, which
''relates to the rational part of our nature"; courage,
which "relates to our irascible part"; temperance,
which consists of the harmonious consonance of our
desires and our reason; last, of justice, which "con-
sists in the accomplishment by all these faculties
of the function proper to each of them," "whether
to commnd, or to obey," (as saia Plato^). But
if we cannot become assimilated to the divinity by
these homely virtues, that process must demand
similarly named virtues of a superior order. However,
these homely virtues would not be entirely useless to
achieve that result, for one cannot say that while prac-
tising them one does not at all resemble the divinity as
they who practise them are reputed to be godlike.
These lower virtues do therefore yield some resem-
blance to the divinity, but complete assimilation can
result only from virtues of a higher order.

THE DIVINE NEED NOT POSSESS THE LOWER VIR-
TUES BY WHICH WE ARE ASSIMILATED TO HIM.

Virtues, even if they be not homely, are therefore
ultimately ascribed (to the divinity). Granting
that the divinity does not possess the homely vir-
tues, we may still become assimilated to Him by other
virtues for with virtues of another order the case might
differ. Therefore, without assimilating ourselves
to the divinity by homely virtues we might neverthe-
less by means of virtues which still are ours, become
assimilated to the Being which does not possess virtue.

258 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [19

This may be explained by an illustration. When a
body is warmed by the presence of fire, the fire itself
need not be heated by the presence of another fire. It
might be argued that there was heat in the fire, but
a heat that is innate. Reasoning by analogy, the
virtue, which in the soul is only adventitious, is innate
in Him from whom the soul derives it by imitation;
(in other words, the cause need not necessarily possess
the same qualities as the effect).

Our argument from heat might however be ques-
tioned, inasmuch as the divinity really does possess
virtue, though it be of a higher nature. This observa-
vation would be correct, if the virtue in which the soul
participates were identical with the principle from
which she derives it. But there is a complete oppo-
. . sition; for when we see a house, the sense-house is not
y identical with the intelligible House, though possessing
. resemblance thereto. Indeed, the sense-house partici-
\ jl pates in order and proportion, though neither order,
proportion, nor symmetry could be attributed to the
. idea of the House. Likewise, we derived from the
\ divinity order, proportion and harmony, which, here
■ I below, are conditions of virtue, without thereby imply-
I ing that the divinity Himself need possess order, pro-
I portion, or harmony. Similarly, it is not necessary that
' He possess virtue, although we become assimilated to
Him thereby. i

Such is our demonstration that human assimilation '
to the divine Intelligence by virtue does not (neces-
sarily imply) (in the divine Intelligence itself) pos-
session of virtue. Mere logical demonstration thereof
is not, however, sufficient; we must also convince.

THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF RESEMBLANCE.

2. Let us first examine the virtues by which we are i
assimilated to the divinity, and let us study the identity
between our soul-image which constitutes virtue, and

.2] CONCERNING VIRTUE 259

mpreme Intelligence's principle which, without being
nrtue, is its archetype. There are two kinds of re-
jemblance: the first entails such identity of nature as
exists when both similar things proceed from a same
Drinciple; the second is that of one thing to another
^hich precedes it, as its principle. In the latter case,
:here is no reciprocity, and the principle does not re-
semble that which is inferior to it; or rather, the re-
semblance must be conceived entirely differently. It
loes not necessitate that the similar objects be of the
same kind; it rather implies that they are of different
cinds, inasmuch as they resemble each other differently.

HOW HOMELY VIRTUES MAY ASSIMILATE MAN TO

THE SUPREME.

(It is difficult to define) what is virtue, in general
3r in particular. To clear up the matter, let us con-
sider one particular kind of virtue: then it will be easy
:o determine the common essence underlying them all.

The above-mentioned homely virtues really render
3ur souls gracious, and improve them, regulating and
iTioderating our appetities, tempering our passions, de-
ivering us from false opinions, limiting us within just
Dounds, and they themselves must be determined by
some kind of measure. This measure given to our
souls resembles the form given to matter, and the pro-
portion of intelligible things; it is as it were a trace of
vvhat is most perfect above. What is unmeasured,
being no more than formless matter, cannot in any
i\vay resemble divinity. The greater the participation
in form, the greater the assimilation to the formless;
md the closer we get to form, the greater the partici-
pation therein. Thus our soul, whose nature is nearer
to divinity and more kindred to it than the body is,
thereby participates the more in the divine, and in-
:reases that resemblance enough to make it seem that
the divinity is all that she herself is. Thus arises the

260 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [19

deception, which represents her as the divine divinity,
as if her quahty constituted that of the divinity. Thus
are men of homely virtues assimilated to the divinity.

PLATO DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE HOMELY
AND THE HIGHER VIRTUES.

3. We will now, following (Plato), ^ speak of an-
other kind of assimilation as the privilege of a higher
virtue. We will thus better understand the nature of
homely virtues, and the higher virtues, and the differ-
ence between them. Plato is evidently distinguishing
two kinds of virtues when he says that assimilation t(
the divinity consists in fleeing from (the world) her(
below; when he adds the qualification "homely" to
, the virtues relating to social life; and when in anotheij
j place he asserts^ that all virtues are processes of puri-j
I fication; and it is not to the homely virtues that ha
* attributes the power of assimilating us to the divinity.

HOW VIRTUES PURIFY.

How then do the virtues purify? How does thi^
process of purification bring us as near as possible to
j the divinity? So long as the soul is mingled with the
body, sharing its passions and opinions, she is evil.
She becomes better, that is, she acquires virtues, only
when, instead of agreeing with the body, she thinks
by herself (this is true thought, and constitutes pru-
dence) ; when she ceases to share its passions (in other
words, temperance) ; when she no longer fears separa-
tion from the body (a state called courage) ; and last,
when reason and intelligence can enforce their com-
mand (or justice).

SELF-CONTROL IS ASSIMILATION TO THE DIVINITY,

We may therefore unhesitatingly state that the re-
semblance to the divinity lies in such regulation, in re-

|i.2] CONCERNING VIRTUE 261

laining; impassible while thinking intelligible things;
|for what is pure is divine and the nature of the divine
action is such that whatever imitates it thereby pos-
sesses wisdom. But it is not the divinity that pos-
sesses such a disposition, for dispositions are the pro-
perty of souls only. Besides, the soul does not think
intelligible objects in the same manner as the divinity;
what is contained in the divinity is contained within us
in a manner entirely different, or even perhaps is not
at all contained. For instance, the divinity's thought
is not at all identical with ours; the divinity's thought is
a primary principle from which our thought is derived
and differs. As the vocal word is only the image of h, ^
the interior reason^ of the soul, so also is the word U ^
of the soul only the image of the Word of a superior '^ ^
principle; and as the exterior word, when compared to
the interior reason of the soul, seems discrete, or
divided, so the reason of the soul, which is no more
than the interpreter of the intelligible word, is discrete,
in comparison with the latter. Thus does virtue be-
long to the soul without belonging either to absolute
Intelligence, nor to the Principle superior to Intelli-
gence.

PURIFICATION PRODUCES CONVERSION; AND
VIRTUE MAKES USE OF THIS.

4. Purification may be either identical with the
above-defined virtue, or virtue may be the result of
purification. In this case, does virtue consist of the
actual process of purification, or in the already purified
condition? This is our problem here.

The process of purification is inferior to the already
purified condition; for purity is the soul's destined goal.
(Negative) purity is mere separation from extraneous
things; it is not yet (positive) possession of its prize.
If the soul had possessed goodness before losing her

262 WORKS OF PLOTINOS

purity, mere purification would be sufficient; and even
in this case the residuum of the purification would be I
the goodness, and not the purification. What is the ■
residuum? Not goodness; otherwise, the soul would
not have fallen into evil. The soul therefore possesses
the form of goodness, without however being able to
remain solidly attached thereto, because her nature
permits her to turn either to the good, or the evil. The
good of the soul is to remain united to her sister intel-
ligence; her evil, is to abandon herself to the contrary
things. After purifying the soul, therefore, she must
be united to the divinity; but this implies turning her
towards -Him. Now this conversion does not begin to
occur after the purification, but is its very result. The
virtue of the soul, therefore, does not consist in her
conversion, but in that which she thereby obtains. This
■ is the intuition of her intelligible object; its image pro-
duced and realized within herself; an image similar to
that in the eye, an image which represents the things
seen. It is not necessary to conclude that the sou! did
not possess this image, nor had any reminiscence
thereof; she no doubt possessed it, but inactively,
latently, obscurely. To clarify it, to discover her pos-
■: I sessions, the soul needs to approach the source of all
j I clearness. As, however, the soul possesses only the
j images of the intelligibles, without possessing the in-
telligibles themselves, she will be compelled to com-
pare with them her own image of them. Easily does
the soul contemplate the intelligibles, because the in-
telligence is not foreign to her; when the soul wishes
to enter in relations with them, all the soul needs to
do is to turn her glance towards them. Otherwise, the
intelligence, though present in the soul, will remain
foreign to her. This explains how all our acquisitions
of knowledge are foreign to us (as if non-existent),
while we fail to recall them.

i.2] CONCERNING VIRTUE 263

THE LIMIT OF PURIFICATION IS THAT OF THE
SOUL'S SELF-CONTROL.

5. The limit of purification decides to which (of
the three hypostases of) divinity the soul may hope
to assimilate and identify herself; therefore we shall
have to consider that limit. To decide that would be
to examine the limit of the soul's ability to repress
anger, appetites, and passions of all kinds, to triumph
over pain and similar feelings — in short, to separate
her from the body. This occurs when, recollecting
herself from the various localities over which she had,
as it were, spread herself, she retires within herself;
when she estranges herself entirely from the passions,
when she allows the body only such pleasures as are
necessary or suitable to cure her pains, to recuperate
from its fatigues, and in avoiding its becoming im-
portunate; when she becomes insensible to sufferings;
or, if that be beyond her power, in supporting them
patiently, and in diminishing them by refusing to share
them; when she appeases anger as far as possible, even
suppressing it entirely, if possible; or at least, if that be
impossible, not participating therein; abandoning to
the animal nature all unthinking impulses, and even so
reducing to a minimum all reflex movements; when
she is absolutely inaccessible to fear, having nothing
left to risk; and when she represses all sudden move-
ments, except nature's warning of dangers. Evidently,
the purified soul will have to desire nothing shameful.
In eating and drinking, she will seek only the satis-
faction
wil
wil

every unconsidered tendency, or even in remaining
within the involuntary flights of f ancy*

264 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [19

THE INFLUENCE OF REASON IS SUGGESTIVE.
In short, the soul will be pure from all these pas-
sions, and will even desire to purify our being's ir-
rational part so as to preserve it from emotions, or
at least to moderate their number and intensity, and
to appease them promptly by her presence. So would
a man, in the neighborhood of some sage, profit
thereby, either by growing similar to him, or in re-
fraining from doing anything of which the sage might
disapprove. This (suggestive) influence of reason
will exert itself without any struggle; its mere presence
will suffice. The inferior principle will respect it to
the point of growing resentful against itself, and re-
proaching itself for its weakness, if it feel any agita-
tion which might disturb its master's repose.

THE GOAL OF PURIFICATION IS SECOND DIVINITY.

INTELLIGENCE.

6. A man who has achieved such a state no longer
commits such faults; for he has become corrected.
But his desired goal is not to cease failing, but to
be divine. In case he still allows within himself the
occurrence of some of the above-mentioned unreflect-
ing impulses, he will be simultaneously divinity and
guardian, a double being; or rather, he will contain a
principle of another nature (Intelligence), whose virtue
will likewise differ from his. If, however, he be not
troubled by any of those motions, he will be wholly
divine; he will be one of those divinities ''who (as
Plato said)^ form the attending escort of the First."
It is a divinity of such a nature that has come down
from above to dwell in us. To become again what one
was originally, is to live in this superior world. He
who has achieved that height dwells v/ith pure Intel-
ligence, and assimilates himself thereto as far as pos-
sible. Consequently, he feels none of those emotions,
nor does he any more commit any actions, which

i.2] CONCERNING VIRTUE 265

would be disapproved of by the superior principle who
henceforth is his only master,

THE HIGHER VIRTUES MERGE INTO WISDOM.

For such a being the separate virtues merge. For
him, wisdom consists in contemplating the (essences)
possessed by Intelligence, and with which Intelligence
is in contact. There are two kinds of wisdom, one
being proper to intelligence, the other to the soul;
only in the latter may we speak of virtue. In the In-
telligence exists only the energy (of thought), and its
essence. The image of this essence, seen here below
in a being of another nature, is the virtue which eman-
ates from it. In Intelligence, indeed, resides neither
absolute justice, nor any of those genuinely so-called
virtues; nothing is left but their type. Its derivative
in the soul is virtue; for virtue is the attribute of an
individual being. On the contrary, the intelligible be-
longs to itself only, and is the attribute of no particular
being.

INCARNATE JUSTICE IS INDIVIDUAL; IF ABSOLUTE.
IT IS INDIVISIBLE.

Must justice ever imply multiplicity if it consist in
fulfilling its proper function? Surely, as long as it
inheres in a principle with several parts (such as a
human soul, in which several functions may be dis-
tinguished) ; but its essence lies in the accomplishment
of the function proper to every being, even when in-
hering in a unitary principle (such as Intelligence).
Absolute and veritable Justice consists in the self-
directed action of an unitary Principle, in which no
parts can be distinguished.

THE HIGHER FORMS OF THE VIRTUES.

I!i this higher realm, justice consists in directing the
action of the soul towards intelligence; temperance is

266 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [19

the intimate conversion of the soul towards intelli-
gence; courage is the (suggestive fascination) or im-
passibility, by which the soul becomes similar to that
which it contemplates; since it is natural for intelH-
gence to be impassible. Now the soul derives this
impassibility from the virtue which hinders her from
sharing the passions of the lower principle with which
she is associated.

EVEN THE LOWER VIRTUES ARE MUTUALLY

RELATED.

7. Within the soul the virtues have the same inter-
connection obtaining within Intelligence between the
types superior to virtue. For Intelligence, it is thought
that constitutes wisdom and prudence; conversion
towards oneself is temperance; the fulfillment of one's
proper function is justice, and the intelligence's per-
severance in remaining within itself, in maintaining
itself pure and separated from matter, is analogous to
courage. To contemplate intelligence will therefore,
for the soul, constitute wisdom and prudence, which
then become virtues, and no longer remain mere in-
tellectual types. For the soul is not identical with the
essences she thinks, as is intelligence. Similarly, the
other soul-virtues will correspond to the superior types.
It is not otherwise with purification, for since every
virtue is a purification, virtue exacts preliminary puri-
fication; otherwise, it would not be perfect.

THE HIGHER VIRTUES IMPLY THE LOWER; BUT
NOT CONVERSELY.

The possessor of the higher virtues necessarily pos-
sesses the potentiality for the inferior virtues; but the
possessor of the lower does not, conversely, possess
the higher. Such are the characteristics of the virtuous
man.

i.2] CONCERNING VIRTUE 267

PRUDENCE TO DECIDE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE
TO POSSESS VIRTUES UNSYMMETRICALLY?

(Many interesting questions remain). Is it possible
for a man to possess the higher or lower virtues in ac-
complished reality, or otherwise (merely theoreti-
cally) ? To decide that, we would have individually to
examine each, as, for example, prudence. How could
such a virtue exist merely potentially, borrowing its
principles from elsewhere? What would happen if
one virtue advanced naturally to a certain degree, and
another virtue to another? What would you think
of a temperance which would moderate certain (im-
pulses), while entirely suppressing others? Similar
questions might be raised about other virtues, and the
arbiter of the degree to which the virtues have attained
would have to be prudence.

THE HOMELY VIRTUES MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED
BY DIVINE DISCONTENT.

No doubt, under certain circumstances, the virtuous
man, in his actions, will make use of some of the
lower, or homely virtues; but even so he will supple-
ment them by standards or ideas derived from higher
virtues. For instance, he will not be satisfied with a
temperance which would consist in mere moderation,
but he will gradually seek to separate himself more
and more from matter. Again, he will supplement the
life of a respectable man, exacted by common-sense
homely virtues; he will be continually aspiring
higher, to the life of the divinities; for our effort at
assimilation should be directed not at mere respect-
ability, but to the gods themselves. To seek no more
than to become assimilated to respectable individuals
would be like trying to make an image by limiting one-
self to copying another image, itself modelled after

268 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [19 ^

another image (but not copying the original). The
assimilation here recommended results from taking as
model a superior being.

1 Theataetus, C2,132. 2 Rgp^ the word "logos," which means
iv. E3,434. 3 Theataetus, 176. both reason and word. 6 Plato,
4 Plato, Phaedo, 69. 5 Pun on Phaedrus. 246.

i.3] MEANS OF RAISING THE SOUL 269

FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK: THREE.

Of Dialectic, or the Means of Raising the Soul to the
Intelligible World.

SEARCH FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF DIVINITY SUCH
THAT THE DEMONSTRATION ITSELF WILL DEIFY.

1. What method, art or study will lead us to the
goal we are to attain, namely, the Good, the first
Principle, the Divinity,^ by a demonstration which itself
can serve to raise the soul to the superior world?

METHODS DIFFER ACCORDING TO INDIVIDUALS;
BUT THERE ARE CHIEFLY TWO.

He who is to be promoted to that world should know
everything, or at least, as says (Plato), ^ he should be
as learned as possible. In his first generation he should
have descended here below to form a philosopher, a
musician, a lover. That is the kind of men whose
nature makes them most suitable to be raised to the
intelligible world. But how are we going to raise
them? Does a single method suffice for all? Does
not each of them need a special method? Doubtless.
There are two methods to follow: the one for those
who rise to the intelligible world from here below,
and the other for those who have already reached
there. We shall start by the first of these two
methods; then comes that of the men who have
already achieved access to the intelligible world, and
who have, so to speak, already taken root there. Even

270 'WORKS OF PLOTINOS [20

these must ceaselessly progress till they have reached
the summit; for one must stop only when one has
reached the supreme term.

RETURN OF THE SOUL OF THE PHILOSOPHER.

MUSICIAN AND LOVER.

The latter road of progress must here be left aside
(to be taken up later ),3 to discuss here fully the first,
explaining the operation of the return of the soul to
the intelligible world. Three kinds of men offer them-
selves to our examination : the philosopher, thejrnusic-
ian, and the lover, These three "must cfearly be"^ dis-
tinguished, beginning by determining the nature and
character of the musician.

HOW THE MUSICIAN RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE

WORLD.

The musician allows himself to be easily moved by
beauty, and admires it greatly; but he is not able by
himself to achieve the intuition of the beautiful. He
needs the stimulation of external impressions. Just
as some timorous being is awakened by the least noise,
the musician is sensitive to the beauty of the voice and
of harmonies. He avoids all that seems contrary to
the laws of harmony and of unity, and enjoys rhythm
and melodies in instrumental and vocal music. After
these purely sensual intonations, rhythm and tunes, he
will surely in them come to distinguish form from
matter, and to contemplate the beauty existing in their
. proportions and relations. He will have to be taught
I that what excites his admiration in these things, is their
I intelligible harmony, the beauty it contains, and, in
short, beauty absolute, and not particular. He will
have to be introduced to philosophy by arguments that
will lead him to recognize truths that he ignored, though
he possessed them instinctively. Such arguments will
be specified elsewhere.^

i.3] MEANS OF RAISING THE SOUL 271

HOW THE LOVER RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE.

2. The musician can rise to the rank of the lover,
and either remain there, or rise still higher. But the
lover has some reminiscence of the beautiful; but as
here below he is separated (from it, he is incapable of
clearly knowing what it is). Charmed with the beauti-
ful objects that meet his views, he falls into an ecstasy.
He must therefore be taught not to content himself
with thus admiring a single body, but, by reason, to
embrace all bodies that reveal beauty; showing him
what is identical in all, informing him that it is some-
thing alien to the bodies, which comes from elsewhere,
and which exists even in a higher degree in the objects
of another nature; citing, as examples, noble occupa-
tions, and beautiful laws. He will be shown that beauty
is found in the arts, the sciences, the virtues, all of
which are suitable means of familiarizing the lover with
the taste of incorporeal things. He will then be made
to see that beauty is one, and he will be shown the
element which, in every object, constitutes beauty.
From virtues he will be led to progress to intelligence
and essence, while from there he will have nothing else
to do but to progress towards the supreme goal.

HOW THE PHILOSOPHER RISES TO THE
INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.

3. The philosopher is naturally disposed to rise to
the intelligible world. Borne on by light wings, he
rushes thither without needing to learn to disengage
himself from sense-objects, as do the preceding men.
His only uncertainty will concern the road to be fol-
lowed, all he will need will be a guide. He must there-
fore be shown the road; he must be helped to detach
himself entirely from sense-objects, himself already
possessing, as he does, the desire, being since a long
while already detached therefrom by his nature. For
this purpose he will be invited to apply himself to

. 272 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [20

mathematics, so as to accustom him to think of in-
corporeal things, to believe in their existence. Being j
desirous of instruction, he will learn them easily; as,
by his nature, he is already virtuous, he will need no
more than promotion to the perfection of virtue. After
mathematics, he will be taught dialectics, which will
perfect him.

WHAT DIALECTICS IS.

4. What then is this dialectics, knowledge of which
must be added to mathematics? It is a science which
makes us capable of reasoning about each thing, to say
what it is, in what it differs from the others, in what
it resembles them, where it is, whether it be one of the
beings, to determine how many veritable beings there
are, and which are the objects that contain nonentity
instead of veritable essence. This science treats also
of good and evil; of everything that is subordinated
to (being), the Good, and to its contrary; of the
nature of what is eternal, and transitory. It treats of
each matter scientifically, and not according to mere
opinion. Instead of wandering around the sense-world,
it establishes itself in the intelligible world; it concen-
trates its whole attention on this world, and after having
saved our soul from deceit, dialectics "pastures our
soul in the meadow of truth,''^ (as thought Plato).
Then it makes use of the Platonic method of division
to discern ideas, to define each object, to rise to the
several kinds of essences^ (as thought Plato) ; then,
by thought concatenating all that is thence derived,
dialectics continues its deductions until it has gone
, through the whole domain of the intelligible. Then,
I- by reversing, dialectics returns to the very Principle
i from which first it had started out."^ Resting there,
because it is only in the intelligible world that it can
find rest, no longer needing to busy itself with a multi-
tude of objects, because it has arrived at unity, dia-

1.3] MEANS OF RAISING THE SOUL 273

lectics considers its logic, which treats of propositions
and arguments. This logic is an art subordinate to
dialectics just as writing is subordinate to thought. In
logic, dialectics recognizes some principles as necessary,
and others as constituting preparatory exercises. Then,
along with everything else, subjecting these principles
to its criticism, it declares some of them useful, and
others superfluous, or merely technical.

DIALECTICS IS THE HIGHEST PART OF PHILOSOPHY.

5. Whence does this science derive its proper prin-
ciples? Intelligence furnishes the soul with the clear
principles she is capable of receiving. Having dis-
covered and achieved these principles, dialectics puts
/their consequences in order. Dialectics composes, and
divides, till it has arrived at a perfect intelligence of
things; for according to (Plato), ^ dialectics is the
purest application of intelligence and wisdom. In this
case, if dialectics be the noblest exercise of our faculties,
it must exercise itself with essence and the highest ob-
jects. Wisdom studies existence, as intelligence studies
that which is still beyond existence (the One, or the
Good). But is not philosophy also that which is most
eminent? Surely. But there is no confusion between
philosophy and dialectics, because dialectics is the high-
est part of philosophy. It is not (as Aristotle thought)
merely an instrument for philosophy, nor (as Epicurus
thought) made up of pure speculations and abstract
jrules. It studies things themselves, and its matter is
the (real) beings. It reaches them by following a
method which yields reality as well as the idea. Only
accidentally does dialectics busy itself with error and
sophisms. Dialectics considers them alien to its mis-
sion, and as produced by a foreign principle. When-
ever anything contrary to the rule of truth is advanced,
dialectics recognizes the error by the light of the truths
it contains. Dialectics, however, does not care for

274 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [20

propositions, which, to it, seem only mere groupings
of letters. Nevertheless, because it knows the truth,
dialectics also understands propositions, and, in general,
the operations of the soul. Dialectics knows what it is
to affirm, to deny, and how to make contrary or con-
tradictory assertions. Further, dialectics distinguishes
differences from identities, grasping the truth by an
intuition that is as instantaneous as is that of the
senses; but dialectics leaves to another science, that
enjoys those details, the care of treating them with
exactness.

THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY
CROWNED BY DIALECTICS.

6. Dialectics, therefore, is only one part of philos-
ophy, but the most important. Indeed, philosophy has
other branches. First, it studies nature "(in physrcsy,
therein employing dialectics, as the other arts employ
arithmetic, though philosophy owes far more to dia-
lectics. Then philosophy treats of morals, and here
again it is dialectics that ascertains the principles; ethics
limits itself to building good habits thereon, and to
propose the exercises that shall produce those good
habits. The (Aristotelian) rational virtues also owe to
dialectics the principles which seem to be their char-
acteristics; for they chiefly deal with material things
(because they moderate the passions). The other
virtues^ also imply the application of reason to the
passions and actions which are characteristic of each
of them. However, prudence applies reason to them
in a superior manner. Prudence deals rather with the
universal, considering whether the virtues concatenate,
and whether an action should be done now, or be de-
ferred, or be superseded by another^ ^ (as thought Aris-
totle). Now it is dialectics, or its resultant science of
wisdom which, under a general and immaterial form,
furnishes prudence with all the principles it needs.

i.3] MEANS OF RAISING THE SOUL 275

WITHOUT DIALECTICS LOWER KNOWLEDGE WOULD

BE IMPEREECT.

Could the lower knowledge not be possessed with-
out dialectics or wisdom? They would, at least, be
imperfect and mutilated. On the other hand, though
the dialectician, that is, the true sage, no longer need
these inferior things, he never would have become
such without them; they must precede, and they in-
crease with the progress made in dialectics. Virtues are
in the same case. The possessor of natural virtues
may, with the assistance of wisdom, rise to perfect
virtues. Wisdom, therefore, only follows natural
virtues. Then wisdom perfects the morals. Rather,
the already existing natural virtues increase and grow
perfect along with wisdom. Whichever of these two
things precedes, complements the other. Natural
virtues, however, yield only imperfect views and
morals; and the best way to perfect them, is philo-
sophic knowledge of the principles from which they
depend.

1 V. LI. 2 In his Phaedrus, 262. ''' v. L ^ In his Sophist.,

Et. 266. 3 In V. LL ^ i. 3. 4, p, 253. 9 See i. 2.3-6. 10 Mor-

5, 6; i. 6. ^ In his Phaedrus, als i. 34, 35; Nicom. Eth., vi.

p. 248. 6 In his Politician, p. 8. 11

276 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [21

FOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.

How the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and
Divisible Elssence.

OUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IV. 7.

1. While studying the nature ("being") of the
soul, we have shown (against the Stoics) that she is
not a body; that, among incorporeal entities, she is
not a ''harmony" (against the Pythagoreans) ; we
have also shown that she is not an "entelechy"
(against Aristotle), because this term, as its very ety-
^•<l mology implies, does not express a true idea, and re-
^' veals nothing about the soul's (nature itself); last,
we said that the soul has an intelligible nature, and is
of divine condition; the "being" or nature of the soul
we have also, it would seem, clearly enough set forth.
Still, we have to go further. We have formerly es-
tablished a distinction between intelligible and sense
nature,' assigning the soul to the intelligible world.
Granting this, that the soul forms part of the intel-
ligibe world, we must, in another manner, study what
is suitable to her nature.

EXISTENCE OF DIVISIBLE BEINGS.

To begin with, there are (beings) which are quite
divisible and naturally separable. No one part of any
one of them is identical with any other part, nor with
the whole, of which each part necessarily is smaller
than the whole. Such are sense-magnitudes, or

iv.2] HOW THE SOUL MEDIATES 277

physical masses, of which each occupies a place apart,
without being able to be in several places simul-
taneously.

DESCRIPTION OF INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE.

On the other hand, there exists another kind of es-
sence ("being"), whose nature differs from the pre-
ceding (entirely divisible beings), which admits of no
division, and is neither divided nor divisible. This has
no extension, not even in thought. It does not need to
be in any place, and is not either partially or wholly
contained in any other being. If _we _dare_say S0i..lt
hovers simultaneously over all beings, not that it heeds
to be built up on them,^ but because it is indispensable
to the existence of all. It is ever identical with itself,
and is the common support of all that is below it. It
fs as in the circle, where the centre, remaining immov-
able in itself, nevertheless is the origin of all the radii
originating there, and drawing their existence thence.
The radii by thus participating in the existence of the
centre, the radii's principle, depend on what is in-
divisible, remaining attached thereto, though separating
in every direction. ^

BETWEEN THEM IS AN INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE WHICH
BECOMES DIVISIBLE WITHIN BODIES.

Now between entirely indivisible ("Being") which

occupies the first rank amidst intelligible beings, and
the (essence) which is entirely divisible in its sense-
objects, there is, above the sense-world, near it, and
within it, a "being" of another nature, which is not,
like bodies, completely divisible, but which, neverthe-
less, becomes divisible within bodies. Consequently,
when you separate bodies, the form within them also
divides, but in such a way that it remains entire in
each part. This identical (essence), thus becoming

278 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [21

i manifold, has parts that are completely separated from
I each other; for it then is a divisible form, such as
/ colors, and all the qualities, like any form which can
simultaneously remain entire in several things entirely
separate, at a distance, and foreign to each other be-
cause of the different ways in which they are affected.
We must therefore admit that this form (that resides
in bodies) is also divisible.

BY PROCESSION THE SOUL CONNECTS THE TWO.

Thus the absolutely divisible (essence) does not
exist alone; there is another one located immediately
beneath it, and derived from it. On one hand, this
inferior (essence) participates in the indivisibility of
its principle; on the other, it descends towards another
nature by its procession. Thereby it occupies a
position intermediary between indivisible and primary
(essence), (that is, intelligence), and the divisible (es-
sence) which is in the bodies. Besides it is not in the
same condition of existence as color and the other
qualities; for though the latter be the same in all cor-
poreal masses, nevertheless the quality in one body is
completely separate from that in another, just as
physical masses themselves are separate from each
other. Although (by its essence) the magnitude of
these bodies be one, nevertheless that which thus is
identical in each part does not exert that community
of affection which constitutes sympathy,^ because to
identity is added difference. This is the case because
identity is only a simple modification of bodies, and
'i. I "^* ^ "being." On the contrary, the nature that ap-
% proaches the absolutely indivisible "Being" is a genuine

! "being" (such as is the soul) . It is true that she unites
with the bodies and consequently divides with them;
but that hapens to her only when she communicates
herself to the bodies. On the other hand, when she

I unites with the bodies, even with the greatest and most

iv.2] HOW THE SOUL MEDIATES 279

extended of all (the world), she does not cease to be
one, although she yield herself up to it entirely.

DIVISION AS THE PROPERTY OF BODIES. BUT NOT
THE CHARACTERISTIC OF SOUL.

In no way does the unity of this essence resemble
that of the body; for the unity of the body consists in
the unity of parts, of which each is different from the
others, and occupies a different place. Nor does the
unity of the soul bear any closer resemblance to the
unity of the qualities. Thus this nature that is simul-
taneously divisible and indivisible, and that we call soul
is not one in the sense of being continuous (of which
each part is external to every other) ; it is divisible,
because it animates all the parts of the body it oc-
cupies, but is indivisible because it entirely inheres
in the whole body, and in each of its parts.^ When
we thus consider the nature of the soul, we see her
magnitude and power, and we understand how
admirable and divine are these and superior natures.
Without any extension, the soul is present throughout
the whole of extension; she is present in allocation,
though she be not present therein.^ She is simul-
taneously divided and undivided, or rather, she is never
really divided, and she never really divides; for she
remains entire within herself. If she seem to divide,
it is not in relation with the bodies, which, by virtue
of their own divisibility, cannot receive her in an
indivisible manner. Thus division is the property of
the body, but not the characteristic of the soul.

SOUL AS BOTH ESSENTIALLY DIVISIBLE AND
INDIVISIBLE.

2. Such then the nature of the soul had to be.
She could not be either purely indivisible, nor purely
divisible, but she necessarily had to be both indivisible

280 WORKS OF PLOTINOS [21

and divisible, as has just been set forth. This is fur-
ther proved by the following considerations. If the
soul, like the body, have several parts differing from
each other, the sensation of one part would not in-
volve a similar sensation in another part. Each part
of the soul, for instance, that which inheres in the
finger, would feel its individual affections, remaining
foreign to all the rest, while remaining within itself. In
short, in each one of us would inhere several managing
souls (as said the Stoics).^ Likewise, in this universe,
there would be not one single soul (the universal Soul) ,
but an infinite number of souls, separated from each
other.

POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC PREDOMINATING
PART OF THE SOUL.

Shall we have recourse to the (Stoic) "continuity of
parts''^ to explain the sympathy which interrelates all
the organs? This hypothesis, however, is useless,
unless this continuity eventuate in unity. For we
cannot admit, as do certain (Stoic) philosophers, who
deceive themselves, that sensations focus in the "pre-
dominating principle'* by "relayed transmission."^ To
begin with, it is a wild venture to predicate a "pre-
dominating principle" of the soul. How indeed could
we divide the soul and distinguish several parts therein?
By what superiority, quantity or quality are we going to
distinguish the "predominating part" in a single con-
tinuous mass? Further, under this hypothesis, we
may ask, Who is going to feel? Will it be the "pre-
dominating part" exclusively, or the other parts with
it? If that part exclusively, it will feel only so long
as the received impression will have been transmitted
to itself, in its particular residence; but if the impres:
sion impinge on some other part of the soul, which
happens to be incapable of sensation, this part will not
be able to transmit the impression to the (predomin-

iv.2] HOW THE SOUL MEDIATES 281

ating) part that directs, and sensation will not occur.
Granting further that the impression does reach the
predominating part itself, it might be received in a
twofold manner; either by one of its (subdivided)
I parts, which, having perceived the sensation, will not
trouble the other parts to feel it, which would be use-
less; or, by several parts simultaneously, and then we
will have manifold, or even infinite sensations which
will all differ from each other. For instance, the one
might say, **It is I who first received the impression";
the other one might say, "I received the imression first
received by another"; while each, except the first, will
be in ignorance of the location of the impression; or
again, each part will make a mistake, thinking that the
impression occurred where itself is. Besides, if every
part of the soul can feel as well as the predominating
part, why at all speak of a ^'predominating part?"
What need is there for the sensation to reach through
to it? How indeed would the soul recognize as an
unity the result of multiple sensations; for instance, of
such as come from the ears or eyes?

THE SOUL HAS TO BE BOTH ONE AND MANIFOLD.
EVEN ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESES.

On the other hand, if the soul were absolutely one,
essentially indivisible and one within herself, if her
nature were incompatible with manifoldness and divi-
sion, she could not, when penetrating into the body,
animate it in its entirety; she would place herself m
its centre, leaving the rest of the mass of the animal
lifeless. The soul, therefore, must be simultaneously
one and manifold, divided and undivided, and we must
not deny, as something impossible, that the soul,
though one and identical, can be in several parts of the
body simultaneously. If this truth be denied, this will
destroy the "nature that contains and administers the
universe" (as said the Stoics) ; which embraces every-

318010

282 WORKS OF^ PLOTINOS [21

thing at once, and directs everything with wisdom; aj
nature that is both manifold, because all beings are
manifold; and single, because the principle that con-
tains everything must be one. It is by her manifold
unity that she vivifies all parts of the universe, while
it is her indivisible unity that directs everything with
wisdom. In the very things that have no wisdom, the
unity that in it plays the predominating "part," imi-
tates the unity of the universal Soul. That is what
Plato wished to indicate allegorically by these divine
words^: *'From the "Being" that is indivisible and ever
unchanging; and from the "being" which becomes
divisible in the bodies, the divinity formed a mixture,
a third kind of "being." The (universal) Soul, there-
fore, is (as we have just said) simultaneously one and
manifold; the forms of the bodies are both manifold
and one; the bodies are only manifold; while the
supreme Principle (the One), is exclusively an unity.

1 See iv. 1.22. 2 See lii. 8.7. Plac. Phil. v. 21 ; Cicero, de

3 See iv. 2.2. 4 See iv. 3.19, 22, Nat. Deor. ii. 11. The "pre-

23 ; iv. 4.28. ^ See iv. 3.20-22. dominating principle" had ap-

^ Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 31-33. peared in Plato's Timaeus, p.

7 See 4.7.6, 7. » Plutarch, de 41. 9 Of the Timaeus. p. 35.

Paragraph 3, of this book (iv. 2, — 21) will be found in its
logical position — judging by the subject matter, — on pages 75 to
78, in the middle of iv. 7, — 2.

^ -:^Q > a^ 133

tFiKfi

B 693 .A4 E5 G8 v.l I.M.S

Plotinos .
Comolete V^orks

LIBRARY

Pontifical Inslituto of AAodiaeval StudtfiS

113 ST. JOSEFJ-I STREET
TORONTO, ONT., C/vMADA M5S 1J4

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Texts

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "Plotinos : complete works, in chronological order, grouped in four periods : with biography by Porphyry, Eunapius, & Suidas, commentary by Porphyry, illustrations by Jamblichus & Ammonius, studies in sources, development influence, index of subjects, thoughts and words."

See other formats